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Abstract
In this thesis I have a threefold purpose. I will attempt: (a) to present a generic
design for a tool - the Argument Support Program - which can be of use in
supporting the reasoning of archaeologists (and others especially, but not
exclusively, in the humanities); (b) I will present a model of argumentation and
debate as the theoretical orientation within which the model is developed; and, (c)
I will suggest that this approach is a natural development of several strands of
research within the artificial intelligence community. A tripartite model of
argument is presented in terms of arguers, the argument structure produced and
the argument domain or field. This model subsumes reasoning, interpretation and
argument exchange or debate. It is maintained, further, that while this model is
generally applicable, specific domains have particular styles of argument. The
notion of argument style is discussed in terms of the types of reasoning used. The
related concept of relevance in argument is discussed in terms of the specific
tokens of these types which may be used in a particular argument. It is argued
that archaeology is characterized, at least in part, by the use of argument by
analogy and argument from theoretical principles or models. A design for a generic
program - the Argument Support Program (ASP) - based on the theoretical
principles is delineated. Details of the partial implementation of the model as a
constrained debater in the domain of archaeology (ASP for archaeology or
ASParch) are presented. Example runs which illustrate how the characterizing
features of archaeology are dealt with are also presented as are examples of the
various domain and system knowledge bases needed. The application of ASPs to
other domains and areas such as literary criticism, legal reasoning and Darwinian
theory is discussed. In the final chapter, the achievements and inadequacies of
this research are summarized, possible reasons are presented for the inadequacies
in the resulting system and future directions discussed.
For Fiona
To be honest I put myself in the category of people who are best able to give form to
their ideas by arguing - I entirely subscribe to the view that truth is reached through
dispute. Left to study a question on my own, I tend to fall into a reflective state
which suits the metaphysical bent of my character and is not conducive to an
energetic, creative thought process, since it affords only emotional material with
which to construct a - more or less well-ordered - framework/or my ideas.
Andrey Tarkovsky - Sculpting in Time
All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already
within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of
departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an
argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which
arguments have their life.
Wittgenstein - On Certainty
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Preface
Parts of chapters 1,2, 3, 4 and 5 are based on material from Stutt, 1987, 1988a,
forthcoming. These reports and papers summarize aspects of the research
discussed in this thesis and have been extensively reworked for inclusion here.
Chapter 5 includes material from Stutt, 1988b. Sections 4.1 and 5.5 include
material based on Patel and Stutt, 1988, 1989. These sections summarize parts of
some joint research conducted by myself and my colleague Jitu Patel on the design
and implementation of the KJVA archaeological interpreter.
Since a thesis on argumentation imposes on its author the obligation to be
reasonably clear as to what arguments are being advanced I have adopted the
practice of summarizing the main points made in each chapter in a prefatory
argument. This practice was once common-place among writers of fiction and
non-fiction. It seems appropriate to renew it here, to the benefit, I hope, of the
reader.
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Chapter 1- Setting the scene
Argument: Argumentation is ubiquitous and innate. It has general and
domain dependent aspects. It can be beneficially represented in a
computer program. This can be illustrated using the domain of
archaeology. The objections of potential users can be overcome by the
use of such a program.
1.1 The application of artificial intelligence techniques to argumentation
'Man was born free, and is everywhere in chains of argument.' This pastiche of
Rousseau's famous words from the Social Contract serves to remind us of the
ubiquity of argument and debate. There are arguments everywhere in the media.
Ministers defend aspects of government policy in chat shows, intellectuals debate the
great moral questions in the early hours, newspaper editorials discuss matters of the
day. We engage in argument with our colleagues, our friends and of course our
spouses. Since argument and debate are everywhere, to seek an understanding of
their nature and function must be a worthwhile enterprise. There is nothing new in the
attempt to answer such questions. Logicians, rhetoricians and philosophers have long
considered aspects of argumentation. The present thesis looks at argumentation from
the point of view of the discipline of artificial intelligence (AI). Thus the emphasis is
on the representation of arguments and the knowledge of how to argue rather than on,
say, the nature of deduction or the use of certain verbal techniques to persuade. The
attempt is made to construct a model of argumentation and debate which could
feasibly be tested on a computer. This forces us to construct a model which is more
rigorous than natural language accounts but which avoids the normative strictures of
philosophical logicians. The model draws upon both a priori discussions of the nature
of argument and actually occurring arguments. This combination of rigour and realism
serves both as an illustration of the acceptable use of artificial intelligence and as a
means of clarifying certain aspects of everyday and academic arguing.
As we shall see in chapter 3, this is by no means the first attempt to deal with
argumentation using artificial intelligence techniques. The present work differs in that,
as well as producing a model of argumentation and debate, it (a) shows how this
model could be used to produce a tool to support arguers from the humanities and (b)
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shows how the model can be used to solve some of the problems posed by the need to
create viable user/expert system interfaces. Because of (a) it also differs from most
previous research in argumentation in artificial intelligence by concentrating on a
single domain.
The model depends on the fact that argumentation and debate are broadly the
same in whatever domain they are used. If this were not so, it would be difficult to
build a model which had more than passing application to more than one domain.
Consider the following. It's a quotation from Huckleberry Finn (Twain, 1987). Huck
and Jim are discussing the question of why the French don't speak English:
'... That's a Frenchman's way of saying it.'
'Well, it's a blame' ridicklous way, en I doan' want to hear no mo' about it. Deyain'
no sense in it.'
'Looky here, Jim; does a cat talk like we do?'
'No, a cat don't.'
'Well, does a cow?'
'No, a cow don't, nuther.'
'Does a cat talk like a cow, or a cow talk like a cat?'
'No, dey don't.'
'It's natural and right for 'em to talk different from each other, ain't it?'
, 'Course.'
'And ain't it natural and right for a cat and a cow to talk different from us?'
'Why, mos' sholy it is.'
Well. then. why ain't it natural and right for a Frenchman to talk different from us?
You answer me that.'
'Is a cat a man, Huck?'
'No.'
'Well, den, dey ain't no sense in a cat talkin' like a man. Is a cow a man? - er is a
cow a cat?'
'No, she ain't either of them.'
'Well, den, she ain' got no business to talk like either one er the yuther of 'em. Is a
Frenchman a man?'
'Yes.'
'Well, den! Dad blame it, why doan' he talk like a man? You answer me datI'
I see it warn't no use wasting words - you can't learn a nigger to argue. So I quit.
Arguments or informal debates have certain general characteristics which are
illustrated by the above. They are conducted in natural language, within dialogue
exchanges, are elliptical, use non-deductive inferences, are grounded in common
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sense views of the world, engage the attention of the participants, refer to whole value
systems. In fact the above dialogue exchange is conducted using two different
varieties of natural language, two different dialects. The exchange is elliptical in the
sense that not all the steps in the argument are mentioned. For example the move
from the facts about cows and cats to what is 'natural and right' for cows and cats
conceals a chain of abstruse argumentation. Huck and Jim are not disinterested. They
are engaged and stimulated by the exchange. It matters to them, even if only for a
moment, and Huck is annoyed when he is refuted by Jim. There is the question of
values and the related issue of what is common sense to the participants. In fact
Huck and Jim live in common sense worlds which only partially overlap. For Jim, but
not for Huck, it is plain common sense that Frenchmen should speak like Americans.
Huck, as revealed by the penultimate sentence, is himself under thrall to a particular
view of the world in which other men can be valued at eight hundred dollars. A view
not shared by the author, of course.
The comic irony of that penultimate sentence also expresses a truth about all of us.
We all know how to argue. We don't have to be taught how to argue any more than
we have to be taught how to talk. It is a natural consequence of our competitive
natures and the rich semantic complexity of our language that argument is both
necessary and possible. Of course we provide training for specialized forms of
argument. For philosophers, say, and lawyers. But the arguments they provide, while
perhaps more formal in their expression and more profound in their importance
nonetheless depend on the tracing or creation of a web of semantic as well as logical
interconnections between the concepts which make up a particular context of
discourse. Take the following (semi-formal) argument from Searle (1987):
Axiom 1. Brains cause minds.
Axiom 2. Syntax is not sufficient for semantics.
Axiom 3. Minds have contents; specifically, they have intentional or semantic
contents.
Axiom 4. Programs are defined purely formally, or syntactically.
Conclusion 1. Instantiating a program by itself is never sufficient for having a mind
(by Axioms 2, 3 and 4).
Conclusion 2. The way the brain functions to cause minds cannot be solely by
instantiating a program (Axiom 1 and Conclusion 1).
Conclusion 3. Any artefact that had a mind would have to have causal powers (at
least) equivalent to those of the brain (by Axiom 1, trivially).
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Conclusion 4. For any artefact that had a mind, the program by itself would not be
sufficient for having a mind. The artefact would have to have causal powers
equivalent to the brain (by Conclusions 1 and 3).
I would contend that neither Huck nor Jim would have much difficulty in following
this argument once certain technical terms such as 'axiom' had been explained. The
relations which make up a chain of argumentation are essentially the same in both
everyday arguing and in great academic debates. Searle's argument may be
expressed in a precise manner but it depends essentially on our innate capacity to
unravel skeins of interconnection rather than on the application of a body of formal
theory such as the predicate calculus.
On the other hand Huck and Jim might not have seen the point in the argument and
certainly would not have been able to produce it. They are in the position of the slave
boy in Plato's Meno (1964) by means of whom Socrates seeks to establish that we
have an innate capacity to understand mathematics. Thus, while the model is broadly
applicable to many domains, nonetheless there are differences in the sorts of
arguments which arguers produce within different domains. These include the
differences in vocabulary and the point in the argument highlighted above. There are
also differences in the sorts of inference used and the kinds of argument commonly
appealed to. More importantly there are differences (as mentioned above) in the sort
of knowledge made use of by different arguers in different domains, the common sense
or background understanding which is tacitly appealed to, the different value systems
and the particular context of an argument. For instance, the context of the Searle
argument includes many items of knowledge which would simply not have been
available to mid 19th century working class citizens of Missouri.
Thus, we cannot argue without having some knowledge about the topic we are
arguing about (though as the example of Huck and Jim given above shows this may be
fairly minimal). Given this. the approach adopted in this thesis incorporates various
kinds of knowledge. There are knowledge bases for the domain of archaeology as well
as a knowledge base which contains knowledge of how to argue. It is in this sense
that the model which will be discussed in the following chapters represents a
knowledge-based approach. As well as this, the argumentation model provides for
the fact that in arguing we often acquire knowledge. Thus argumentation depends on
knowledge and is a source of knowledge.
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While we can identify the various characteristics of arguments and debates this
thesis will only deal with some of them. This is partly for reasons of scope. A proper
analysis and simulation of the various characteristics of argument would be many
volumes long. Furthermore, some aspects of argument, for example, the relatedness
to value systems are problems which artificial intelligence may never be able to deal
with. Thus, the thesis is not about dialogue as such. Of course, as the example of
Huck and Jim shows, arguing is a form of dialogue. While this is taken account of in
the model to be presented below, the reader expecting to find a discussion of many of
the issues normally dealt with under that rubric will be disappointed. Nor does the
thesis attempt to deal with natural language issues. The generation and parsing of
natural language sentences are both research projects in themselves. It is sufficient
for the purposes of the present research that we are always aware that our approach
must be compatible with the parsers and generators used elsewhere. Furthermore
the thesis does not deal with logical issues. That is, if we mean by logical issues,
those to do with formal deductive systems. If we mean the rules which govern at
least a large part of our everyday discourses, a descriptive rather than normative
discipline, then the present research is to do with logic. On the other hand, the thesis
does deal with the means of analysing and representing arguments; of generating
arguments using domain knowledge and knowledge of how to argue; of generating
responses to arguments; of manipulating the domain knowledge using both deduction
and analogical reasoning; of making use of higher level theoretical knowledge.
1.2 The domain of archaeology
Apart from my own interest in these areas there are several good reasons for the use
of archaeology as a domain for study. In one sense of course it does not matter which
domain I use since the work is applicable to many domains as I will argue in chapter 7.
What does matter is that the designer of a knowledge based system has experience of
the domain or close and prolonged contact with someone who has such experience.
For this reason I have had to concentrate on the one domain. One which I know
something about and have access to those more knowledgeable.
Before outlining the reasons for using archaeology I must begin by saying
something about archaeology itself (see Chapter 2 for a fuller exposition of the nature
of archaeological debate). Archaeology is a wide and varied discipline. Its subject
matter ranges from the study of Neolithic earthen monuments in Southern England to
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medieval fortifications in Normandy. I shall draw my examples from many diverse
areas of archaeology although I shall concentrate on prehistory; that is, the study of
periods before the uses of written texts. In this country the delimiting date is usually
taken as the Roman Invasion of AD 43. Indiana Jones to the contrary, archaeologists
are not concerned with the discovery of long hidden exotic treasures, they are more
concerned with the precise recording of many thousands of finds in the hope of coming
to understand some small part of the culture of those who used these artifacts. It is
also important to note that archaeology is not a totally homogeneous discipline. What
discipline is? There are two broad categories and several other ways of classification.
The broad categories are into theoretical and practical archaeology. Typically the
former cogitates in a nice warm study about the discoveries made by the latter on
some wind-swept Welsh hillside with pressures from developers, the weather and
recalcitrant staff. Often however the theoretical and practical caps are worn by the
same person. The division into applied and theoretical is not as clear as in, for
example, physics. Archaeologists can also be classified depending on whether they
study a particular culture (e.g. Incas), a particular period (The Bronze Age), a
particular form of technology (Steam Engines) or use particular techniques (tree ring
dating). This heterogeneity is important since it is one of my claims that different
areas have different canons of argument. Thus what I say about archaeology will not
hold completely for the law. This distinction can also be made within a discipline. My
general conclusion is that while there are certainly areas where the canon is markedly
different there is a remarkable degree of overlap. Thus while the lawyer has a
different style of argument in defending a client compared with that of the
archaeologist in interpreting a site they both make use of many common patterns of
argument. This will also be the case within archaeology. However there will be
disputes within a sub-domain which are not even intelligible to related domains.
My reasons for using archaeology as my primary domain can be summarized as
follows:
Negative reasons
• Work on expert systems has concentrated on domains such as medicine and
electronic fault finding. However, it may be the case that much of the problem
solving in these domains can be done using algorithms which reason from first
principles. That is to say that expert systems (seen as composed of heuristic
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knowledge) are no longer needed.
• Very few AI researchers have backgrounds in arts subjects apart from
philosophy. This has meant that there has been a tendency not to apply AI
techniques in these sorts of area. This a pity since such subjects are a vital part of
any culture. Furthermore, if AI techniques are to be tested rigorously they should
be applied in many different domains.
Positive reasons
• The area of the humanities is one in which argument plays a large role. Papers
written by humanities specialists are not much concerned with empirical fact or
experiment but with theory and argument. A humanities domain thus provides a
highly suitable domain in which to test the ideas about argument.
• If AI could get a model of the processes we use in interpreting a site or in
evaluating a piece of literature it would have gone along way towards
understanding how we work in general. If it fails then this will show a limitation of
AI.
• Domains such as archaeology provide important information which fills out the
information we have from disciplines such as psychology about how humans work.
Archaeology in particular has much to say about the relation of man to material
culture and ritual activity.
• In common with other humanities, archaeology is a self-conscious discipline.
Archaeologists argue about the theories they apply. No diagnostic engineer will
argue in this way due to the relative fixity of the theoretical background. This is
important in two ways:
a) it provides a test bed for ideas about argument
b) it brings out background ideas and the relationships of these to
operational principles.
• Archaeology (and literary criticism) are conducted within various theoretical
perspectives such as postmodernism, structuralism and marxism. These
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perspectives inform the work of many other human and social scientists. AI must
have a proper response or means of accommodating such theories if only because
they are so prevalent in work in these areas. At a deeper level they must surely
contribute to the conceptual framework that these workers employ in interpreting
reality. The study of these processes in archaeology (and literary criticism) will
have much to tell AI. Albeit this thesis will only expose the tip of a very large
iceberg.
1.3 Objections to AI
In the preceding section I gave various reasons for the use of archaeology as a domain
of application for my theoretical perspective on arguing. One point not made there was
that archaeologists are fairly resistant to the use of expert systems in their discipline.
After a period in which expert systems were greeted as possibly epoch-making, a
reaction followed in which the inadequacies in the models contained within expert
systems were highlighted. The introduction of argument support programs can be
seen as a response to this reaction. I feel that it is necessary for the designer of
knowledge based systems to have a clear understanding both of the domain and of the
problems in using advanced computer systems as perceived by users in the domain.
For this reason I have concentrated on the single domain of archaeology in an attempt
to lay the fears of archaeologists to rest and in the hope that the case of archaeology
can stand as an emblem for the widespread hostility that expert systems provoke in
some while they are welcomed with open arms by others. It is often thought that the
hostility can be overcome simply by adding on more and more features. I doubt this
very much. It is not simply that the programs are felt to be inadequate (though they
are) nor that they are felt to be authoritarian (though they can be) but that their
existence changes not only accepted procedures but accepted ways of thinking. As
Weizenbaum (1976) points out the existence of AI programs changes our canons of
acceptable thinking away from judgment towards calculation. Each discipline fears
that changes will be wrought in its theoretical fabric. Perhaps the clearest example of
the effects of introducing a new technology, historically, is the case of the changes
wrought by the invention of printing. A largely oral poetical tradition and a tradition of
manuscript illustration more or less totally disappeared although prestigious
manuscripts were often illustrated by hand until the sixteenth century. Thus
resistance to AI programs need not be brought about by hide-bound conservatism or
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technological illiteracy, nor even technological inadequacy. It may represent the fear of
some that the use of such programs will lead inevitably to the withering away of
certain of our abilities. We become even more the creatures of eye and hand and less
the offspring of imagination and thought.
I have derived these objections largely from the work of Huggett and Baker from
the Research Centre for Computer Archaeology at North Staffordshire Polytechnic
(Huggett 1985, Huggett and Baker 1985, Baker 1986, Reilly 1985). These objections
and my rejoinders can be summarized as follows (H = Huggett et al., AS = Arthur
Stutt):
H: AI people use archaeology as a test-bed for ideas which are archaeologically
inadequate.
AS: I freely admit that my ideas are archaeologically inadequate. It is up to
archaeologists not to use them as they stand. I am advancing my system not for
its archaeological prowess but because of its knowledge about argumentation. As
in any other branch of science or even of the humanities argument is necessary.
H: Expert systems appear too intelligent and therefore lead to false expectations.
AS: I agree with this and hope that the necessity for my system to attempt to
convince the user of the correctness of its decisions by defending them goes some
way towards a solution. Graphical presentation techniques also reduce the risk of
easy trickery. (See chapter 5 below for a design principle based on this notion.)
H: There are the problems associated with standardizing, abstracting and
formalizing archaeological knowledge. '...the degree of formalization necessary to
construct an expert system is a form of reductionism, in that the translation of
knowledge from the implicit to the explicit will inevitably involve the loss of
elements in the process ...' (Huggett 1985:135)
AS: (a) This is true of the formalization of any domain by whatever formal method
be it mathematical or logical. The nice thing about AI formalisms is that while they
are in some ways inflexible they are perhaps more psychologically plausible than
say quadratic equations.
(b) Some gains will also accrue. Some would say that non-formal methodologies
are hardly methodologies at all. I do not share this belief since I feel that many of
the inferences we make in natural language are more subtle and creative than any
possible in a formal system. However this is again a general problem we can only
touch on.
(c) The arguing system seeks to capture the actual reasoning processes of
archaeologists (or whatever specialists). It does this by utilizing a range of logical
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and non-logical inference methods which make up the common argument style for a
domain.
H: Representing the knowledge will lead to what may be called the 'fossilization' of
a particular conceptual framework: 'The widespread and uncritical adoption of
expert systems could result in the stifling of archaeological theory, since the
encapsulation of archaeological knowledge may in fact lead to its stagnation.'
(ibid: 135)
AS: Huggett may be right about most expert system shells. However a large part
of the current research effort is in producing systems capable of automatically
changing their knowledge base or 'learning'.
H: Not all the assumptions made in reasoning are justified
AS: Huggett writes as if human experts can do this. I feel that ultimately we must
all retreat to a general (culturally determined) basis for our beliefs as well as to
the citing of authorities as the sources of our knowledge.
H: Only deductive or quasi-probabilistic reasoning is available
AS: Researchers are currently working on many other forms of reasoning. These
will soon be available as a part of commercially available products. For example,
there is work on analogy (Gentner 1983, Keane, 1988a, 1988b, Keane and
Brayshaw, 1988), on plausible reasoning (Collins 1978, Baker, Burstein and
Collins, 1987) and, on abduction (Josephson, Chandrasekaran, Smith and Tanner,
1987).
H: Archaeology is not a good domain. 'Archaeology does not seem to be the
natural candidate for the application of expert systems that some would believe.'
AS: But Doran (1977: 433) has said: 'Archaeology has clear attractions as a
problem domain for artificial intelligence research. Many of the problems of
recognition and interpretation encountered in archaeology have close parallels with
classic artificial intelligence problems, notably those of scene analysis.' There is
obviously a lot of disagreement here. My feeling is that Doran is right if only
because the domain is attractive even if some of the problems remain intractable,
as Huggett suggests.
While one of the most successful expert systems - RI - operates in a domain in
which the the knowledge is complete and unchanging there have been other systems
in less certain domains such as medical diagnosis. There is no a priori reason why an
expert system should not be possible in archaeology. An Argument Support Program
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(ASP) functions as such a system, finding plausible rather than valid arguments.
comparing arguments and finding and utilizing responses to arguments. The ideas are
drawn from a study of rhetoric and should not upset any archaeological reasoning
patterns since they must hold for all arguing. Something of the kind must be used in
any scientific or non-scientific area. Such a system is non-directive. It works as a
partner in the reasoning process and must be thought of. not as an oracle delivering its
prognostications, but as the fellow you share the office with who is always willing to
listen and attempt to refute your arguments. In this way I feel that my system is, as
Huggett requires, dictated by the domain it is arguing about rather than the other way
around.
1.4 The thesis - model, program design, program
In the pages which follow I shall present a model of argument, a design for a computer
program and a partial implementation of the design. In this section I will present a
brief summary of each in order to provide the reader with an outline of the path to be
followed before the details of the journey are encountered.
• Model
Arguments can be viewed at three levels: debates, interpretive arguments which are
deployed in debates and the argument steps which make up the interpretive
arguments. Since the term 'argument' is ambiguous I have adopted the use of the
following terminology for the three levels: argument-D. argument-I and argument-2.
While this terminology is ugly, it serves to stave off any incomprehension or
misunderstanding caused by lack of clarity in the use of the word 'argument'. An
argument-O represents a step in an argument-I. An argument-I is equivalent to an
interpretation. An argument-2 represents the on-going dialogue between two or more
participants each of whom deploys a series of argument-Is. The three levels and the
relations between these is illustrated in Figure 1.1. As the figure shows, there are
graphical equivalents for each of the three levels. In representing an argument-2, I
have concentrated on the relations between the argument-I s which constitute it. For
this reason the graphical form of the argument-2 only shows claims and grounds. The
figure illustrates how the argument-2 can be decomposed into its constituent
argument-Is and their constituent argument-Os. The expanded versions of
argument-Is (interpretations) and argument-Os (graphical toulmin structures) contain
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more information. In the body of this thesis I make extensive use of graphical
argument-Zs and toulmin structures in illustrating various points. The program to be
discussed in chapter 6 mainly uses graphical interpretations.
• argument-Os, argument steps or toulmin structures
These may be represented as in Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1979) as a series of
related propositions. An argument step is a structure which has a claim and a set
of propositions representing grounds. warrants or backing. Grounds can be related
to claims by warrants or derivation rules drawn from common sense. accepted as
conventional in the particular domain or depending on some theoretical principles
relevant to the domain. These different bodies of knowledge constitute the
backing for the warrant. The warrants which compose the relations between
propositions at the lowest level can be of many different types. I have
concentrated on deductive and analogical linkages.
The reader will note that in the toulmin structure the warrant is a branch from
the link between grounds and claim. In an interpretation. on the other hand. the
warrant is a node positioned between the grounds and the claim. Toulmin
structures are used here as Toulmin himself illustrates them. They should be read
as showing how a warrant relates grounds to claim and how backing relates
warrant to grounds and claim. The two representations are therefore equivalent.
• argument-I s or interpretations
An interpretation is taken as a tree-like structure in which a top level claim (or
claims) is supported by a series of propositions or grounds. Each of these sets
{grounds, claim} constitutes an argument-D. Each of the grounds may in turn
provide the claim for a sub-argument. The relations between the propositions are
mediated by the warrants or rules and include relations based on deduction.
analogy, causation and so on. An argument-I may be composed of a single
argument-O, Whereas, in archaeology, the argument-Is are the equivalent of
interpretations. in other domains. an argument-I might constitute. for example. a
mathematical proof. An argument-I viewed as an interpretation is the result of a
process of applying transformations to facts about a domain. The interpretation
can be seen as the elucidation of the meaning of the data.
- 12-
• argument-2s or debates
The model of argument exchange draws on two analogies: i) an argument can be
viewed as a series of moves in some game, for instance, a card game; ii) an
argument can be viewed as the exchange between two lawyers before a judge who
then gives a verdict. The former analogy is intended to capture the following facts:
(a) that an argument has moves, which are governed by rules; (b) that argument
participants take turns; and (c) that the result is usually that one of the
participants wins the argument. The latter analogy points mainly to the
assessment of an argument which we make in judging its strength and the overall
winner. Each participant has a series of turns in which claims can be attacked or
supported. An argument exchange is taken to be composed of a sequence of
argument-Is which may be spread over several turns in the argument. There are
relations of support or .il!.till between the claims of previous and subsequent
steps. An argument exchange can be represented as a graph-like structure with
argument-Is as its nodes and relations of support and attack as its edges.
A computational model of arguing or debating must also deal with the active as
well as the relatively static components mentioned above. Thus the model must
include components for the parsing, checking, generation, and assessment of
arguments as well the response to them. A satisfactory theory of response is one of
the main foci of this thesis. These active elements form part of the arguer who by
making use of domain knowledge will produce an argument as described above.
While much of this model is generally applicable to many domains I shall suggest
that archaeology is characterised by the use of two specific kinds of argument:
argument by analogy and argument from models or theory. I have thus concentrated
on these two both in terms of how they may be generated and how they might be
responded to.
• Program design
The generic Argument Support Program - ASP - and the version of the program
applicable to archaeology - ASP for archaeology (or ASParch) - designed in accord
with this model have the capacity to store and retrieve domain knowledge as well as
knowledge about how to argue. It includes procedural code for the operative
components mentioned above, declarative representations of the domain, declarative
- 13-
representations of strategic knowledge and assessment knowledge as well as frame
like structures for argument-Os, tree-like structures for argument-Is and a network
for argument-2s. An ASP (see Figure 1.2) is composed of two main modules: (a) the
argument module and (b) the underlying domain knowledge base. In terms of the
above model, the components of the argument module represent the operative
elements (the arguer). These use the system and domain knowledge to produce
argument-Is as part of an argument-2.
• The argument module
Components include control, user argument parsing, user argument checking,
system argument generation and overall argument assessment. At the heart of
the system will be the reasoner which can draw upon an inference engine to
produce or assess arguments which can be either deductive or analogical. The
system will also include a means of switching between the system and user
viewpoints, a means of updating these viewpoints and of storing them. A system
knowledge base will be required consisting of knowledge of viable next moves. An
argument net composed of frame-like nodes for storing the argument as it
proceeds will be an essential component.
In any automatic argumentation system it will be necessary for the system to
have some means of responding to the user's arguments. Rather than following a
simple algorithm, an ASP makes use of data-structures known as troublemakers
to focus the system's reasoning. These troublemakers consist of a two stage
process in which the actual response is preceded by a process of discovering faults
in the opponent's argument thus determining the contents of the response.
• The archaeological knowledge base
The knowledge base must contain knowledge about a particular sub-domain or
domains. This knowledge constitutes the factual context for any argument. Since
this is so the knowledge base must be as complete as possible so that every likely
topic is covered.
• Implementation
In the implementation the principal focus has been on the generation of responses to
user arguments and, in particular to those which make use of analogies or depend on
- 14 -
control
reasoner
Ar2ument module
Domain knowled2e
base
System
knowledge
base
Figure 1.2 - The architecture of an Argument Support Program
various theoretical viewpoints. These can be viewed as an extension to the basic set
of troublemakers. The partial implementation of the above is in terms of a constrained
arguer or debater. Here the user can act as a participant in a formal debate in which
each side has two moves. In the first move a statement for or against a particular
topic is made. In the second move that statement is either supported or the argument
of the other participant attacked. The participants take turns. This constrained
implementation allows me to illustrate clearly what I envisage happening in a full
arguer without worrying about all the processing tasks that that would involve. These
issues centre on the notion of how, in a given field, a reasonable response to an
argument is generated and how analogy and theoretical argument are dealt with. I will
present a series of examples which illustrate how the system would deal with the
archaeology specific tasks mentioned above. At the same time I suggest that these
may be generalizable to other domains. I also suggest that debate is a sub-
component of a proper free-flowing argument and that therefore, it should be possible
to defend my model on the basis of the success of the partial implementation of the
model.
The knowledge bases used are standard fact and rule knowledge bases. In the
implemented version, the system has partial knowledge about the modem Cree Indian
site described by Bonnichsen (1973), the Pueblo Indian sites described by Schiffer
(1976) and Longacre (1970) and the Wessex culture of southern England in the
Bronze Age described in Piggott (1938).
1.5 Examples
In order for the reader to get some idea of the possible use of an argument support
program, I will outline two example arguments and suggest how a computer based
system could be used. To illustrate the kind of tool I envisage I will show a) how it
might tackle an argument drawn from a newspaper article and b) how it deals with a
real example from archaeology.
1.5.1 A hypothetical example
This example serves two purposes. Firstly, for the reader whose knowledge of
archaeology is not wide, the example serves to shed light on the argumentational
aspects of the argument as opposed to its archaeological content. Secondly, the
example, lends some weight, I hope, to my general claim that the method I am
- 15·
discussing need not be confined to the archaeological domain. This example also
concentrates on the method as a technique for analysis of arguments while the second
example illustrates the functionality of an arguing machine.
The Guardian (of 21st January 1989) carried an article by Paul Fussell in which he
argues forcibly that the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were
necessary since they obviated the need for an invasion in which 'a staggering number
of Americans', 'Thousands of British assault troops' and numerous Japanese would
have lost their lives. It would be possible to analyze this article and extract all the
propositions which are contained therein and work out the various relations between
them. But for the illustration we can take the seemingly central claim that the atom
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were necessary. We can call this C. This
statement rests on the ground that otherwise a great number of human beings would
have been killed: let us call this G1. This claim could not on its own produce the
conclusion required. Even if we are not talking about strict implication here, G1 on its
own doesn't lead to C. We need at least the assumption that it is better to do
something which will kill a known number of people than to do something which may
kill a greater number of people. Let us call that 02. It might also be useful to extract
the warrant for moving from Oland 02 to C. Again this is not stated but we might
assume that it would be of the form: If better to do X than Y and the proposed action is
an X then necessary to do X. We can call this warrant W. Immediately we put the
argument this way we can see that even with Oland G2 and W we cannot derive C.
We can only derive 'It is better to do X' not 'It is necessary to do X'. Other
assumptions must be involved to produce C. Furthermore we can see that G1 cannot
stand as self-evident. A sub-argument which has 0 I as its claim and at least one
ground SGI and a warrant is needed. We might also wonder why we should accept
02. This in turn needs a sub-argument. Again we have no reason to accept the
warrant W. Thus we might require an argument which has W as a conclusion and
some grounds for this conclusion plus a warrant for deriving the grounds. Finally we
have, for this simple argument, built up a complex structure (Figure 1.3).
We should note that this structure is open-ended in that any ground or warrant
can require further support. It should be noticed that in this attempt, as in any attempt
at an analysis of what an arguer actually says, an element of interpretation is
involved. That is to say that we could have supporting arguments for the
interpretation given above which we can callll as opposed to another interpretation
- 16-
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12. Thus, not only is the argument contained in II shown to be open-ended, the
process of producing 11 is always provisional. The sort of analysis given above (which
will be elaborated upon in the body of the thesis) is something which we may do
consciously if we have been exposed to logic or informal logic. It is also something we
do naturally. We need to produce an interpretation in order to respond to the
argument. The production of interpretations is often thought to be subjective and that
logic and related techniques give an objective means of analysis. This is only so in
that they provide a means of making purely prejudicial response less possible once an
interpretation is made. There is nothing in logic or in the method given above which
ensures the correctness of the interpretation of the natural language statements of an
argument. This interpretation will always be an uncertain, plausible and provisional
process. At the same time certain elements become clearer when exposed in the
above manner. This clarity can be enhanced by a computer program which automates
the analysis by prompting the user for the necessary elements in building up an
argument.
The representation and manipulation of the hypothetical argument discussed above
would be accomplished as follows. The argument-Os would be stored as a set of
frames, argument-Is by a tree of nodes each representing an argument-O and
argument-2s by a network of linked argument-Is. Thus, for example, the above could
be represented at the lowest level by what I have called a toulmin structure, i.e. a
frame structure (Minsky, 1975) with slots for various different kinds of proposition:
name: fussell-top
claim: the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
were necessary
grounds:
(1) it is better to do something which will kill
a known number of people than to do something
which may kill a greater number of people
(2) a great number of human beings would have
been killed during invasion of japan
warrant:
If better to do X than Y and the proposed action
is an X then necessary to do X
Manipulation would include the checking of elements of the network against facts
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stored in a knowledge base by means of a reasoner which is capable of a full range of
human reasoning abilities i.e more than deduction. The argument might be displayed
as in Figure 1.4.
The system might prompt for, or search for (if input is text of whole argument), the
elements which make up the above. Similar arguments could be produced by the
system by interpreting its knowledge base (and ideally slanting this towards a
particular ideological stance). The system would be able to make use of overall
strategies and rule-like ways of responding to select an appropriate response - for
example, Figure 1.5 - and knowledge about what counts as a good argument in
assessing the strength of the current argument.
1.5.2 A real example
The following example is intended to give the reader a foretaste of what a program
based on the model and design I shall introduce in the following pages is capable of.
Similar examples will be presented in chapter 6.
The example is based on the Millie's Camp domain (Bonnichsen, 1973).
Bonnichsen describes in this paper an archaeological experiment in which
archaeologists interpret a modem Cree Indian camp and check this against the actual
use of the camp as given by Millie, the occupant. The archaeologists get some things
right but make several errors in interpretation. The paper as a whole is evidence of
the need for some means of representing and manipulating archaeological inferences
so that errors of interpretation are minimized. The particular importance of the paper
for my work is that Bonnichsen gives clearly the conclusions arrived at and the
justifications for these conclusions. The example I am concerned with here is based
on a small piece of the interpretation where it is argued that one particular activity
area (or part of a site in which significant activities were performed) is used for hide
working because of the discovery of a frame construction found in the activity area.
In my reconstruction of the example the machine acts as Bonnichsen's interpreter.
As we can see from Figure 1.6(a) (redrawn from a Macintosh™ output screen) the
system puts forward the argument that the area is used for hide working because it
has a feature (featurell) whose use is hide working. The user responds as shown in
Figure 1.6(b) by suggesting that the activity of the area is cooking because there is an
analogy to feature I I whose use is cooking. To this the machine responds in turn by
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providing a partial critique of the user's argument as shown in Figure 1.6(c) in drawing
attention to the fact that the analogy with featurel0 relied upon by the user is suspect
because it does not depend upon a salient attribute Le. the angle. The user argument
here is not derived from the Bonnichsen paper but created for the example. FeaturelO
can be thought of as a spit, that is, a construction for cooking. The hide-working frame
is also a construction but one in which the angle between it and its support is of crucial
importance.
Figure 1.6 as a whole illustrates part of the argument network which is produced
by this exchange and includes the relations between the user and system
argument-l s (although the graphical display of argument networks is presently
unimplemented). Each node in this network is similar to the hypothetical node given
for the Fussell argument above and is represented in the following way:
argl instance_of argument with
claim: (the activity of activity_area_l is cooking),
grounds: [(the analogue of featurell is featurelO),
(the use of feature!O is cooking),
(the contents of activity_area_! is feature!!)]
The most important aspect of the machine's functioning in responding to the user's
argument is a set of rules which I have called weakstatus rules. These determine
whether any of the nodes in the user's argument are weak in some way and represent
the implemented version of the first stage of the troublemakers mentioned in section
1.4. In the example given, the node which contains an analogy is identified as a
potential weak spot. This weak spot is then tagged as an analogy _ground and
passed to another set of rules for dealing with the weak spots. The particular rule
which is fired in this instance is the rule which detects the misuse of an analogy
because the analogy does not match on an attribute which is regarded as salient in
this domain.
As we can see from these examples, the computer has a role as a displayer of
arguments, an exposer of assumptions, an imposer of a particular analytical and
interpretational methodology and as a responder to arguments. A computational
arguer provides a means of representing an individual argument as well as the
interrelating arguments which form a debate. The system can display the argument in
graphical form, clearly distinguishing its components. The system can prompt for
. 19·
elements in an argument. By this means it provides an invaluable tool for the
revelation of concealed assumptions. The passive analysis and display of the
argument has the effect of exposing all the interconnections between claims and other
claims. The active response has the effect of highlighting weaknesses in the support
for a claim and in providing some idea of the possible ways these might be attacked.
The system can represent the grounding of the argument in backing theories, common
sense or ideology thus allowing for the display of a particular viewpoint on the facts.
The system can produce an argument insofar as it can produce an interpretation and
embody strategies for responding to an argument.
1.6 Conclusion
In summary then this thesis will:
• outline a model of argumentation and its relation to concepts such as justification,
explanation and so on;
• show how this theory provides a model for the design of interfaces for expert
systems - especially for users in the humanities;
• show how the program designed in accord with this model can be seen as both
a) a tool to aid argument production and assessment - focus on JIlruk;
b) as a natural means of interaction with a knowledge base - focus on content.
Insofar as argumentation is the meat and bones of many of our discourses both in
our everyday life and in our specialized pursuits (academic and non-academic) this
attempt is important. However, for the same reason, the attempt must ultimately fail.
In order to be able to "argue" as a human can a machine would need to be the
isomorph of a human being. Arguing is not something we do independently of our
other capacities and attributes. Thus the model I will produce must of necessity only
approximate to a human arguer. My attempt must be seen not as an attempt to deal
with the whole of arguing but to attempt to model some elements of the process. In
this it is no less of interest than other attempts. However the computer enforces a
degree of objectivity on the attempt which is of importance and, when coupled with
artificial intelligence techniques of representation and manipulation, a model and a
- 20-
simulation of arguing can be produced which, while formal in that a computer language
is used, is also human-like in taking account of more than the merely mathematical
aspects of logic. I am aware that computer technology is in itself determined by
particular social and political constraints. But then this is true of any form of
expression which I might attempt to use. The computer, like natural language, can be
used as a means of exposing its own determining factors. The automation of arguing
processes also allows the possibility of exposing and manipulating the processes
which shape our arguments.
1.7 Guide to the reader
Chapter 2 contains my characterization of the domain of archaeology in more detail
than that attempted above. I point out the aspects of argument which archaeology
shares with other domains and those which may be regarded as domain specific. In
particular, I will discuss the use of argument by analogy and argument from theoretical
principles or models.
Chapter 3 contains a review of related literature. This falls into two sections: (a)
work on explanation; (b) work on computational models and implementations of
systems for argumentation. I have included the review of explanation capabilities
since I feel: firstly, that explanation and argument are closely related; and secondly,
that, historically, argumentation represents a natural development of "explanation"
capabilities.
Chapter 4 presents the three level model of argumentation in greater detail and
discusses how arguments are parsed, generated, assessed and sustained. The model
of argumentation includes a model of interpretation which derives from the work of
Jean-Claude Gardin.
Chapter 5 presents a design for a program based on the theoretical principles
delineated in chapter 4. The design concentrates on its function as a tool for more
effective arguing. The design and its subsequent implementation represent a means
of tightening up and testing the theoretical principles of chapter 4.
Chapter 6 gives details of the partial implementation of the model as a constrained
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debater. The program ASParch is presented in terms of the knowledge structures
required and the procedural code for manipulating these. Example runs from this
system are also presented and analysed.
Chapter 7 discusses the application of ASParch to other domains. These are: a)
literary criticism; b) legal reasoning; and, c) Darwinian theory
Chapter 8 is the conclusion. Here I discuss what has been achieved, the failures,
limitations and way ahead. This chapter includes my rationale for thinking that the
representation of a complete arguer is not possible.
-000-
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Chapter 2 - Archaeological reasoning
Argument: Archaeologists have made use of artificial intelligence
techniques in a number of ways: to model archaeological reasoning; to
simulate social change; to act as tools. An ASP acts as a model and
as a tool and therefore encompasses much of previous work in the
application of artificial intelligence to archaeology. In order to model
archaeological reasoning correctly we must characterise it.
Archaeological reasoning is characterised as (a) making use of
analogy and (b) appealing to theories.
This chapter has the following structure. I begin with an examination of current work
in using AI programs in archaeology, pass to a consideration of archaeological
reasoning, the use of analogy in archaeology and archaeological theory, present a brief
overview of the main domains examined in this thesis and end with an example
archaeological argument.
2.1 Current work in using AI programs in archaeology
It is not surprising that AI programs should be in use in archaeology. This is one of
the disciplines that has made extensive use of computers in data analysis especially
since the advent of the 'New' archaeologists and their desire for a more 'scientific'
approach. More recently, an interest in simulations (see Sabloff, 1981) has developed
into an interest in simulations based on models drawn from cognitive science and AI.
This has provided one strand in the interest shown in expert systems by
archaeologists. Archaeologists are interested (a) in modelling their own reasoning
processes (b) using models derived from cognitive science for simulations of cultural
change and (c) in the increased efficiency such systems might bring their work. It is
possible that these motives might pull against each other but they surely represent
the sort of motivational tangle which brings about all scientific change. I will give
examples of each of these uses of AI within archaeology.
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2.1.1 Models of archaeological reasoning
This use of expert system techniques is most in evidence in the work of the group of
French researchers influenced by the ideas of Jean-Claude Gardin (1980, 1987a,
Lagrange and Renaud, 1985, Francfort, 1988). I shall discuss the general model of
reasoning employed by Gardin in Chapter 4, confining myself here to a discussion of
the nature of the systems produced.
Gardin's ideas have resulted in a great number of programs which can be said to
model the expertise of archaeologists in particular specialist areas. These have been
discussed in Gardin et al. (1987), a compendium of research results, in which models
have been developed for the interpretation of hellenistic pottery, iron-age metallurgy,
cypriot pottery, roman amphorae, medieval structures and turkish stelae. Typically
these authors proceed by taking a text or texts, analysing this in terms of the logicist
analysis and encoding this in a form suitable for interpretation by a production system.
Thus, these authors are not attempting to produce systems which can be used in day
to day contexts. For this reason I have distinguished them from application systems
(see section 2.1.3 below).
According to Lagrange and Renaud (1985) logicist analysis is a general technique
for the analysis of reasoning patterns in scientific or non scientific discourse. In
Gardin (1980) the technique is applied to what Gardin calls constructs. By this he
means the written texts produced by archaeologists, ranging from catalogues to
theoretical interpretations of finds. Basically the technique depends on analysing the
piece of discourse into three major elements:
• the initial set of data which the author selects to fulfill his goal in writing. This
goal can range from the purely descriptive (inventories and catalogues) to the
interpretative. Lagrange and Renaud refer to this as the Po propositions, Gardin
as the 'raw materials, M'. Gardin thinks the propositions derived at one level can
form the material for operations at another level. For instance historical inference
can depend on propositions produced by classification.
• the terminal propositions - Pn propositions - which represent the endpoint of the
reasoning process whether this is simple taxonomy or interpretation.
• the intermediate 'data and operations involved in the transition from M to P'
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(Gardin) the 'intermediate propositions' (Lagrange and Renaud). The latter's
propositions are the textual representation of the operations discerned by the
former in his analysis of archaeological constructions.
Perhaps the best known logicist analysis is that of Gardin (1980) involving a stela
of the Seldjukid period in Turkey (pre-Ottoman). This analysis can be represented
graphically as in Figure 2.1. In this figure a schematic representation of the stela is
presented and the the different propositions which make up the interpretation are
clearly shown. This example has been implemented by Lagrange and Renaud (1985).
Lagrange and Renaud give an example of the technique which is concerned with
the identification of a medieval structure. The Po propositions are in this case the
descriptions of the structure e.g. 'The interior dimensions of the building are about 10m
X 12.70m'. (Zadora-Rio 1982, quoted in Lagrange and Renaud). The terminal
proposition (Pn) that the structure is a medieval walled garden. The intermediate
propositions (Pi) consist of the arguments which connect the above together. For
example 'On account of [propositions] 2, a and b, of 1, a.b,c, LPG [Le Plessis-
Grimoult] definitely resembles a fortress such as those built in Philippe Auguste's
time'.
The basic claim is that this is an adequate technique for the capture of the
discursive reasoning patterns evidenced by archaeologists in their written texts. This
is undoubtedly so. However, as they admit themselves, the technique is of general
applicability and therefore does not capture anything specific about archaeological
reasoning. More importantly the technique does little to capture the sort of reasoning
actually employed by archaeologists as they carries out the various techniques of
classification and interpretation. Gardin concedes that the analyst will often have to
supply the intermediate steps. Thus models derived from this sort of analysis invite
the criticism that they reflect an artificial reasoning pattern derived from the analysis
itself rather than from the archaeologist's reasoning patterns. However, as we saw in
chapter 1, any analysis of an argument is itself a reconstruction and an interpretation.
Thus the technique is a perfectly valid means of simulating archaeological
interpretation.
There are interesting parallels between Gardin's analysis of the different sorts of
reasoning possible in archaeology and the "model of expertise" approach to knowledge
acquisition of Wielinga and Breuker (1986). Gardin's operations are similar to the
tasks of Wielinga and Breuker. There are also parallels with Clancey's work on
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Figure 2.1 - A logicist analysis
Neomycin (1985a) and the approach of Kuipers and Kassirer (1984) in which they
suggest that precise scientific models from the literature can be transformed to
produce computationally viable causal models without the use of experts.
2.1.2 Models derived from cognitive science
It is here that archaeology comes closest to the interdisciplinary area known as
cognitive anthropology (Holland and Quinn 1987, D'Andrade 1981) in which cultural
knowledge (e.g. 'folk psychology') is seen as having a strong influence on our cognitive
abilities. An example of the sort of work I have in mind here is Doran's computational
model of socio-cultural systems (1982). It is obvious that if archaeology is to explain
as well as categorize its artifacts then these must be integrated into a theoretical
framework for socio-cultural change. Doran attempts to model these changes in terms
of the interaction of human beings. He thus draws on studies from cognitive science
as well as of socio-cultural change in order to formulate a model which makes possible
an '...understanding of the mechanisms of belief or meaning in sociocultural systems..'
His model is thus radically different from previous models based solely on the
computing of mathematical equations. Doran's system embodies the following four
hypotheses (1982: 378):
(1) The structure of a sociocultural system reflects an inherent goal, which is the
optimal exploitation of its environment.
(2) The goal of the sociocultural system derives from the goals of its component
actors. The system's structure therefore reflects the need to satisfy the actors'
individual goals in spite of their spatial distribution.
(3) The structure of the system also reflects and derives from the nature of the
cognitive processing of its actors: notably mechanisms of (social) perception, goal
achieving, and knowledge manipulation.
(4) The need for cognitive economy is a major determinant of an actor's
cognition.(By 'cognitive economy' Doran means the best use of cognitive abilities
e.g. using previous though only partially relevant solutions to save effort.)
It is important to realize that Doran's system is not yet implemented. It is easy to
see why from the far-ranging nature of the above hypotheses. To test these Doran
develops a model in which a set of communicating processes (or actors) models the
socio-cultural system. In the model, one actor corresponds to the environment.
Communication between actors and the environment and actors and other actors is
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limited in a realistic way. The environment is exploitable and can communicate its
material beneficence to certain actors. Each actor's goal is to acquire, from the
environment, energy resources. In order to do this it has knowledge of the
environment and the other actors and can make plans. If such a system were to be set
in motion, Doran predicts that its behaviour would be to show cooperation between
the actors. This cooperation will lead individuals to formulate particular kinds of plans
which have the effect of continuing the cooperation within which specialized activity
would take place. Eventually aggregation between groups of actors will take place.
Thus a 'pattern of contracts' will develop.
This seems to be a sophisticated research direction, combining as it does elements
from simulation and cognitive science. If the proposal works it would represent a
development not only in archaeological modelling but also in AI. The main danger is
again that archaeological theory becomes constrained by alien notions from AI. Surely
however this is better than the current scarcity of coherent and fruitful models?
Doran's work also shows how a qualitative model for archaeology based on
simulations of interacting agents could be developed to form the basis for the
underpinning of shallower heuristics. This is related to much work on the use of 'deep
knowledge' in expert systems (e.g. Fink, Lusth and Duran's Integrated Diagnostic
Model, 1985).
In more recent papers (1986, 1988) Doran has discussed partial implementations
of models similar to the above. In (Doran 1986) he discusses the simulation of
sociocultural change in terms of a 'contract' model where actors can form contracts
yielding 'benefits' which can be quantified. When the model is run the system of actors
exhibits 'sudden global collapses'. Doran relates this to the notion that societies may
collapse because they are too greatly integrated (in terms of the model, the system of
contracts is too widespread) so that when a part of the structure collapses the whole
follows. In the 1988 paper Doran reports on the EOS project which examines 'the
properties of communities of agents, especially hierarchical organizations'. This work
is not specifically aimed at archaeology but does have archaeological implications. In
particular, he shows how it may be possible to model the emergence of complex social
organizations such as the simple form of hierarchy mentioned. It is suggested that the
model could be linked to archaeological studies in which hierarchies follow as a result
of specialization and where central control is needed.
In general Doran's work is a stimulating application of recent ideas in areas such
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as multi-agent systems and distributed artificial intelligence. As such, it represents a
different approach to that presented in this thesis. However, it should be possible to
incorporate the sorts of models which Doran proposes as one knowledge source
within an overall system which at least in part makes use of shallower heuristics.
Thus the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the combination of
model and heuristics would represent the type of advanced expert system mentioned
above. In chapter 6 I will propose an alternative means of dealing with models of
sociocultural change.
2.1.3 Application models
There are very few such systems and most of these are prototypes of one kind or
another. They do, however, represent the possibility of future developments. Most of
these have been in the well-structured areas of archaeology needed in the
classification of artifacts and structures. For instance, earlier work by Doran (1977)
on the analysis of cemetery test data made use of procedurally oriented demons as
knowledge sources in producing an interpretation. This work can be seen as a
predecessor of the multi-actor model discussed above. Doran's work is distinct in not
making use of production systems or rule and fact type knowledge bases. Most of the
other work is of this form. For instance there is the work of Brough and Parfitt (1984)
on the the classification of animals from teeth. This was extended in Brough's work on
the Fossil expert system for classifying fossil finds (1986). The work of Bishop and
Thomas on Beaker pottery (1984) and Ennals and Brough (1982) on the recognition of
earthworks both exemplify the expert system as a form of knowledge medium (Stefik,
1986). Ennals (1985) has many examples of the representation of archaeological and
historical data for use in educational contexts.
Current work is exemplified by the system proposed by Baker for the analysis of
bird bones. This system makes use of statistical and metrical studies in the
identification of these remains. Further than that it incorporates 'deep' expertise about
environmental archaeology and can emulate the work done after identification e.g. it
can decide on strategies for further sampling and make inferences about, for example,
diet (Hugget and Baker 1985). Hugget has proposed a system (similar to the subject
of this thesis) which would act as the front end to a conventional database and
attempt to find alternative explanations and test hypotheses. For instance, from the
incomplete data from a cemetery (grave goods, position etc) it should be able to
- 28-
DIAGRAM ON THIS
PAGE EXCLUDED
UNDER INSTRUCTION
FROM THE
UNIVERSITY
postulate which sex the occupants of the graves belonged to. Vitali and Lagrange
(1988) have discussed an expert system which will assist archaeologists in the
interpretation of data from archaeometric studies (i.e. the dating and measurement of
archaeological artefacts using scientific means).
2.2 Archaeological reasoning and analogy
It would seem (a) that archaeological reasoning is more usually non-deductive since
archaeology is at best a semi-formal discipline (as was suggested by Huggett in
chapter 1) and (b) that theory in the discipline is labile since it is at a fairly early stage
in its development. I do not suggest that either of these are fixed and permanent
attributes of the discipline. Archaeology may well develop into a fully formal discipline
such as physics. However, as it stands, archaeology is a miscellany of specialisms
drawn from other disciplines such as history, geography, particle physics, surveying,
natural science and geology. Attempts by the 'new archaeologists' in the States to
produce a theoretical archaeology (e.g. Schiffer, 1976, Binford, 1983, 1987) have only
been partially successful in combining ideas from yet another discipline - systems
theory - with this interdisciplinary mish-mash. This section will (a) discuss the use
of analogy in archaeology and (b) discuss the use of theory in archaeology.
2.2.1 Analogy
Analogy has played a large part in the reasoning of archaeologists. For instance
Wylie (1987:6) says, 'oo.archaeologyhas been perhaps uniquely dependent on
analogical argument..' However it is important to note that the primary use has been
in determining the use or function of something or the mechanism by which something
is achieved as the following examples show. I have indicated the analogy in italics.
Analogy frame construction on this site ::frames on other Cree sites
The frame construction is similar in shape and size to frames used in contemporary
Cree camps for hide stretching. (Bonnichsen, 1973)
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Analogy pots ::persons
We shall argue that pots "are" persons and that concepts of the body are closely
related to and partly determinative of decorative expressions on pots... (David,
Sterner and Gavua, 1988)
Analogy early Neolithic boats ::Eskimo boats
It seems likely therefore that the British early Neolithic settlers used skin-boats ...
true sea-going skin-boats ... survived into recent times in the Arctic circumpolar
region ... (Case, 1969)
Analogy archaeological smudge pits ::hide smoking smudge pits
The correspondence in form of smudge pits as known archaeologically and of
hide-smoking smudge pits as described ethnographically is essentially perfect.
(Binford, 1967)
Analogy stone gorgets ::pottery making implements (ribs)
The point ... is the striking similarity of the contemporary ribs and prehistoric
"stone gorgets". (Curren, 1977)
Other domains also make use of analogical reasoning in the production of
hypotheses. However, given the paucity of the data available to the archaeologist,
analogy perhaps plays a larger part here than in most domains. Even so, because of
the bad press it gets from philosophers, archaeologists have always been uneasy
about this use. Thus on the one hand we have a sub-field called ethnoarchaeology
(Stiles, 1977) which is concerned to make use of analogies between the culture of
living peoples and those of prehistoric date. For instance, one can make analogies
between modem and prehistoric patterns of residence among the Hopi based on the
pottery type clustering. On the other hand Gould (Gould and Watson, 1982) argues
strongly that such analogies are suspect:
Ethnographic analogies may be plausible and potentially testable, but they are
often unscientific and are sometimes hard to distinguish from wishful thinking.
Only when we try to explain anomalies in human behaviour as viewed in the
context of uniformitarian relationships in nature can we posit the widest possible
range of alternative behaviours to account for the material residues we deal with
and proceed to test them in a scientifically acceptable manner. The answer to the
question Is analogy necessary is thus no - or only sometimes, as long as we do
not mistake it for cultural uniformitarianism or use it as a substitute for the kind of
uniformitarianism S. J. Gould regards simply as good science.
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There is perhaps a certain lack of awareness on the part of some archaeologists
that work in the philosophy of science has advanced beyond the logical positivist
models the above seems to exemplify. As Hesse and others have shown, analogy
(and metaphor) form the basis of much of what can be seen as good science (Hesse
1980). Wylie reflects this when she suggests (ibid), that there is '...a widespread
recognition among post-positivist philosophers of science that analogical inference
plays a central role, not just in the formulation, but in the testing of scientific theory,
the heartland of scientific rationality'.
Wylie has put forward suggestions which attempt (a) to make the use of analogy
in archaeology more viable and thus (b) overcome the fears of writers like Gould.
(1) She suggests that simple analogy should be backed by considerations of
relevance. An analogy is relevant if a piece of background knowledge exists which
allows conclusions to be drawn about similarities between a base and target object.
For instance, the piece of background knowledge in the case of the Hopi mentioned
above may be that there is a continuity over time between historical and prehistorical
Hopi culture. (I will discuss the notion of historical analogies in chapter 4.)
(2) Wylie also argues that analogy is given its viability by being accepted as
ultimately grounded in deductive reasoning:
The conclusion I draw concerning these general arguments is that although
analogical inference certainly comprises a loosely defined type of inference
strategy, it does not seem plausible that its warrant is .M analogical. Its warrant
is that it approximates, to one degree or another, a valid inference from general
knowledge of determining structures that link known and inferred properties. [ibid
pg 5]
In this view analogical argument derives its validity from possible corresponding
deductive arguments which make use of 'determining structures', I take these to be
much the same as Gentner's second order relations (1983) which structure or
constrain the first order relations of potential analogues. An example would be a
second order attribute such as leads_to{has_wealth(person),
has_expensive_burial(person)] which expresses the notion, true of some societies,
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that the having of great wealth leads to the displaying of it after death. An analogy
between two cases would be more powerful if it could be shown that the first level
relations or attributes (such as has_wealth) were generally constrained by second
level attributes (such as leads_to). Thus it could be argued, by analogy with a
contemporary culture in which the leads _to relation is true, that since the prehistoric
culture shows evidence for expensive funeral rites therefore this culture contained
individuals with large amounts of accumulated wealth which was expressed in their
funerary monuments. If this is what Wylie means, then it seems unlikely that such
general constraints will be found. We could easily imagine occasions either where
wealth is not expressed in the above manner or where expensive funeral rites are
provided for poor individuals (e.g. Gandhi).
The deductive approach to analogy has been worked out in computational terms by
Davies and Russell (Davies and Russell 1987). However, if they are right in
principle, such arguments may not yet be possible (since our knowledge is limited) or
humans may never be able to deploy them in reasoning about the archaeological
evidence. Psychologists have long argued about whether we think deductively or
analogically. It may well be that humans only rarely make use of purely deductive
inferences in arriving at conclusions while the path they have followed may sometimes
be summarized in terms of a deductive argument. Given this and the admitted
sparseness of the archaeological record, any system concerned with aiding the
archaeologist in finding arguments to express his or her interpretation of the evidence
must rely on non-deductive reasoning at least some of the time. The deductive form of
the analogy must often remain an ideal to which inferences both of man and machine
correspond only partly.
Branigan makes use of an analogical argument which may help to clarify these
notions (Branigan 1985) - although there are no second order relations here, only
background knowledge about architecture. He argues that since the Newgate in
Londinium and the East gate at Lincoln are of a similar architectural type to the main
gateways at Verulamium therefore they are of the same date.
A similar date, early in the third century, is firmly fixed for the double-portal
Newgate at London and the East Gate at Lincoln which was remodelled along
similar lines to the London and Chester gates at Verulamium c AD 210-230.
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The gates at the other roman cities are relevant because we know that architectural
features may be widely dispersed geographically while being temporally limited. Thus
similarity in style of building can allow us to conclude about the date. This
approximates to a purely deductive argument in which the grounds are
a) the attributes of Newgate and Verulamium's main gates,
b) the similarities between Verulamium and Londinium and
c) a general rule which allows a conclusion from the known attributes and the
similarities to other attributes
and the claim is the attribution of the known date of Londinium's gates to the
Verulamium gates. The problem is, of course, that it is more or less impossible to find
law-like generalizations such as c) in domains such as archaeology.
In an ASP, analogy will be dealt with using a knowledge base in which knowledge
about the facts of the domain is structured in terms of objects which allow both
deductive and non-deductive inferences to be made. This set-up is flexible enough to
allow for any of the other possible forms of plausible reasoning (Collins 1978, Baker et
al. 1987).
Wylie draws attention to an interesting corollary of her treatment of analogy in the
following quotation:
Thus, the warrant acquired by particular analogical inferences will vary with the
nature and level of understanding of these structures. Weitzenfeld adds to this the
observation that while analogical arguments may have a common central structure,
"patterns of reasoning [in the 'informal context of deployment of the analogue'] will
vary from field to field". [ibid]
That is to say that particular domains will allow different patterns of analogical
reasoning and that different individuals will exhibit different styles of reasoning
depending on the "nature and level of understanding of' the determining structures or
second level constraining or structuring relations. If Wylie is correct then patterns of
reasoning or arguing using analogies may differ from field to field or indeed from arguer
to arguer. I shall have more to say about this in chapter 4 below.
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2.2.2 Archaeological theory
Leaps of faith are necessarily made since much of what archaeologists reconstruct
is unobservable (Hodder 1984).
Given the prevalence of non-deductive forms of reasoning in archaeology in its
attempt to make what Hodder calls 'leaps of faith' to the proper interpretation of the
data available it is obvious that archaeological theory will not correspond to the sets
of propositions (or equations) with relations of logical or mathematical implication
applicable to 'hard' sciences such as physics. Archaeology as an interpretive or
hermeneutic discipline will have theories which are more concerned with shedding
light on some particular object or site than with general laws. Thus archaeology will,
in common with other social sciences, adopt currently fashionable theories such as
structuralism and marxism in order to provide a theoretical viewpoint on the data. The
interested reader should consult Hodder (1986) for a full discussion of the different
forms of archaeological theory.
There are at least two ways in which theory and interpretation interact in
archaeology. Firstly there is the use by archaeologists of what may be called
extrinsic theories. That is to say those theories which have been developed in other
disciplines such as economics, philosophy and geography and which are applied to the
solution of problems in archaeology. For instance, marxism and structuralism have
both been used in archaeological interpretations (see Hodder, ibid, chapters 3 and 4).
There are, secondly, corresponding intrinsic theories. These are the theories which
have been developed within archaeology for the solution of archaeological problems.
Schiffer (1976), for example, has attempted to formulate theories about the processes
which artefacts undergo after deposition. There is also the so-called 'middle-range'
theory of Binford which attempts to find ways of measuring the archaeological data so
that the relations between the material objects deposited and the type of society that
used them can be determined (Hodder: chapter 6). Indeed like many of the disciplines
in humanities and the social sciences archaeology is awash with theory. We might, in
fact, distinguish a third kind of theorizing in archaeology; that is, those discussions
which attempt to legitimate or justify a particular brand of theory. At this level the
archaeologist is acting as an epistemologist or philosopher of science. Some writers,
such as Shanks and Tilley (1987: 107) regard 'theory construction as the key towards
disciplinary development.' Others, such as Shennan (1988), regard the situation in a
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poorer light and hope that the computer will provide a means of putting archaeology on
a securer theoretical footing. As we shall see in chapter 4, an ASP provides one
means of doing this.
The problem with using ASPs to model the theoretical backing for archaeological
inferences is that the theoretical principles involved are rarely stated. This can be
seen from the following quotes. The theoretical backing is implied rather than explicit.
Indeed in many cases it is shown only by the decision to use a particular vocabulary.
ceramic material interpreted in terms of a structuralist stance
For instance, preliminary analyses of the abundant ceramic material found directly
outside the entrance to Ramshog supports our contention that an expression of
boundedness was an important structuring principle. (Shanks and Tilley, 1982)
grave goods interpreted in terms of marxist categories of society
...at which time burials with rich grave goods...appear in both the Elbe-Saal area
and Bohemia and Moravia. From this I would infer that a hierarchically
differentiated society had arisen in these areas, in which the expression of inter-
individual differences at burial continued but had now taken on the role of
legitimating the hierarchy through the consumption of prestige items. (Shennan,
1982)
societal change interpreted in terms of [invasions/settlement]
...settlement implies the establishment of a primitive farming system by stone-
using people with primitive transport. (Case, 1969)
However, while there is the danger of misrepresenting the particular theories in
other computational systems, in an ASP, where these are clearly distinguished from
other domain knowledge, it should be possible to modify them easily.
ASPs are also of potential importance for the development of archaeological theory
for another reason. I would suggest that any system which is to serve as an aid to
theory formation in any domain further needs the ability to provide competitive
arguments as a means of providing support for theoretical interpretations in the
domain. Since much of the reasoning in archaeology is analogical such a system will
need to provide at least competitive analogical arguments. My system can provide
such arguments and can therefore be seen as a potential tool for theory building. This
idea is adapted from Van Lehn et a1.'s notion that competitive arguments are needed
to provide support for theories in cognitive science (VanLehn, Brown and Greeno,
1984, VanLehn, 1985):
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...competitive argument seems to be a tool for analyzing and clarifying the
theoretical issues implicit in a computational model of a cognitive faculty.
I see no reason why it should not be applied to archaeology or any other area in the
social sciences or humanities where the interpretations are concerned with what goes
on inside people's heads. (Hodder (1984) thinks of archaeology as the attempt to
investigate what once went on in people's heads. 'In particular, how can a scientific
archaeology ... cope with verifying statements about ideas in prehistoric people's
heads?') This attempt is also important to the general attempt to model human
reasoning. This is because it is arguable that much of our thinking is theory derived in
this way. We all carry around half-baked notions from physics, chemistry, political
theory and so on. These serve as constituents in what passes for our background
knowledge. The modelling of how theory interacts with domain facts in archaeology
may prove of interest to AI generally
2.3 The archaeological domains
Apart from the Millie's Camp domain which has been discussed in the first chapter,
and some examples drawn from neolithic archaeology and the roman period, the
archaeological domains used either for illustration or implemented examples are: (a)
Pueblo Indians and (b) Ancient Wessex.
• Pueblo Indians
Perhaps the most accessible account is that of Lekson, Windes, Stein and Judge
(1988). Other accounts can be found in Longacre (1970) and Schiffer (1976). The
Pueblo Indians belong geographically to the south-western United States and
temporally to our Middle Ages. The principal cultural grouping is that of the Anasazi
who in the period 1100-1300 AD built many of the large pueblos or large multi-storey
many roomed buildings constructed of stone such as Pueblo Bonito in New Mexico.
Figure 2.2 illustrates an idealized Pueblo sitel. These buildings and the artefacts
they contain have been extensively studied by American archaeologists and are of
interest for two main reasons: firstly. the state of preservation is good because of the
dry conditions, hence a great deal can be discovered about the material culture;
secondly, contemporary pueblo dwellers such as the Hopi seem to be historically
1A 'kiva' is a subterranean room probably used for ritual purposes.
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Based on Schiffer, 1976
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Figure 2.2 - An idealized Pueblo site
related to the Anasazi so that it is, to some extent, possible to reconstruct the ritual
and spiritual life of the ancient culture.
• Ancient Wessex
The Wessex culture of central southern England was identified by Piggott (1938) on
the basis of the inclusion of certain grave goods in a new form of burial monument, the
round barrow or mound. The culture dates from the British early bronze age around
1500BC and many of the objects represent the first bronze artefacts known in this
country. The presence of faience beads has suggested that the culture was, at least,
in contact with the bronze age cultures of the Mediterranean. There has always been
controversy about where this culture had its origins and indeed about whether the
culture was wrongly identified in the first place. Clarke (1966) suggests that the
'invasion hypothesis' used as a model of culture change by Piggott was wrongheaded
and that the culture was an indigenous development. More recent accounts of the
period (Clarke, Cowrie and Foxon, 1985) suggest that the culture represents the
burial practices of a cultural elite rather than of the whole culture.
My interest in the Wessex culture (apart from the beauty of some of the artefacts)
stems from the fact that there is a controversy which has waged over several decades
about how to interpret the material remains from this period of British prehistory. The
argument is also important because it concerns the question of culture change which is
a central notion in archaeology since, if it is not just to be a cataloguer of artefacts and
sites, it must evolve some theories about how cultures emerge and grow and finally
collapse. The Wessex debate points to the fact that the arguments hinge on the
different backing theories held by the participants. The interpretations produced
depend on whether or not a specific model of cultural change is held. I shall attempt in
chapter 6 to model some aspects of this debate. The debate over the Wessex culture
also makes it clear that it is not only the conclusions which will differ from interpreter
to interpreter. Given the marxist model, the purported argument about the origins of
the culture might better be represented not as about the origins of culture C but rather
about whether C exists at all. The theoretical backing determines what counts as
facts and the concepts used to interpret these facts.
The interested reader might like to turn to Appendix II for a fuller account of the
debate over the origins of the Wessex culture.
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2.4 An archaeological argument
This section illustrates the notion of argument in archaeology with an argument drawn
from a paper on the interpretation of Durrington Walls a Neolithic (circa 2000 BC)
henge or ditched enclosure as discussed by Wainwright (1975). The argument
centres around the disputed use of the henge. Figure 2.3 shows the main elements of
Wainwright's argument.
I have indicated the significant claims as Cn in square brackets and the grounds for
these as Gn. The argument can be displayed in diagrammatic form as in Figure 2.4.
Here G5 contradicts G3 and G4 renders G1 less important. G2 is used in both
arguments since the ceremonial use is accepted. This argument exemplifies many of
the characteristic elements of archaeological arguments. In chapter 4 we will suggest
mechanisms for rendering them computational. The elements are:
• the use of analogy
• the strategy involved
1. attack premises
2. replace conclusion with an alternative
• the conclusion is regarded as an explanation
• the conclusion is not certain
• the reasoning appeals to common sense
Overall, the argument represents a prime example of a well known method in
philosophy - the dialectic - which derives from Hegel and ultimately Plato. Here there
is a thesis - Cl - an antithesis - C2 and C3 - and a synthesis - C4.
By contrast, in the argument simulated in chapter 6 (example 3) which is about the
rise of chiefdoms in Bronze Age Wessex, each side depends on a theory or model (or
as Clarke 1966 has it 'hypothesis') about how societies change.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have looked at current use of artificial intelligence techniques in
archaeology. We have learned that archaeology makes use of analogies and appeals
to theory. In chapter 4 we shall see how a model of argumentation can be modified to
take account of this domain specific characteristic. In chapter 6 we shall see how a
prototype system based on this model copes with analogies and responds to the use
of theory to ground an argument.
-000-
- 38-
• The reasons why henge monuments in general are thought to have ceremonial use[Cl]
are, firstly, the presence of an external bank,[OI] secondly, the presence
within certain externally banked enclosures of stone structures which have a
presumed ritual signifIcance[02] and, thirdly, the absence of occupation debris[03].
• Partially as a result of some excavations in 1972 at an Iron Age farm near Oussage
All Saints in Dorset, a three acre settlement surrounded by a boundary ditch
and external bank, I would not now regard the late Neolithic earthworks as
anything other than secular.[C2] In certain situations, for example in areas
where stock is to be confined, an internal ditch is a positive advantage [04] and
such enclosures occur for example amongst the pastoral settlements of the Iron
Age in Wessex.
• A characteristic peculiar to these buildings and their surrounding earthworks is the
great quantity of human refuse [05] - sherds, stone and bone artefacts and animal bones.
• It may be suggested therefore that a consideration of those points concerning the
character of the earthworks and the quantity of refuse could result in secular
interpretations being placed on the enclosures and structures under discussion.
[C3] There is, however, a further aspect to be considered which in the past has
been termed lithicisation.
• There is therefore some indication of a period in Wessex between 1700 and 1600 be
when certain of the timber buildings at Mount Pleasant, The Sanctuary and
possibly Stonehenge, were replaced by stone settings of a ritualistic nature ... Its
relevance in the present context is that the process should indicate some special
function for the multi-ring buildings under discussion, which made it necessary
for their ruins to be permanently indicated by stone settings. For this reason
alone a purely domestic use for the buildings seems unlikely and a pre-eminent
function within a secular context seems the explanation best suited to
the arguments which have been outlined. [C4].
Figure 2.3 - An archaeological argument about Durrington Walls
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Chapter 3 - A review of related AI work
Argument: The historical roots of ASPs are in research on explanation
capabilities in expert systems and computational models of arguing.
The primary form of explanation in expert systems is justification.
Justification can be seen as the provision of reasons for a claim. Thus
argument intersects with explanation and justification and an ASP can
take the place of an explanation capability. Explanation capabilities in
expert systems have followed a line of development which results
naturally in ASPs. ASPs are a means of integrating the diverse
concerns of argumentation theorists with those of explanation
researchers.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to situate the work I am doing within the field of AI generally.
There are two main bodies of research which I have been concerned with: (a) work on
the providing of explanation capabilities for expert systems and (b) work on
computational theories of argumentation. My own work on ASParch can be viewed
historically as an attempt to apply the insights from the latter as a means of producing
a better type of explanation facility. However, as the work has progressed I have
become aware that the sort of system I envisage is no longer simply an expert system
with a particular kind of interface but a radically different kind of system. An ASP isn't
an expert system because it doesn't aim to produce the single correct answer to
some problem. On the other hand an ASP isn't a real arguer since it doesn't have
natural language capabilities and is constrained in its knowledge. Nonetheless the
roots of this system are in these two areas and for this reason it is worth giving an
account of their salient points. In my view of course they tend to converge therefore I
have slanted the story in this direction. The convergence is however one-sided as
well as perhaps fictional. While little attempt has been made by the argument
theorists to examine the concerns of the expert systems researcher, s/he on the other
hand has been involved in the attempt to extend expert systems so that they become
interactive systems capable of graceful degradation and natural language exchanges.
ASParch can perhaps be seen as a slight tangent to this work. For me the importance
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of the system is not in its ability to interact in a human-like way but in its ability to
exhibit system reasoning in a comprehensible manner and in a way that allows the
user to interact with the reasoning. Because of my interest in arguments the
emphasis in what follows will be on explanations as justifications rather than causal
explanations. This restriction is not as limiting as it seems since, while causal models
are widely championed as a means of providing explanations, most expert systems
explanations are simply re-hashes of the system's reasoning. It is unlikely that
(apart from educational contexts and specific diagnostic tasks) the user requires the
sort of information included in causal models. The introduction of such models is
mainly an attempt to enhance the reasoning abilities of expert system rather than to
extend their explanations. This is made clear by de Kleer (1986) when he says:
Explanation is often oversold. The reason explanation is such an issue for expert
systems is that the implementers of expert systems have to convince the other
researchers in this field, and their own managers, that these programs work when
in actual fact they don't. ... If the conclusion of the expert system was always right,
or mostly right, you wouldn't need an explanation, you'd just follow it. (1986:81)
To show how similar an ASP and an explanation capability are, consider the
following four functions which Wallis and Shortliffe claim are fulfilled by an expert
system explanation capability (Wallis and Shortliffe, 1982). 1.A method for
examining reasoning in order to debug the system while it is being built; 2. A way of
assuring users of the logical nature of the system's reasoning in order to ensure
acceptance; 3. A way of persuading users to accept unexpected advice; 4. Education.
While the aim in examining the reasoning may be different (reply rather than peace of
mind) the user of an argumentation system will also require methods for the explicit
display of the reasoning of the system. The principal aim of an argument is to
persuade. In fact, an argument is more directed at persuasion than an explanation is.
ASPs are not directed at education in the sense of guiding students through some
body of knowledge. On the other hand it is one of their functions to tutor users in an
informal fashion in the use of a particular method of argument analysis and in the best
responses to make. Insofar as an ASP does these things it fulfills the function of an
explanation capability. However, I would argue that it goes beyond explanation just
as argument subsumes explanation and justification but not the other way round Thus
an ASP is not simply an expert system though it makes use of some elements of that
technology. It is more correctly thought of, more generally, as a knowledge based
system in the same family as expert systems.
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Before moving to a discussion of explanation in expert systems I would like to
discuss the notion of explanation and argument and how they are related.
3.1.1 Explanation
Requests for explanation in everyday discourse are signalled either by a range of
WH-questions (WHY, WHY NOT, WHAT IF ETC.) or by the use of the verb
'explain' or its various synonyms ('Explain yourself, 'The TUC was asked to explain
its position on a pay settlement', 'Can you tell us the circumstances surrounding the
accident'). Such requests are made in the expectation that the hearer will provide a
satisfactory response from a range of possible responses. This range includes:
justifications - Why pick that one?'
puzzle-resolutions - 'Why aren't the shops open?'
fillers of gaps in knowledge - Why do birds migrate?'
tests - 'Explain the principles behind the use of the internal combustion engine.'
There is no clear correlation between the sorts of verbal cues we give when
seeking explanations and the different sorts of explanation we get. Different sorts of
requests can be signalled by similar types of questions which means that you cannot
tell which sort of request is being made simply from the words used. Nor are there any
clear distinctions to be made between the types of request given above. A puzzle, for
example, is often resolved by filling a gap in the questioner'S knowledge. A
sophisticated explainer will know that a gap-filling explanation is sometimes required
by puzzle-resolution question.
Given our relative lack of ability in this area coupled with the need to make subtle
distinctions between the types of explanation required it is hardly surprising that we
require a process of negotiation often before the required explanation is proffered and
usually before this is accepted (cf. Kidd, 1985, Draper, 1987). Explaining is thus not a
once and for all process but an open-ended interchange between human beings which
ends when a satisfactory explanation is arrived at. A satisfactory explanation is one
which is appropriate (to the person and the context), relevant and complete.
In expert systems, while work is proceeding on other forms of explanation, the
most common form is justification - the giving of reasons for some claim which has
- 41 -
been made. Justifications, in general, can best be seen as a particular form of
explanation which require the explainer to reveal the bedrock of reasons for a belief or
action. Milton's attempt in Paradise Lost to justify the ways of God to man shows us
another aspect of our use of the term. Here Milton was attempting to prove that
God's ways were correct. But in proving these ways correct certain inconsistencies
(between free will and predestination) are thereby explained. The notions of
explanation and justification are inexorably intertwined. A justification of a piece of
behaviour is also frequently an explanation of it. Furthermore, it is hard to entirely
distinguish between a justificatory explanation and an argument.
3.1.2 Argument
There are at least two main senses of the term 'argument'. We speak of an argument
between two or more people. This can range from the objective proposal and
assessment of arguments as in a court of law or at a scientific meeting to the heated
exchange of opinions and prejudices during a conversation in the pub. The former is
often referred to as a debate; the latter as a row or quarrel. In the former any of the
participants may be required to defend a particular position with reasons or supporting
claims. We must all know the vertiginous sensation brought about by a hasty
statement of an assumed position which we realize we cannot hope to defend. In
quarrels, since what is at issue are the personal opinions of the participants. the
justifications are, more often than not, self-justifications. We also speak of an
argument as the proposition defended in debate by means of grounds. In the
introductory chapter these were referred to as argument-2 and argument-I. In
chapter 4 I will provide a model of argumentation which clearly distinguishes these
two senses.
I turn now to a brief consideration of how argument has been dealt with in AI and
cognitive science. This whole approach to argument and explanation depends on the
assumption that arguing and explaining are part of our everyday linguistic behaviour
and that, as such, they are not entirely random affairs. That is to say that there are
rules which govern them. If this were not so it is hard to see how we could
meaningfully conduct a conversations. Of course these rules are not the law-like
generalizations of natural science. Nor are they formalizable in standard formal logic.
This was a realization made by Grice (1975) in his conversational maxims (which are
the philosophical backing for AI work on discourse) and before him Wittgenstein
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(1953). For Wittgenstein in his later philosophy the meaning of what we say depends
not as he formerly (and formally) thought on a picture-like correspondence with reality
but on the situatedness of the discourse in aform of life. Such forms of life carry no
absolute truth values and thus we have a relativistic way of looking at meaning.
However, for others to understand us there must be rules. Grice showed that such
rules could be made explicit in his seminal paper. Current AI work on dialogue and
discourse consists mainly in finding computational means for representing these
maxims (and the notion of performative utterances and speech-acts which is another
child of Wittgenstein's rejection of a formalist approach). If any criticism can be made
of current AI work in general it is that researchers fail to realize the resistance to
formalization of many of the concepts they are dealing with. Rendering them in the
Procrustean bed of a computer program might also render them essentially incoherent.
3.1.3 Explanation, justification and argument
The argument about the proper relations between justification, explanation and
argument is probably, like all good arguments, totally open-ended. For our purposes
we will take justifications to be the kinds of explanation most prevalent in expert
systems and to be characterised as sets of propositions in which a claim is justified by
a set of reasons. Taken in this way we can see that justifications are similar to what I
have called argument-Is or interpretations in the introduction. Thus the set of
propositions which make up an explanation could as readily form a component in an
argument. Indeed any set of propositions in which one proposition is supported by the
others can act in this way. Thus, other forms of explanation can act as argument-Is.
Those which are composed of a set of reasons for a conclusion or which, although
some of these elements are tacit, can be construed in this way. The best way to think
of the relationships here is that there is a large intersection between justification and
explanation and an equally large intersection between argument and explanation
(largely via justification). The principal distinguishing factor between these is the
purpose to which the sets of propositions are put. This purpose will guide the choice
of the particular propositions which make up the set. Thus a justification will tend to
produce propositions which in some sense exonerate the justifier. Explanations on
the other hand are more directed at gaining or communicating knowledge. In our work
this latter and the desire to get the matter straight are the only motives.
As I have said, most requests for explanation in expert systems, (when they are
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not simply requests for the system to be what it is not - a human being) are requests
for justifications. Why ask that question? Why make that decision? Attempts to
extend the range of questions which such systems can answer may result in systems
which can give proper explanations - fill gaps and resolve puzzles (the basis for
scientific as well as everyday explanation requests). I see no reason why these
should not be presented in the form of arguments and subsumed within a system
which is capable of an extended argumentative exchange. Thus in some cases, at
least, ASPs can subsume explanation capabilities. Moreover, since, as we shall see
there is a move towards increased interaction with the user as a means of facilitating
explanation, an ASP seems to be an ideal solution to the problem of producing viable
explanations.
There is however another sense in which an explanation can be an argument.
Some philosophers have argued that an explanation in science simply is an argument
in a formal sense. Hempel for instance (1968) argues that there are two main forms of
explanation: deductive-nomological (D-N) and probabilistic. These have come to be
known as the covering law model of explanation. The former has the form
Cl, C2"",Ck
Ll,L2,· ..,Lr
E
Where Cn are statements describing facts and Ln are general laws and E is whatever
is being explained. A probabilistic explanation takes the form of an argument from the
existence of certain factors and the high probability of something given these factors to
the claim that that something is very likely, where p(O,F) means the probability of 0
given F.
Fi
p(O,F) is very high
================
makes very likely Oi .
The model can be criticised both for its narrowness and for its width. We can see from
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the example of Darwin's theories of natural selection that this formulation is far too
strict. According to Darwin's theories, a feature of a particular species can be
explained by means of the theory of natural selection - that species become adapted
over time to the environmental conditions which are prevailing. This theory
undoubtedly explains the feature. However it can hardly be called a general law in the
sense that say Ohm's law is in physics. Since Darwin does not argue either
probabilistic ally or from general laws according to Hempel he has not provided an
explanation. The formulation is also far too loose. There are many arguments of the
above form which do not count as explanations. For example, take the following (from
Kim,1967):
All copper expands on heating - Law
This piece of copper did not - conditions
-------------------------------------------
This piece of copper was not heated - E
The above is a deductive argument but the proposition E is hardly explained by it.
There is also a famous counter-example in the literature originally put forward by
Bromberger (discussed in Harman, 1986). According to this we can see that there is
a relation between the height of a flagpole, the angle of the sun and the length of the
shadow cast by the flagpole. Given any two of these we can deduce the third.
However while we may accept the deduction from the angle of the sun and the height
of the pole to the length of the shadow as an explanation we will not accept, say, the
derivation of the length of the pole from the other two as an explanation. As Harman
concludes (ibid: 74) 'Perhaps the argument provides a kind of non-causal explanation
of the angle of the sun, even though it does not offer a causal explanation of why the
sun should be at that angle'. The above model has also been criticised since it does
not seem to apply to social or historical sciences where there are no general laws in
the physical sense.
Perhaps the most important feature of the criticism of the the D-N model is that it
does not include any constraint that there must be relations of relevance between the
premises and the conclusion. This is a failing with traditional formal deductive
systems - there are arguments which are counterintuitive mainly because of the
paradoxes created by the rules for material implication (e.g. anything follows from a
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contradiction). There have been attempts to supplement ordinary logic with relevance
constraints (Anderson and Belnap, 1975).
Mary Hesse (1980) has proposed a modification of the D-N model in which
'..theoretical explanation [is seen as] metaphoric redescription of the domain of the
explanandum'. What this means is that a scientific theory can be viewed as describing
events and states in a primary domain (the explanandum) in terms usually applicable
to a secondary domain. Hesse's thesis is that this constitutes an explanation. Her
example is the explanation of how sounds travel - 'sound (primary system) is
propagated by wave motion (taken from a secondary system)'. Hesse's thesis, if
correct, carries with it the appealing notion that as part of the process of explaining
something scientifically we seek analogies to other domains which are already
understood. This is appealing because it is something I feel we do in everyday
explanation as well. And as we have seen above, at least in archaeology, analogy is
an important feature of arguments as well. Hesse can be construed as showing not
that explanations are not arguments but that explanations are analogical arguments.
More recently there are has been renewed interest in argument as the basis for
acts of explanation (see Kitcher, 1981).
Another approach to the question of the relationship of explanation to argument
can be derived from the work on informal logics. Toulmin, et al. (1979), for instance,
list several types of explanation all of which are responses to the recognition of
anomalies (puzzle-resolution) and all of which can be cast in the form of arguments.
For example the explanation of Jim's throat-clearing and loud talking about something
else is as follows:
Claim: Jim changed the subject to avoid talking about Mary
Ground: Jim and Mary have just broken up and he is still embarrassed and grieving
Warrant: People avoid discussing topics in public which will cause pain or
embarrassment.
Philosophical discussion thus reflects our commonsense intuition that explaining,
arguing and justifying are closely related concepts. Nonetheless it must be stressed
that there may be senses of explanation which have nothing to do with argument
(causal explanation - attributing feelings to others) and senses of argument which are
not explanations (not all justifications are explanations but also not all arguments are
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justifications - argument may be used as a means of discovery, for instance).
However the above discussion has shown that there is a wide overlap between the
two in the following ways:.
• explanation and argument both include structures which are made up of
statements plus some supporting evidence (justifications)
• both have two senses: a structure and a discourse mode
• both have formal and informal modes (contrast scientific and everyday
explanation, arguments in a pub and philosophical arguments)
3.2 Approaches to explanation
The following section attempts to characterise four important approaches to
explanation and to identify their strengths. The approaches are:
the traditional approach
the sociolinguistic approach
the critiquing approach
the cooperative approach.
It is my contention that the development of these shows a clear progression towards a
style of explanation in which there is a symmetry of possible operations available to
the system and user and in which data from human discourse plays an important role.
The earliest systems made use of simple Why and How type explanations. This
has been supplanted by systems which take account of empirical studies of human
discourse and latterly which seek to emulate the two way exchanges common in
everyday conversational exchanges and within which explanation is usually situated.
3.2.1 The traditional approach
This is exemplified by such programs as MYCIN (ShortIiffe, 1976, Buchanan and
Shortliffe, 1984) and is characterized by the provision of translations of knowledge
base rules into English in response to Why and How requests. The earliest
versions of MYCIN contained a relatively primitive explanation capability. Basically if
the user typed 'RULE' when the system was asking a question a translation of the
current rule was displayed. Later versions of the program included both Why and
How commands. Why worked by means of a 'history tree'. This allowed the user to
examine the reasoning process by progressing towards the topmost goal using a
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succession of Why questions. The How command allowed the user to trace the
reasoning path (that is, the sequence of rules used to produce the interim or final
conclusions) .
While the work done by the MYCIN team remains the foundation upon which
subsequent attempts to automate explanations must build there are drawbacks in the
approach. As we shall see, later researchers in the MYCIN team have attempted to
overcome some of these deficiencies with greater or lesser degrees of success.
MYCIN can be seen to be deficient in the following ways. Firstly, the system
contains no knowledge about its potential users. As a result that there is no
differentiation between the output given to novice users, expert users and knowledge
engineers. Because of this the system is incapable of any user-system dialogue.
Since it can be argued that explaining is not a once and for all thing but depends on a
process of negotiation any oracular pronouncement from the system will be fairly
useless. Secondly, the system contains only shallow sources of knowledge unfounded
in theory or first principles. This means that it is incapable of any answer to a
question which goes beyond its shallow heuristics to first principles. This also means
that the system has no real understanding of the domain it is trying to explain. It is a
cardinal precept here that what is not understood can not be explained. Less
importantly the system has no awareness that there are different sorts of explanation
which may be appropriate in response to different questions.
Clancey's work on GUIDON (1979, 1986a) and NEOMYCIN (Clancey and
Letsinger, 1981, Clancey 1985a) is an attempt to deal with some of these problems.
GUIDON, a tutoring system, can be seen as a development of its predecessor,
MYCIN, in at least the following ways: i) the system has (of necessity) a user-
model and some user-machine interaction and ii) Clancey has begun to think about
ways of organising the knowledge in the knowledge base (KB). NEOMYCIN is a
consultation system whose KB is that of MYCIN reorganised to explicitly include
strategic knowledge so that it can be used by GUIDON in teaching situations. The
reorganisation and expansion of the MYCIN KB required for teaching purposes is also
required for explanation purposes. Indeed it might be argued a priori that this would
be so, given the close interdependence of these two activities. In particular, MYCIN
rules had to be expanded to include knowledge such as the following. Strategic
know/edge is represented in NEOMYCIN in terms of hierarchical meta-rules (Davis,
1980). This provides a vehicle for the explicit representation of problem-solving
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strategies - in this case diagnosis of a disease. Causal knowledge is represented in
terms of rules. Disease process knowledge is implemented in terms of frames whose
slots are aspects of the disease process.
The application of these extensions to explanation is made clear in Clancey
(1983). In this paper the work on NEOMYCIN and GUIDON receives a clear
exposition based on a strong epistemological theory of how knowledge should be
organised in the KB of an expert system. Basically, Clancey argues that a K.B should
be viewed in terms of three kinds of knowledge, apart from the empirical associations
used in inferences:
- support knowledge Le. the causal and disease process knowledge mentioned
above.
- structural knowledge Le. abstractions which are used to index the rules of the
KB.
- strategic knowledge Le. the organization of goals and hypotheses for problem-
solving tasks such as diagnosis or interpretation.
One criticism of this work is that it is perhaps too tied to the MYCIN rule-based
approach. Thus even though an epistemology is advanced which is generally
applicable, the discussion is in terms of a particular approach. Clancey is too
concerned with explanations which are explanations of rules. Little account is taken of
the sorts of explanation which are appropriate in everyday life (Le. not simply to do
with rules) and in systems which seek to incorporate the causal and common-sense
knowledge needed. More recent work by Clancey (Clancey, 1986) shows a greater
awareness of the limitations of the rule-based approach and the need to incorporate
models at various levels. Indeed in his most recent work, Clancey argues that expert
systems should be seen as qualitative models of various domains.
Hasling, Clancey, and Rennels (1984) give a clear picture of how explanations are
treated in NEOMYCIN and of the explanation of strategies. Explanation in
NEOMYCIN is geared to the production of strategic explanations which are defined
as an attempt to make clear the plans and methods used in reaching a goal (in this
case, a medical diagnosis) (Hasling et al., 1984:5). Unlike previous approaches,
NEOMYCIN produces its strategic explanations from an abstract, declarative
representation of the strategy as a meta-rule. That is to say, that the meta-rules
which implement these strategies are not domain specific to the domain of medical
diagnosis. Thus, in NEOMYCIN, Why and How explanations are answered in
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terms of the current task (for example 'test-hypothesis') being pursued as part of a
general strategy such as 'group-and-differentiate'. Clancey (1985a) gives more
details of the sorts of meta-rules employed in the system.
With NEOMYCIN we can see a progression towards a system with a more viable
explanation capability. The NEOMYCIN KB contains different sorts of knowledge
which are explicitly represented and clearly differentiated from each other. This has
been done in terms of an epistemological theory of how a KB should be organised. In
general GUIDON and NEOMYCIN represent a move away from the simple display of
rules and rule traces. They are able to interact with the user and form relevant
explanations based on multiple knowledge sources. However, no attempt has been
made to enable the system to carryon a process of negotiation in order to determine a
correct explanation.
3.2.2 The sociolinguistic approach
The work of Goguen. Linde and Weiner on the system BLAH has made use of
sociolinguistic studies of human explaining behaviour to produce a theory of the
structure of explanation. An explanation. viewed as a discourse structure. is modelled
in the machine as a tree of statements and justifying reasons. The production of the
explanation can be viewed as a series of transformations on this tree. This approach
to explanation is also an approach to reasoning and hence argumentation as well.
BLAH - the theoretical background
Goguen. Weiner and Linde have collected data from a number of psycholinguistic
studies which has enabled them to produce their theory of the structure of explanation.
It is clear from their paper (Goguen et a1. 1983) that these authors do not see the
explanation system as something which is attached almost as an after-thought to
some reasoning system. They (ibid: 521) define reasoning as the 'internal mental
processes' which result in reasoning 'expressed in verbal form'. They define the
expression of reasoning to be explanation. Explanation is thus for them something
which is central in the lives of human beings since it is the sole access we have to the
reasoning of others. Given this it also likely to be central in any interface seeking to
be human -like,
Eschewing the normative approach of logicians and others they approach the study
of explanation in an empirical manner by observing how people produce explanations
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in commonly occurring situations. They hope that an understanding of how people
explain will result in more comprehensible machine output.
Their theory is stated as follows (ibid: 523): 'We wish to regard the text as a
sequence of transformations on an underlying tree structure which represents the
abstract form of the argument being developed'. An explanation is viewed as 'a unit of
language which purports to show why the speaker believes some particular
statement, and (in most cases) is intended to cause the hearer to accept this
statement'. As a tree structure plus transformations an explanation is amenable to
computational expression. The authors make use of a representation of explanation
parts as trees in which the leaves are statements and the nodes are labelled with the
different kinds of subordination. The explanation is built up by a series of
transformations on this tree. These transformations are signalled in the text of
naturally occurring explanations by 'enunciants' (Le. "any piece of text, of whatever
size, which signals a transformation" (ibid pg. 537)
A typical tree might look like the following where SI-3 are actual propositions:
STMT/RSN
/ \
SI STMTIRSN
/ \
S2 S3
This tree can be read as saying Sl because S2 because S3.
BLAH - practical application
The theoretical work reported on in Goguen et aI. (1983) has been implemented in the
BLAH explanation system (Weiner, 1980). This is a knowledge based system where
the assertions and justifications (statements and reasons) are produced by the rule-
based reasoning component. The KB is also partitioned into system or user Views
Le. the assertions currently believed. The system works by outputting, from the
reasoning component, a tree which represents a statement plus support (i.e. an
explanation) which is structured in a natural way with subordinating parts as
discussed above. The explanation generator translates this tree into the final output
text. The tree is pruned by reasoning in the user's view to see what s/he knows (i.e.,
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the partition of the knowledge base associated with the user is consulted). This
provides an elegant means of circumventing the need for user models. The pruning
which takes place as a result of this reasoning ensures that only relevant explanations
are given. The explanation is also made more comprehensible by making it less
complex.
One minor drawback of the system is the simplicity of the KB which it uses. Since
the research is primarily concerned with explanation rather than reasoning this is
understandable. Further, there is no reason to suppose that a BLAH-like system
could not have a KB with multiple diverse knowledge sources.
This work has had a profound influence on my own work. I have attempted to
follow the general approach in producing a model of argumentation which, while not
being as mathematically elegant as the use of tree transformations by these
researchers, at least provides a clear set of relationships between the various
components. I have also adopted the use of the tree structure for my argument-Is. I
have not made a systematic study of naturally occurring arguments but, as far as
possible, I have used examples drawn from real arguments. An ASP might be seen as
the attempt to produce a BLAH which can criticise a user's tree structure and sustain
an argument about a topic as well as produce its own argument-Is.
3.2.3 The critiquing approach
There are two bodies of research which exemplify this approach - the work of Langlotz
and Shortliffe on ONCOCIN (1983) and of Miller on ATTENDING (1983). In this
approach the relevance of the explanation to the user's wishes is guaranteed since the
program proceeds by asking for a user's plan (e.g. for therapy management) and then
compares it with its own while producing explanations of the differences. By means of
this mechanism, the attempt is made to return the control of the diagnostic or other
task to the hands of the physician dealing with the particular case. The machine
becomes an assistant rather than directive and intrusive. This aspect of the critiquing
approach makes it particularly attractive for work in the humanities.
ATTENDING
The approach in ATTENDING is very similar to that of ONCOCIN, albeit without the
interaction after the critique is given. The following quote from Miller (1983: 452)
gives a clear resume of the system's actions.
First, a conversion routine transforms the physician's plan, expressed as "menu
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selections". into a tree-structured form called the physician approach tree CPAT).
The PAT is then passed to the ADN [medical knowledge is stored in the form of
augmented decision networks] analyzer which uses the augmented decision
networks. together with the risks and benefits which augment their arcs, to
analyze the proposed approach. This analysis produces the alternative approach
tree (AAT), which includes the proposed approach plus any alternatives which
ATTENDING has found. Finally, the AAT is input to the prose generator which
produces the prose analysis.
In many ways an arguing system will be analogous to the above. Step one in such
a system will involve the parsing of the user input and the creation of a tree like
structure for the user's argument as well as the integration of this into the overall
argument. Step two will involve the finding of a suitable response. Step three will
involve the output of the response to the user's argument by means of text or a
graphical display. The most important point from an argument viewpoint is that while
selection of an alternative argument is analogous to argument response,
ATTENDING makes no attempt to assess the alternatives. This is something which
is probably going to be important in any argument since at the very least assessment
is needed to decide on the point in an opponent's argument to attack next.
ONCOCIN
Langlotz and Shortliffe (1983) discovered that the routine giving of advice by
ONCOCIN was standing in the way of physician acceptance of the program. This was
one of the main aims in the system. Thus, although the physician could override
ONCOCIN's recommendation, frequent such overridings became annoying to the
users. Langlotz and Shortliffe decided that this barrier to acceptance could be
overcome if the system, instead of routinely offering advice, was modified to criticize
the therapy plans of the doctor using the system. This critiquing approach is a
development of work done by Miller mentioned above. The ONCOCIN system is
intended to make such critiques more acceptable to the user by providing explanations
of the differences between the plan proposed by the physician and that recommended
by ONCOCIN. The critiquing approach thus allows the doctor a greater say in the
treatment plan. Furthermore the system provides an opportunity for educational use,
in that the user can be provided with explanations of the differences between his or
her plan and that of the system.
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Comparison is done by the method of hierarchical plan analysis. In short, this is a
technique based on the fact that decisions about which kinds of treatment should be
selected depend on other decisions at a different level. For instance, decisions about
radiation therapy may be dependent on decisions about chemotherapy. In the
comparison process the system determines whether there are significant differences
between matching components in the two plans. Explanations are generated for each
of these differences with the explanation dialogue focussed accordingly.
Again, given the limited aims of the system builders, it is not surprising that the
critiquing approach does not on its own represent a solution to the problems of
explanation. I hope, however, that it is obvious from my general remarks earlier and
from my comments above that I feel that adequate explanations will not be
forthcoming from an expert system until this includes elements from a BLAH-like
system and from the critiquing approach and that this is best represented by the
following approach.
3.2.4 The cooperative approach
This is the approach adopted by such researchers as Rector, Newton and Marsden
(Rector et al 1985), Kidd (1985), Worden et al. (1986) and Knight (1986). The
approach is exemplified by a shift in emphasis from a model of expert systems as
Delphic oracles toward a more cooperative model in which the system and the user act
together to solve a problem. This may involve, as in the suggestions of Kidd, a
system which is capable of a process of negotiation in order to produce the best
explanation. Apart from the work on cooperative interfaces to expert systems there is
also work on cooperative front ends to databases (Kaplan 1982) and research on
computer support for cooperative work (e.g. Winograd and Flores 1986).
The basic reason for the introduction of the cooperative model is, as has been
mentioned before. the extreme reluctance of users to accept expert systems. One
possible means of overcoming this reluctance is to have a system which does not
provide a once and for all answer but which 'cooperates' with the user in performing
some task. In one sense the cooperative model can be seen as an extension of the
critiquing model in that it is one function of an assistant to criticise the decisions of the
person being assisted. A full assistant will need to perform other functions as well.
For instance the assistant needs to know when to take the initiative, what to do when
a system decision is overriden, explain its own decisions and criticise the user's when
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asked.
These ideas have been implemented in a system for Electromyography
examinations which are aimed at diagnosing peripheral nerve disorders such as Motor
Neurone Disease. In addition to the domain knowledge and knowledge about
strategies, the EMG assistant has knowledge of how to be an assistant. The chief
interest of the paper is in the alternative model of explanation it suggests - in which
the user and system cooperate in a task, the system provides explanations of its
decisions and expects explanations of the user's decisions. In order to accomplish this
the system conducts a dialogue with the user. This dialogue would. in an cooperative
explanation system, enable the system not only to determine the most appropriate
explanation to give but to understand the explanation given by the user.
3.2.5 Conclusion of this review of explanation facilities
As a result of this review of explanation capabilities I contend: firstly, that there has
been a trend towards greater user/system interaction, and secondly, that there has
been a trend towards cooperative rather than oracular responses. An ASP is intended
to be both interactive and cooperative and can thus be seen as a natural outgrowth
from the above research.
There are however differences between the work of Wordern et al., Knight and
Rector et a1. and myself. For instance Rector et a1. envisage a cooperative expert
system as ideally one which has two parts - the 'problem representation system'
(PRS) and the 'assistant system'. It is the job of the latter to cooperate with the user,
with communication via the blackboard-like PRS, in finding the solution to a problem.
My system is ultimately designed to bring about agreement rather than cooperation.
Of course, as Grice has shown, no form of conversation is possible without
cooperation at some level. However my system tries to cooperate in the user's
overall goal (of reaching the truth of some matter) by being as argumentative as
possible. The user's arguments are put to as extreme a test as the system can
possibly devise and argument is sustained for as long as possible. Thus neither the
system or the user is the master. There is a game played in which truth is the
prize.! The system plays the role of death in a chess-game with the user in which
truth and reality are the prizes rather than the user's life. That this is so is a natural
1 This is the notion of argument or dialectic to be found in Plato's dialogues. According to
Plato we use dialectic as a means of experiencing the transcendent world of the forms.
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result of the battle-metaphor which lies at the heart of our notion of argument. This in
turn is related to Popper's notion that what we are about in science is finding ways of
falsifying hypotheses (1963). Thus argument is not to be seen in a negative way as a
war in which power relations are fixed but rather as a series of duels between equals
in which some matter of honour is settled.
In the above I have, of course, left out many approaches to explanation in expert
systems. This partly for reasons of space but also because the above are the most
relevant to the work I am reporting in this thesis. Apart from the above perhaps the
most important contributions are:
• The computational approach to explanation (Swartout 1983, Neches et al 1985)
in which automatic programming techniques are used to produce an expert system,
leaving a trace of the refinement structure which can subsequently be used by the
explanation capability in justifying the program's code. This work is based on the
assumption that the reasoning which system designers go through in producing the
system is what is needed in producing explanations. The automatic program
generator makes use of domain models and domain principles (problem-solving
strategies) in creating the system.
• The graphical approach in which explanations are displayed as mixed text and
graphics using current work station technology. Representative work includes that
of Clancey on Guidon-Watch (Richer and Clancey 1985) and Langlotz et al (1983)
on the interface to the ONCOCIN program discussed above. In the latter case the
interface is composed of a screen version of the form used for recording the
experimental plans for treating cancer with chemotherapy. The principal aim being
ease and naturalness of use. As we shall see below (in the discussion of
hypertext) similar developments are being made in displaying and interacting with
other kinds of data and knowledge bases.
Other approaches to explanation in expert systems can be gleaned from the
proceedings of the Alvey sponsored workshops on explanation which have been held
over the past few years.
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3.3 Approaches to argumentation
Unlike the research in explanation presented above. in argumentation there is neither
a) a clear picture of the sorts of research carried out; nor b) a coherent and organic
progression from one area to another. This is partly because a lot of the research in
explanation is based on the work done on Mycin thus giving it a feeling of
connectedness. On the other hand I feel that the main problem is that the area of
argumentation - a battleground for centuries - is one which does not divided clearly
into different approaches. Because of this the work I shall present is not split by area
but by researcher or research group. I will present the work of four groups or
individuals and one more diverse set of approaches:
Yale group
McGuigan and Black
Cohen
Reichman-Adar
Hypertext and similar approaches
3.3.1 The Yale group - the process model of argument
The above is a convenient nom de guerre for a group of researchers at Yale who are
involved in research into various aspects of argumentation. While their concerns are
not identical - there are at least two main areas of research - they are rendered fairly
homogeneous by their background in Schankian theories of language and memory
structures. The two main areas of research are i) adversary arguments ii) the
understanding of arguments in newspaper editorials.
Adversary arguments
This is represented by the work of Flowers. McGuire and Birnbaum (1982), Birnbaum
(1982) and Flowers and Dyer (1984). As presented in the former paper the authors
are seeking to formulate a theory of the processes which are needed in comprehending
and generating argument steps. They have implemented their theories in a computer
program (ABDUUILANA) which can take either side in an adversary argument about
the Arab Israeli war of 1967. Flowers et al. make a strong distinction between
adversary arguments and persuasion arguments. The goal of the former is winning,
of the latter agreement. By and large the sorts of argument I am concerned with are
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the latter - argument used as a means of cooperative problem solving. However I feel
that such arguments (if they are to deserve the name) must be at least as well argued
as adversarial arguments. Flowers et al. make the distinction in terms of the sorts of
moves allowable in the former which are not made in the latter. In particular an
adversarial argument allows for personal attacks. This may be largely true. However
the sons of attacks they describe are not really personal attacks as such but attacks
on ingrained positions. There is thus not so much of a distinction here. The
cooperative arguer can attack the background beliefs of the user. Neither kind of
argument easily countenances the sorts of degenerate arguments or rows in which
personal abuse is allowed. That this is so is shown by the example of legal argument.
This is essentially adversarial but has as its goal the solution of a problem i.e. the
doing of justice. Thus what Flowers et al. have to say is of relevance to the
cooperative arguer.
In order to implement the process of arguing Flowers et al. have made use of the
fact that arguments have a certain structure. In their terms they are made up of
propositions which are connected by argument relations either of attack or support.
The possibility of successfully engaging in an argument depends on argument tactics.
For instance in order to attack an argument one can either: 1. attack its claim; 2. attack
the evidence offered in support of the claim (i.e., its grounds); or 3. show that the
evidence fails to support the claim. In order for the arguer to relate argument steps to
the argument as a whole an argument must be stored. Flowers et al. use an
argument graph - 'a network of propositions connected by argument relations'. They
go on (ibid: 281): 'This graph is important both for understanding and rebutting in an
argument, because it constitutes the conversational context into which a new
utterance is integrated. and found to be coherent.'
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Israel responsible for
'67 war
I
<-------- attacks ---------> Egypt
responsible
for '67 war
I
suppon: attacks are
acts of war
support:
I blockades
I are acts
I of war
I
Egypt blockaded
Israel
Israel fired on Egypt
An example argument graph (from Flowers and Dyer, 1984).
The notion of the argument graph was very influential in my own model. Thus the
graph given above is very similar to the examples given in the introductory chapter.
The notion of (external) relations of attack or support between the two arguments is
retained. The principal difference is that the notion of (internal) support between
evidence and claims exemplified above is replaced by the notion of a warrant which
relates grounds and claims. (A notion introduced in the later work of this group.) This
avoids confusion between the support relation between two arguments and the
support relation between grounds and claims.
Components of an argument graph which are likely to recur are called argument
molecules. The importance of these is twofold: a) they facilitate argument
understanding since they can act as components of the argument graph, and b) they
restrict the range of potential responses by making clear which propositions are most
vulnerable. It is not entirely clear from the paper what kind of restriction is involved
here. I take it that they can be used to determine which of the propositions making up
an argument are more or less sustainable/attackable. This is made clearer in the
Birnbaum paper where he shows how such structures could be useful in finding the
propositions which are 'likely candidates' for attack. Birnbaum (1982: 65): 'In essence,
a molecule packages knowledge about the logical structure of an argument fragment in
a way which makes explicit which potential responses would have some logical force,
and which would not'.
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Flowers et a1. also attempt to show that possible rebuttals can be found in the
comprehension process. This comes about because, in performing a search of the
causal chains which they use to represent historical facts. the system can note 'near
misses'. It seems intuitively that this is something like what happens when we argue
- possible rebuttals are accessed as a new argument is presented to us. I am not
sure however that the ability to use near misses in this way is anything more than an
artifact of the sort of representation they use. If. for example, memory is represented
by production rules and remembering as the process of firing these rules then it is not
so easy to see how 'near misses' could be determined. Perhaps all this shows is that
the Schankian type representation is superior. Note that this is related to the Yale
group's belief that argument is not an explicitly planned activity but is essentially
opportunistic in that rebuttals are often found while engaged in doing something else
(Birnbaum, ibid: 63). McGuire, Birnbaum and Flowers (1981) make the point that it is
only when such remindings are not found in this opportunistic manner that the
argument graph is used for the generation of responses. As McGuire et al. conclude:
'It seems possible that a theory of conversation (or more specifically, of
argumentation) based on this kind of opportunistic processing can reconcile our
everyday perceptions of conversations (or arguments) as being, on the one hand,
planful, and on the other, wandering and disorganized.'
One further criticism of the above work, raised by Cohen (1987), is that while it
deals with what responses to generate it has little to say about how participants
structure arguments and not much on how arguments may be assessed.
Understanding newspaper editorials
The two papers I shall concentrate on here are Alvarado, Dyer and Flowers (1985)
and Alvarado. Dyer and Flowers (1986). This work represents a development of the
work discussed above and an application of it to a particular kind of text - the
newspaper editorial. Again because of its concern with naturallanguage issues this
work is only of partial relevance to my own. In fact it is of more relevance to a
possible development of my work where the arguing system is used in comprehending
the arguments used in, say, literary critical texts. The work presented in these papers
is also only concerned with argument comprehension.
Alvarado et al. call their model a conceptual model in contrast to the structural
model of Cohen (see below). Their system understands the arguments in newspaper
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editorials not merely by recognising the structural relations between parts of the
argument but by building a conceptual graph which '...captures interactions between
goals, plans, events, states, beliefs and argument units'. One new aspect is the
inclusion of Toulmin's warrants as more basic beliefs relating conclusions and
evidence.
There are two major new features of the Yale Group's work: argument units and
reasoning scripts.
• Argument units
According to the 1985 paper, 'Argument units (AUs) are abstract reasoning
structures which organize: (a) belief, goals, and plans; and Cb)support and attack
chains of reasoning and relationships in arguments'. While argument molecules are
not mentioned in these papers, I think that it is safe to say that units and molecules
are related notions. Alvarado et aI. (1985) mentions seven ADs: AD-ACTUAL-
CAUSE, AU-OPPOSITE-EFFECT, AU-EXPECTATION-FAILURE, AU-
HYPOCRISY, AU-ACTUAL-EFFECT, AU-EQUIVALENCE and AU-
RELEVANT-ISSUE. These can be illustrated by AU-OPPOSITE-EFFECf which
contains the following reasoning chain:
Although Y believes that executing his PLAN P will achieve GOAL G, SELF does
not believe this because SELF believes that executing P will thwart G. Therefore,
SELF believes that P is bad.
where SELF is the originator of of the AU. As we can see, unlike the situations
discussed above, the AU captures reasoning chains which are essentially to do with
the goals and plans of the participants. For Alvarado et aI. (1985):
...following an argument involves recognizing these constructs [argument
connectives such as 'but', goal, plan, belief relationships], accessing the specific
conceptualizations they refer to, mapping from them into their appropriate
argument unit, and triggering that argument unit's inference rules for recognizing
belief, support and attack chains of reasoning and relationships.
As they conclude 'We believe that all arguments are composed of configurations of a
fixed number of abstract argument units'. An AU organizes several support or attack
relationships and provides the means for integration into the argument graph as well
as a means of accessing the graph. There is also a taxonomy of AUs depending on
whether the support/attack relationships are to do with (a) the implementation of
plans (b) the pursuit of goals or (c) the holding of beliefs in ideological contexts.
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• Reasoning scripts
In Alvarado 1986 it is made clear that they think of their theory as a theory of
reasoning as well as argument. As far as I can tell reasoning scripts are used as a
means of identifying and tracking chains of reasoning which support beliefs. Thus they
are necessary in building the conceptual graph. I assume also that they will be used in
concert with AUs to fill in the justifications in these (higher level) reasoning chains.
At any rate they are a development of a notion mentioned in Flowers et al. (1984:
658). Here 'A fundamental notion ... is that human reasoning frequently makes use of
previous examples. prior chains of reasoning formed from previous arguments, and
adaptations of situations related to the current problem'. The idea is that 'general
rules' are used in the first instance to produce an elaborate chain. This is then stored
as a script which is then accessed in solving similar problems. In Alvarado et al.
(1986: 251) the reasoning scripts are more closely related to the plans and goals of
the participants.
In OpEd [Alvarado's program], reasoning scripts are used to organize
prespecified reasoning chains involving cause-effect relationships among politico-
economic goals, plans, events, and states...OpEd recognizes and instantiates
these reasoning scripts when following belief justifications which contain structural
gaps ...
To illustrate this the following is the the $R-DROP-FOREIGN-SPENDING-->
DROP-JOBS script:
IF COUNTRY Cl spends less on PRODUCT P produced by PRODUCER PI from
COUNTRY C2, THEN there is a decrease on the EARNINGS of PRODUCER PI.
AND IF there is a decrease on the EARNINGS of PRODUCER PI, THEN there
is a decrease in the number of OCCUPATIONS in PRODUCER PI.
One criticism highlighted here but true of the whole approach is that the rule
mentioned here is very specific to reasoning in a particular domain - economics. The
authors claim that their approach is generalizable to any editorial. That may be so
(since they are usually concerned with political or social or economic issues) but I
doubt whether it can so easily be transferred to other arguments.
3.3.2 McGuigan and Black - the rhetorical model of argument
Another perspective on the study of argument is provided by McGuigan and Black
(1986). This approach, while not as fully worked out as that of the Yale group has the
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advantage of support from empirical studies as well as relative independence from the
ideas of Schank on memory and language comprehension.
In a manner similar to rhetorical studies of argumentation they have produced a
typology of argument which is very useful as a starting point for my own work. As a
result of an examination of a number of arguments, McGuigan and Black have divided
argument structures into three types: argument by analogy, categorical argument and
causal argument. Categorical argument (or argument using categories) includes
deduction. What is interesting about this division is that they believe '...that the
representations and processes used for argument also serve for understanding the
world in general'. That is to say that they believe that the process of argument
comprehension (and generation) are not distinct from the process of understanding
generally. They support this by showing: a) that categories are important both in
argument and in the process of gaining understand about the world; b) that the
physical world cannot be comprehended without an awareness of causal relations;
and, c) analogies are an important means of grasping the significance of new
situations and assimilating new knowledge. As a result of this, their argument
comprehension program proceeds in a fashion more or less indistinguishable from the
way a general world understander would. While I agree that argument understanding
is related to world understanding (arguments have an epistemic role) I feel that they
have not proven that there are not specific knowledge structures for argument. Apart
from this their approach can be criticised since they have not clearly distinguished
between argument comprehension and generation or between comprehension and
assessment. The latter distinction is necessary since it is possible to comprehend an
argument which is assessed as being weak.
McGuigan and Black have implemented their ideas in a program called MAGAC.
As it is presented in the paper, this program deals with arguments (comprehends and
assesses them) by instantiating frame like structures called support and conclusion
organization frames (SOFs and COFs). The program proceeds by utilizing
background knowledge to fill the empty slots of the COF. As far as I can tell this
knowledge is placed in the system by the builder - there is no means of inferring it
during processing.
While the work of McGuigan and Black contains some good ideas (on strategies
for example) and has been evaluated by empirical tests I feel that it fails on one major
count: There is no clear and precise theoretical backing for the implementation. It is
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simply asserted that argument comprehension is accomplished by the same structures
as world understanding - there is no theory to link these. Nor is there any theory or
model to link comprehension, evaluation and production.
3.3.3 Cohen - the structural model of argument
Cohen (1987) is principally concerned with understanding natural language (as anyone
interested in arguments must ultimately be). However the distinctions she draws and
the algorithms she presents are of relevance to any work on understanding and
evaluating arguments. Cohen's paper is divided into three main sections. These deal
with the three main theories she advances as part of the background theory from
which a computational model of argument might be derived. These are:
• a theory of expected coherent structure - i.e. a specification of the kinds of
proposition and their ordering;
• a theory of linguistic clue interpretation - Cohen, since she is dealing with natural
language, develops a taxonomy of possible clue words or words (especially
connectives) which can give information about the user's intention in a proposition;
• a theory of evidence relationships Le. what counts as evidence for what.
For Cohen an argument is a set of propositions. These can be analyzed one at a
time to see where they fit into the argument as a whole. The argument is represented
as a tree. The interpretation of an argument can be construed as the assignment of a
place in the tree for each new proposition. Its position depends on a set of reception
algorithms. Its relationship to other propositions (if it is related) is decided by an
'evidence oracle'. As far as I can see the new proposition is fitted into the tree only if
it is passed by the evidence oracle. This may be a drawback since in certain
categories of argument, for example those with many sub-arguments, it is necessary
to assess whether or not a proposition detracts from the argument. In this case it
needs to be stored as part of the overall argument even though it fails.
The evidence oracle is perhaps the most interesting part of the system - especially
since none of the other researchers have devoted much attention to it. The basic
definition of evidence is given as:
A proposition P is evidence for a proposition Q if there is some logical connection
from P to Q - i.e. some rule of inference such that P is premise to Q's conclusion.
On the face of it this seem to equate arguments with deductively valid arguments.
- 64-
However, Cohen takes account of the fact that we are not deduction machines. She
introduces two notions to deal with this - 'modus brevis' and relaxed logic- as well as
a notion of plausibility which includes reference to the possible beliefs of others. The
oracle works a 'black box' which accepts a set of two propositions and determines
whether there is an evidence relationship between them. To do this it must: a)
identify missing premise(s) and b) verify the plausibility of the missing premise(s) In
order to achieve b) the system must:
- use logic in the system knowledge base
- relax logic in the system knowledge base
- stereotype speaker i.e. form a user knowledge base
- judge plausibility Le. test against the hypothetical beliefs of an ideal third person.
Modus Brevis is a notion developed in a paper by Sadock (1977). The rationale
behind his work is that in arguing we rarely present fully valid deductive arguments.
He argues that we employ deduction in arguments but that these are often presented
in a truncated form i.e. if we think of an argument as a deductive syllogism, that we
miss out the major or minor premises. Thus for example in the argument presented by
a below:
a: The Falklands war won Thatcher the election.
b:Why?
a: Because she was seen as an 'iron lady'.
the missing major premise is something like 'All iron ladies win elections'. As Cohen
says 'The common form for arguments, then, is one where the hearer must supply
missing statements in order to establish the connections for the representation of the
argument'.
Relaxed logic includes what other writers have called induction and abduction. If
the system fails to find a logical connection then it tests to see if the statement can be
derived by relaxing the requirements for deduction. For Cohen relaxed logic is a
means by which the system fills in either a user knowledge base with plausible
premises (Le. those it is plausible for the user to believe) or its own knowledge base
with the results of this plausible reasoning or with generalizations. Abduction is more
clearly used when the system does not believe a premise and has no prior knowledge
of a particular speaker (or stereotypical knowledge of a class of speakers) then the
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system must postulate new facts. Cohen speaks of this as reasoning from the beliefs
of a hypothetical person. One means of doing this would be an abduction from P->Q,
Q, therefore P, where P is not believed by the system but could plausibly be held by
the user.
In conclusion then, I feel that there is much of value in Cohen's approach if only
because she allots sufficient concern to evaluation in the comprehension of arguments.
As with the work of the Yale group it is clear that argument, while it is a social
interaction on one level, is deeply concerned with issues to do with valid and plausible
forms of inference.
3.3.4 Reichman - the discourse model of argument
It is very difficult to summarize Reichman's (Reichman-Adar, 1984, Reichman, 1985)
work in a short space. However the main points of her theory are:
a) a conversation can be viewed as a sequence of moves - e.g 'support' and
'challenge' moves are particularly relevant to argument;
b) the conversation has an underlying structure which enables us to follow its
many 'twists and turns';
c) the structure is a hierarchy of discourse units (or elements which playa
particular role in the conversation);
d) at anyone time there are two context spaces (the name she gives to discourse
units embodied in conversation moves or series of utterances) active in a current
section of conversation - the ground or preceding and controlling context space
and thefigure or currently being developed space;
e) context spaces have an internal structure which includes the set of utterances in
the space, a pointer to its controlling space and a specification of the type of
relation to the controlling space;
f) the grammar which controls movement between context spaces can be encoded
in an Augmented Transition Network (ATN).
In short then Reichman envisages a conversation as a series of discourse moves
or conversation moves. As Grice (1975) pointed out, these moves can be more or
less appropriate given the current state of the conversation. Reichman's principal goal
is to render Grice's maxims for conversation more computationally tractable. To this
end there are rules for determining when a conversational move is appropriate. In the
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model which she provides, conversational moves are represented as the acts in an
ATN-like grammar. As test conditions are met, using information about the
conversation stored in the context space (CS), the grammar gives the moves which
are currently possible. The CSs thus constitute the static information about the
conversation while the ATN represents the dynamic aspect of the conversation. In
this way a context space 'fulfills' the conversation move. Reichman means by this that
the new context space is set up as the static record of the move. To achieve this the
context space contains slots which organize the propositions which make up the
move, representations of the components which are necessary for a move to be
'fulfilled', pointers to other context spaces and the status of the CS in the conversation
(Le. active, controlling and so on). Reichman mentions two types of context space:
issue and non-issue. Issue is further divided into epistemic, evaluative and deontic
CSs. All of these can be debative or non-debative (if the latter they will have slots for
protagonists, antagonists, counterclaims and countersupports). Non-issue CSs
include comment, narrative and support.
I have two main difficulties with Reichman's work. While it provides a feasible
means of delineating the legal moves in a conversation and of dealing with the thorny
problem of Grice's maxim of Relation (relevance is relative to the context spaces
currently operative), it is, firstly, too constraining, in that natural conversations are
more creative, and, secondly, somewhat deficient in giving actual strategies for
assessment and next-move generation. In everyday arguments we are aware of
when we are losing and argument or, looking back, of who the winners and losers
were. Thus we must have some means of assessing the overall strength of an
argument. This is of vital importance in an automatic system. The system will only be
able to tell that it has lost the argument if there is some explicit means for evaluation.
This awareness is important since the system needs to be convinced of this defeat
before it will change it mind. Thus arbitrary changes to the knowledge base will be
avoided and a principled and human-like means of knowledge acquisition can be
implemented.
3.3.5 Hypertext and argumentation
While there are many examples of the use of hypertext systems as a means of
storing, retrieving and displaying arguments, I will concentrate on two: a) VanLehn b)
Marshall. For a general resume of hypertext systems the reader should consult
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Conklin (1987a.b). Other systems which deal with argument include Trigg (1986) and
Begeman and Conklin (1988). There are yet other systems which, while not really
hypertext systems, have some similarities. These include the work of Lowe (1985),
Stefik and others on Colab (Stefik, Foster, Bobrow, Kahn, Lanning and Suchman,
1987) as well as the general area of what has become known as 'groupware' (Byte
special report December 1988). As a third example in this section I will briefly
discuss the work on Colab.
• Van Lehn (1985) discusses the use of NoteCards as a means of representing the
argumentation necessary in theorizing about the learning process involved in learning
procedures. As he says The main job of argumentation is to contrast the explanatory
power of various sets of hypotheses. Metaphorically speaking, the theorist takes
several sets of hypotheses and sees how many bugs each can explain.' (1985:4)
Basically Van Lehn took the argument structure of his thesis and represented it in
NoteCards format. A Notecards 'card' or window contains each hypothesis in the
theory and has pointers to other cards giving the arguments for and against the
hypothesis. As the report suggests it is relatively simple to take a linearly organized
document as a tree of arguments and translate this into the network available in
Notecards. Indeed it is one feature of such systems that they allow the fairly arbitrary
representation of such structures. Unexpectedly VanLehn found that in two instances
the use of NoteCards forced theory reform. Firstly when adding new hypotheses
VanLehn found it easier to represent what had been a tree as a matrix (see Figure
3.1). This resulted in a table with clear representation of whether a piece of evidence
supported a hypothesis or not. When this was done a major re-evaluation of the
strength of the differing hypotheses was achieved. 'In short, sloppy reasoning,
abetted by a poor rhetorical organization, allowed the suppression of a winning
hypothesis.' (1985:6). The second discovery was made when NoteCards was used to
display the graph made up of the cards and the pointers. When this was done it was
discovered that relationships between the various issues (about which hypotheses
were made) were missing. As VanLehn points out this should not be the case in a
properly structured theory. In effect what had been left out were the decompositions
of the large issues into smaller ones. These decompositions were not made explicit in
the original document and therefore represented unexamined and unexaminable
assumptions. In the event VanLehn discovered a new decomposition for one of the
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issues and hence a new version of his theory. As he concludes (1985:9):
However, there is no cadre of professional argument-organizers who are the
analogs of printers and graphics designers. Nor can there be such a cadre. The
organization of arguments is too strongly coupled to their content. ... To put it
differently, argument has an organization whether one likes it or not. ... Someone
has to give the arguments a good organization. And that someone must be the
thinker who is responsible for the argument's content. NoteCards' organizations
are emergent properties of the content of the arguments NoteCards' emphasis
on emergent organizations makes it harder to fool oneself. Perhaps the hardest
job that a theorist has is to discover the assumptions that he or she is
making ....NoteCards seems to provide such an aid.... The NoteCards database is
about as close as any written artifact can get to expressing a whole theory.
NoteCards is a first step on the path towards a theoretician's workbench that is a
synergistic combination of human and artificial intelligence .
• Marshall (1987) discusses, among other applications, the use of NoteCards as a
means of representing 'the logical structure of an argument' (1987:253). In this case
the card and pointer mechanism is used to capture the structure of arguments in a
manner based on that of Toulmin (1958). (I will have more to say about Toulmin's
work in chapter 4.) In this case the domain is that of legal arguments. The structure
used to represent these can be represented as in Figure 3.2 and is one which I have
adopted for my own display of argument-Os. Using this graphic representation, the
relations between the different elements in the argument can be shown and one
argument can be linked to other arguments. This faciliates the comprehension of the
argument.
Marshall raises the important issue of the level at which argumentation structures
should be represented and the semantics of the representation. As she argues a
hypertext system allows a range of representations at different levels of the the same
argument. Thus an argument can be seen as a whole. Alternatively the system can
allow a process of 'zooming' to finer and finer details of the argument (cf TPM, the
Prolog debugging tool discussed by Eisenstadt and Brayshaw, 1987). At the lowest
level these would be the individual propositions which make up the argument.
Marshall also commends the use of matrix or tabular representations of the argument
(similar to those of VanLehn) as a means of presenting an assessment or as a means
of displaying the relations of support and/or attack between propositions.
To anticipate some points to be made in the final chapter of this thesis, Marshall
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points out (1987:268) that:
[One] way hypertext systems can be extended is by facilitating programmatic
interaction with user-created structures and substances. For example, if a
representation is used by an expert system or some other type of inference engine,
it may be necessary for the program to interact with the content of a node or object
to extract the knowledge inside it. Since hypertext is a good vehicle for capturing
and structuring knowledge, programmatic interpretation of a hypertext network
appears to be a logical extension.
This is a point also made by VanLehn and again more forcefully by Halasz (1988).
'The integration of hypermedia and AI technology is an interesting direction to explore.
In many ways, hypermedia and knowledge-based systems are a natural fit.' (1988:
847) As I shall suggest below (chapter 8) argumentation is a natural means of
integrating these two technologies.
• The Colab project as reported in Stefik, Foster, Bobrow, Kahn, Lanning and Suchman
(1987) is an attempt to create an environment which can be used to facilitate
'collaborative problem solving'. To do this each user has a workstation connected to
other workstations by a local area network so that each user can see on his or her
screen the same public information that the others see. Users can interact verbally or
by means of software which allows them to draw or write on the shared screen areas.
Two pieces of software are of especial interest: (a) the Cognoter and (b) the
Argnoter.
The former, the Cognoter, is used to facilitate the production of a communally
produced presentation. To some extent this program is a communal version of other
outliners commonly packaged with word processing software. However the Cognoter
can be used in all three phases of the production of an outline: brainstorming,
organizing and evaluation. In the brainstorming phase concepts are entered freely on
the screen. In the organization phase links are drawn between concepts to represent
their order and ideas are grouped together. In the final phase, evaluation, the
participants reorganize, amend and delete parts of the outline. As Stefik et aI. point
out (ibid: 36), this tool can itself be used to facilitate human-human argument
exchanges:
In Cognoter, the various decision-making processes are separate and distinct
operations. Delaying deletion until the last phase, for example, provides a more
visible basis for argument in the sense that an argument for deleting an idea
because it is not relevant may be more convincing when that idea is not visibly
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linked with any others; or arguing the unimportance of an idea may be more
convincing when the competing ideas are available for comparison.
However in the second tool, the Argnoter, work is proceeding to produce a tool which
will act as a sort of argumentation spreadsheet. This tool imitates the arrangements
of meetings aimed at trying out proposals which the Colab team have used without
computer aid. The goal is to produce the best proposal. Again the tool has three
phases: proposing, arguing and evaluating. In the proposing phase each proposal is
given a description (which may be text alone or include graphics) and a name. In the
arguing phase reasons for and against the various proposals are written beneath the
appropriate proposal and distinguished as being either for or against the proposal. In
the evaluation phase the assumptions behind the arguments for and against proposals
are requested. As Stefik et al (ibid: 39) put it 'Assumptions, in Argnoter are
expressed as statements about statements'. Belief sets, or sets of statements
accepted as valid or rejected as invalid by the participants are used by the Argnoter to
evaluate the proposals. As Stefik et al. explain (ibid: 39):
The proposal display is generated by stepping through the arguments about the
proposal, looking up the assumptions, and then displaying those arguments that
are supported in the specified belief set. Multiple belief sets may coexist, and any
participant is able to create ...belief sets. The belief sets are intended to
characterize different generic points of view.
Evaluation proceeds by selecting and ranking the various evaluation criteria such as
feasibility and cost which the participants want to use. Thus proposals can be viewed
in relation to different criteria as well as in relation to different belief sets. The best
proposal is therefore the best in relation to a particular belief set and as assessed in
terms of a specific set and ranking of criteria. The assessment does not seem to be
automatically performed. The system simply displays the proposals in the light of the
beliefs and criteria and the decision is left up to the meeting.
This system has many attractions. For instance it can deal with many domains
since it is only concerned with the structure of the argument not its content. As Stefik
et al. point out (ibid: 39):
Argnoter need not understand the meaning of design proposals: It need only
differentiate between proposals, arguments, assumptions, and belief sets, and
compute the relevant logical support relationships.
While I am impressed by this work I have three main criticisms:
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(i) It seems unlikely that any real evaluation can be done without an analysis of
the semantics of what is being evaluated. Much is made explicit in Argnoter but
apparently not the semantics of the propositions. The system relies on a shared
semantics on the part of its users.
(ii) In any real argument the debate can be followed in many dimensions. Thus
there needs to be a means of allowing debate about the belief sets before
evaluation can occur.
(iii) There is more to a viewpoint than a set of beliefs. While the use of belief sets
goes some way towards the modelling of these there will often be a structure in
these i.e. a theory or a model of a situation in which certain beliefs depend on
others and so on. This constitutes another possible dimension of the argument.
Nonetheless there is much of interest in the Colab project. If only as they say
(ibid: 40) because:
...making the structure of arguments explicit facilitates consensus by reducing
disagreement that arises from uncommunicated differences.
3.3.6 Conclusion of this review of computational models of argument
If the relation of ASPs to explanation capabilities is one of continuity, the relation to
the models discussed above is more complex. ASPs make use of elements from
almost all of the models discussed. These are summarized in the next section. They
also fulfill many of the same functions. In particular:
• ASPs (like the Yale group and Reichman) attempt to respond to user arguments;
• ASPs (like Cohen's model) check user arguments;
• ASPs (like the hypertext models) make use of graphical displays of arguments;
• ASPs (like McGuigan and Black's MAGAC) contain a typology of arguments.
At the same time ASPs can be used to provide an interface to an expert system which
subsumes explanation capabilities. In this, and in its integration of all these elements,
the ASP is substantially different from any of these approaches.
3.4 Conclusion
By way of a conclusion I would like to outline a series of lessons which have been
imparted by the examples of the systems discussed above. In the next chapter I will
develop a model in the light of these lessons.
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Lessons from the research on explanation
• all aspects of the domain knowledge (including structure and strategies) must be
represented explicitly
• this knowledge should be separated
• particular knowledge representations are appropriate for explanation structures
(especially tree-like structures in which a statement is supported by reasons which
may in turn be supported by reasons)
• in order to deal with explanations the knowledge base should be divided into views
• believable representations need the results of empirical research into human
explanations
• explanations are open-ended
• explanations are conducted within on-going conversational exchanges
• an explanation is a structure; explanation is an activity which produces this
structure
• it is possible to provide a graphical visualization of an explanation
Lessons from the research on argumentation
• data structures are needed for representing arguments in terms of individual steps
and overall arguments
• the processing of arguments can be thought of in terms of parsing. checking and
response
• structures for representing strategies for argument production and generation should
be available
• a typology of argument types is needed
• there should be a computational means of dealing with these types
• (from hypertext) it is possible to have multiple representations/views of an argument
both textual and graphical and a means of interacting with these/ traversing them
-000-
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Chapter 4 - Models of interpretation and argument
Argument: Interpretation may be viewed as a process of applying
transformative rules to facts and the results of other transformations in
order to produce a set of claims and supporting reasons (an
argument-L). Argumentation may be viewed in terms of arguers,
arguments and domains. The notion of argument style is a means of
determining which types of reasoning are operative in a domain.
Relevance concerns the fact and warrant tokens.
In the previous chapter we presented a historical account of the background of the
ASParch project and suggested that explanation and argument are closely related. In
the present chapter I put forward the claim that argument and interpretation are
similarly related. My main reasons for this claim are as follows: (a) in the domain of
archaeology there is rarely disagreement about facts but about interpretations of facts;
and, (b) since interpretation is an open-ended process - any interpretation can be
superseded - then the attempt to get to the correct interpretation requires argument
and debate. The former is an empirical claim about what archaeologists do (though
surely generalizable to many other sciences and to areas such as medicine, psycho-
therapy and so on). The latter is a claim about the nature of interpretation. If these
assumptions are correct then argument needs interpretation to provide its object or
topics whereas interpretation needs argument as the means by which more and more
satisfactory interpretations are achieved. Apart from this an interpretation may be
represented in terms of a claim with its supporting grounds and can therefore act as an
argument-L
In the remainder of this chapter I will present a model of interpretation and of
argumentation; introduce the notion of argument style; discuss arguments from
analogy and principles; and end with some comments on relevance and level shift in
arguments.
4.1 Interpretation
A model of interpretation is needed as part of the overall model of argumentation since
we need to specify the component which produces the object for argumentation. In the
- 74-
domain of archaeology the principal reasoning task is interpretation and the principal
object of argumentation the results of interpretation. Apart from excavation, there are
others such as cataloguing, description and statistical analysis. In general, however,
these either contain interpretative elements or can be seen as part of the
interpretative process. While the model of interpretation forms part of my overall
model of argumentation it can also stand on its own as a model of the interpretative
task. For this reason I have discussed it in a separate section.
I have derived the model of interpretative reasoning used from the work of J-C
Gardin (Gardin 1980, 1987) and various of his colleagues in which he puts forward
what he calls a logicist analysis of archaeological reasoning. We have already
discussed this work and its implications for archaeological reasoning in chapter 2.
Here we will discuss the model of interpretation put forward.
Gardin's logicist models provide a clear, principled and general statement of
interpretative reasoning. They are derived from a consideration of archaeological
reasoning and therefore are ideal for the model of interpretation needed for a model of
argumentation in that domain. At the same time they are of wider application. The
approach has been applied to many areas both inside archaeology and outside. For
instance there is an interesting analysis of Baudelaire's poem Chats in Natali-Smit
(1981).
The logicist approach produces analyses of archaeological reasoning which can be
expressed clearly in diagrammatic form. The principal material is the reasoning of
archaeologists as exhibited in their texts. Thus the logicist model does not attempt to
simulate the actual process of forming the interpretation but the process of justifying
it. Logicist models 'are not meant to provide a film of the successive stages of a
construction, as they 'really' developed, but rather a kind of flow diagram indicating one
way of reproducing the construction through a mechanistic sequence of operations that
may have nothing to do with the author's own mental processes' (Gardin 1980: 122).
They are thus necessarily related to justification and hence to argument.
The main aim is to produce an architecture of the propositions which make up an
interpretation. There are, as we have seen, three types of proposition: (a) those
which capture the initial data forming the basis for an interpretation or Po propositions;
(b) those which capture the end product of the process of reasoning involved in the
interpretation (Pn); and, (c) the intermediate propositions which capture the stages in
the reasoning intermediate between initial and terminal propositions (Pi). A tree-like
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representation of an interpretation can be produced in which the connections between
nodes are determined by the application of transformation rules. The type of the
resulting relation between the nodes depends on the type of the transformation.
Possible transformations include various forms of reformulation and of inference. For
instance a transformation may be applied to a node to derive a deductively valid
proposition which can serve as a node at a higher level. Here the relation is one of
implication. Or again a transformation may be applied which produces semantically
equivalent values. The relation being one of sameness.
We have already given an example of the use of the approach in Figure 2.1. In this
example the Po, Pi and Pn propositions are clearly distinguished. We can also see the
different levels of interpretation as the interpretation becomes more and more precise.
The sorts of transformations which are operative can be expressed as rules in a
production system. Gardin et al. (1987) and Lagrange and Renaud (1985) describe
the results of experiments in the use of production rules to capture the
transformations. These rules can be exemplified by the following:
If
x is holding a hawk in a scene
Then
The scene is a hunting scene.
In our application of this model, archaeological interpretation is taken to have the
following components (see Figure 4.1):
la. Classification of features. The term "features" encompasses the various
aspects of archaeological sites both man-made and natural (e.g., pits, ditches,
walls etc.).
lb. Classification of finds. "Finds" are mobile features which are either man-
made or natural such as bone fragments.
2. The reconstruction of past human activities in terms of activity areas and
their associated activity. An "activity area" is a significant area of a site at
which identifiable human activities (e.g., cooking or hide-working) were carried
out.
3. Cultural interpretation. That is, the creation of an interpretation or cultural
profile for the site as a whole which includes a determination of the technology,
subsistence, social organization and religious or other beliefs of the occupants of
the site.
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Thus the application of the transforms or rules produces higher and higher levels of
interpretation. At each level a clear account can be given of all the propositions
involved as well as all the logical and semantic links. We can illustrate the process of
interpretation involved here by an example. Suppose that in a given site we have
found the following:
• a ring of stones
• a pit within the ring of stones
• a spatially related stone artifact with sharp elongated edge
During the process of classification we can use these finds to infer, for example, that
there is a firepit on the site (a pit surrounded by a ring of stones) with a knife (a stone
artifact with a sharp elongated edge) related to it. Using this information and our
knowledge that knives may be used for cooking or hide-working we can provide a
reconstruction (or Pi propositions to use Gardin's term) of the area around the fire-
pit as either a hide-working area or a cooking area. This, in turn, can provide the
basis for a cultural reconstruction at a higher level, for example, that the economy of
the site is predominantly hunter-gatherer.
As it stands this is too simple a model of interpretation. The above example
illustrates how the model can be used to derive conclusions or Pn propositions in a
bottom-up or data-driven manner. However, archaeological interpretation is more
likely to proceed in a top down manner. When an archaeologist interprets a site s/he
has a model of the kind of site which determines what s/he expects to find. Thus in
the example given above, the archaeologist, thinking that s/he is excavating a Pueblo
Indian site, will expect a particular range of artifacts and features. Gardin recognises
that his model can accommodate top-down or hypothesis-driven reasoning but
considers these to be merely alternative ways of looking at the interpretation.
However, if logicist analysis is to function as a model of the process of interpretation
as opposed to the justification of interpretation it must incorporate a top down element
since the production of interpretations in archaeology will involve abductions or
guesses as a means of explaining the occurrence of particular anomalous results. As
Schank (1986a) suggests, we only need explanations when our expectations are
thwarted in some way. Otherwise we can categorise data readily. In the same way
we really only need to provide interpretations when an anomaly occurs. For instance,
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when an unexpected artefact is found. Winograd makes a similar point when he
suggests that reasoning is triggered when some new piece of information has led us to
question something previously taken for granted (Winograd 1980: 235). If we
incorporate this top down element we produce a model of interpretation in which
propositions are produced initially either by applying rules in a bottom up manner or by
making use of an ideal description of a site. Each node may then be subject to several
cycles of bottom up reasoning and top-down checking before the final value is arrived
at. This may involve a reappraisal of all the lower nodes in the tree which constitutes
the partial interpretation. Thus, by gradually extending the satisfactory nodes the final
interpretation is produced.
This expectation-based model of interpretation has been implemented for the
domain of archaeology and reported in Patel and Stutt (1988, 1989). The system we
produced was called KIVA and reasoned about the domain of Pueblo Indians from the
south-west of the USA. (A kiva is a ceremonial area in a pueblo village.) While this
approach has close affinities to the model-based approach advocated by Clancey
(1986b) as well as to the techniques for combining different kinds of knowledge in the
domain of language understanding (e.g. in Hearsay-II, Erman, Hayes-Roth, Lesser
and Reddy 1980) we chose the term expectation-based rather than model-based
since in the actual implementation there is only an implicit model of an archaeological
site. This is distributed in a set of rules which act as constraints on the possible
interpretations. Typically a series of interpretations would be produced which could be
pruned subsequently by the application of the constraint rules. KIVA builds up all
possible solutions and, from its knowledge of a typical site, picks out the best solution
(or solutions). In the above example the system could apply a set of constraint rules
which includes the knowledge that all Pueblo sites have a cooking area. Thus it could
determine that it is better to believe that the activity carried out in this particular area
was cooking since the area has a firepit and no other area of the site has evidence for
this necessary component of a site of this kind. Furthermore, from its knowledge that
hide-working was never carried out in an area reserved for cooking, it could determine
that cooking was the only activity carried out. (I shall have more to say about these
rules in the next chapter.)
While the expectation-based approach is intended to model the reasoning of
archaeologists in discovering an interpretation, it can also serve as a means of dealing
with uncertainty in archaeological reasoning. Uncertainty in archaeological reasoning
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arises in at least two ways:
(a) That which arises because more than one interpretation of the data will always
be possible. As in everyday reasoning, the inferences that are made are usually
plausible rather than certain. This is because there is inevitably a gap between
the material evidence and the interpretations placed upon it. While there have
been attempts to produce law-like generalizations in archaeology (e.g., Schiffer
1976), these have mostly been confined to the lower levels of interpretation and
there is some doubt about their applicability even at this level.
b) That which arises because the data is incomplete. Since there is a limited
supply of data available and this may be destroyed in the process of excavation
which precedes interpretation, the evidence upon which the archaeologist bases
his or her interpretation will always be radically incomplete. This incompleteness
in the data will result in uncertain inferences.
Unlike the alternative approaches to uncertainty, the expectation-based approach
deals with both the multiplicity of contending interpretations and the incompleteness
of the data. In the case of the former, the site model can be used to reduce the number
of interpretations. In the case of the latter, the model can be used to make plausible
assumptions which will allow reasoning to proceed even when data is missing. In our
implementation, we concentrated on the former. Moreover, since the knowledge which
is used to select the possible interpretations is represented explicitly (in what is, in
effect, a distributed model of a typical archaeological site) the knowledge of how the
system reached its decision about its reasoning is available for possible use in
explanation.
There are still inadequacies in the above model. For instance there is no means of
representing the different theoretical backing which may govern the application of a
transformation and hence no way of capturing the notion of a theory determined
interpretation. There is also no means of distinguishing between types of inference.
As we shall see below, the Toulmin method of analysing arguments gives us a clear
means of representing transformation rules and their backing. In section 4.3 the use of
this in arguing will be explored. In effect, my work can be seen as an attempt to
integrate the work of Toulmin and Gardin within the framework provided by a model of
argumentation.
Another feature missing from the above account is explored by Winograd and
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Flores (Winograd 1980, Winograd and Flores 1986). This is the notion of pre-
understanding which derives from the work of philosophers such as Heidegger and
Wittgenstein.
In any situation where we are interpreting language, we begin with a system of
understanding that provides a basis within which to generate an interpretation.
This pre-understanding in turn arises and evolves through acts of interpretation.
This circle, in which understanding is necessary for interpretation, which in turn
creates understanding, is called the hermeneutic circle. (Winograd 1980:223)
Winograd (1980) is happy to equate this with the computational use of frames which
are partially filled to begin with and filled more completely as processing proceeds.
Winograd and Flores (1986) use the need for pre-understanding (or background) as
important plank in their argument against the possibility of a computational language
understander which we will discuss in the final chapter. The important point to note is
that all interpretation requires knowledge. This insight is similar to that of
researchers in explanation based learning (for example, Mitchell, Keller and Kedar-
Cabelli, 1986) where prior theoretical knowledge is used in learning new concepts. In
fact this too can be construed as a form of interpretation. The other point to make is
that all interpretation takes place within a background or context. This context is
partially given by the facts at issue. In our case, they are given by the domain (and
sub-domains) of archaeology. The context is also partially determined by the
knowledge which is brought to bear on the facts and (as we shall see) the kinds of
inferences made and the backing for these inferences.
Taken simplistically the outlined model can be seen as another way of stating the
nature of any expert system as the application of rules to initial data to produce
structured sets of propositions. Of course the inference engine in an expert system is
sometimes called an interpreter but this is to be distinguished from the high level task
of interpretation which, according to Stefik et al. (1982), is one of the main expert
tasks which an expert system might be expected to perform. They define it (ibid: 136)
as 'the analysis of data to determine their meaning'. The work of Lagrange and
Renaud and others suggests that the approach is readily applicable to the construction
of expert systems. However while all expert systems may be described as producing
transformations of data they are not aimed at producing the structured output of a
system based on the above principles. The logicist approach is very similar to the
discussion of BLAH (Chapter 3 section 3.1.2) where the system produces
explanations as the result of transformations on a tree. Both are equally compelling
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and similarly tractable models. In fact, the extended logicist model provides a new
model for the interpretation task in expert systems. This especially true if some
mechanism for explicit and justifiable choices between the possible interpretations is
incorporated. With this the internal reasoning of the system more closely matches its
external role as a provider of interpretations, explanations (or arguments) as well as
decisions. The internal process involves the production of interpretations followed by
the justifiable choice of one of these. In this case the system can be said to argue with
itself and explaining or justifying becomes the dominant reasoning task rather than
something which is tacked onto the reasoning. We have already met this suggestion
in our discussion of BLAH where Goguen et al. (1983) define reasoning as the
internal form of that which is expressed outwardly in language as explanations. Other
researchers have made similar claims. For instance Winograd: It •••reasoning is a form
of arguing with yourself, and the justification for a step is that it (temporarily at least)
quiets objections to some statement" (1980:235). There is also work on the explicit
representation of justifications for knowledge base refinement (Smith, Mitchell,
Winston and Buchanan 1985). Thus explanation, justification and argument may not
be seen as something which is additional to reasoning. They may be seen as one (or
the) form of reasoning. This is especially true if one eschews the logical approach to
belief change as, for instance, Harman (1986) does. Here reasoning has no relation to
logic but is rather thought of as principled change of view.
In conclusion of this discussion, logicist models succeed as a means of analysing
the reasoning of archaeologists as well as much of our everyday reasoning. This is
shown by the success of systems built in terms of the logicist approach. These
systems reveal aspects of the process of interpretation. On the other hand the logicist
model needs to be augmented so that it can deal with discovery as well as
justification. By adding a top-down component, the model not only becomes
psychologically more plausible it also provides a means of dealing with uncertainty.
The basic logicist model also needs to be augmented so that the different types of
reasoning can be clearly distinguished and so that backing theories can be dealt with.
Finally the range of choices available at any node in the interpretation tree
necessitates the addition to the model of a mechanism for dealing with these. While
the expectation-based approach can prune these, a computational arguer provides a
mechanism for comparing the various interpretations, deciding between them, arguing
for or against them and storing the resulting argument-2. Thus the inevitability of
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choice coupled with the need for explanation or justification requires that the model
includes argumentation. Thus, interpretation, properly viewed, intersects with
argument. In the next section we shall see how this model of interpretation provides
the means for the production of argument-Os and hence argument-l s.
4.2 Argumentation
One school thinks a post-hole in an ancient floor
stands first of all for a pupil in an iris.
The other thinks a post-hole is a post-hole. And so on -
like the subversives and collaborators
always vying with a fierce possessiveness
for the right to set 'the island story' straight. Seamus Heaney - Parable Island
In this section I discuss the model of argumentation which I have employed. I first of
all discuss the work of Stephen Toulmin and then put forward my own model of arguing
based on this work.
4.2.1 The work of Toulmin
Toulmin's 1958 book on the uses of argument has long been one of the most influential
texts in this field. This influence is apparent not only among informal logicians or
theorists of argumentation but also among researchers interested in the computational
modelling of argument and, more recently, among explanation and dialogue theorists.
In outline, Toulmin's discussion of the correct model for arguing moves from a
rejection of logic as a model to the use of legal procedures.
There has been much debate over the years over the precise nature of human
reasoning (Henle, 1962, Johnson-Laird, 1983, 1987, Rips, 1983, Cheng and Holyoak,
1985, Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett and Oliver, 1986, Lakoff and Johnson 1980a, 1980b,
Lakoff 1987). It has been argued on the one hand that human reasoning is conducted
much in the way that a logical proof is constructed so that formal logic, while
representing an ideal, is nonetheless a good model of human reasoning. On the other
hand it has been suggested that formal logic is a normative rather than a descriptive
discipline and that it relates only to reasoning of a very specialized and abstract kind.
I am of the latter opinion. One reason for believing this is the bizarrerie of material
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implication, which has the following truth table:
A B A -> B
--------------------------------
T
T
F
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
T
This table expresses the notion that the implication holds except in cases where A is
true and B is false. As a result of this 'a false proposition materially implies any
proposition ...and any proposition materially implies a true proposition' (Lacey, 1976).
There is nothing in the definition captured in this table which requires that the
propositions have any relevance to each other. Thus the proposition "The moon is
made of green cheese" materially implies the proposition "I am constructing an
example for my thesis".
Another is the empirical evidence for the difficulties that novices have in getting to
grips with the logic programming language Prolog (Taylor, 1984). Winograd also
agrees: 'In looking at any significant sample of natural language, it becomes quickly
apparent that only a small fraction of human "reasoning" fits the mold of deductive
logic' (1980: 219).
Logic and argument are two separate though interrelated areas. Argument is the
process by which two or more agents arrive at the truth of something by an
adversarial process. Logic is a normative system related to mathematics for the
manipulation of propositions which have a particular form. Of course we sometimes
use deduction in argument but an argument can proceed without logic in its formal
sense. Auguste Dupin (Poe's detective) or Sherlock Holmes may claim that it is logic
which helps them solve various mysteries such as the murders in the Rue Morgue or
the Silver Blaze mystery. However, while they make use of logical elements, they
principally employ a process which Pierce calls abduction - Le. best-guessing or
hypothesis making given the evidence. They interpret the evidence and find an
explanation which explains all or most of the facts presented. This process cannot be
represented in terms of logical proofs. Of course story-tellers cheat and coincidences
and fortuitous happenings will occur which allow the detective to present his
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interpretation of the case. For instance the broken nail in the murders in the Rue
Morgue. So detectives are not perhaps the best analogues to arguers. For more on
the relation of fictional detectives to abduction see Eco and Sebeok on Holmes (1983).
If we no longer look to formal logic for our model of human reasoning where should
we search? Toulmin encountered similar difficulties in his analysis of arguments. As
he says (1958:2):
In fact ... the science of logic has throughout its history tended to develop in a
direction leading away ... from practical questions about the manner in which we
have occasion to handle and criticise arguments in different fields, and towards a
condition of complete autonomy, in which logic becomes a theoretical study of its
own, as free from immediate practical concerns as is some branch of pure
mathematics ...
His solution to the problem of analysing and assessing arguments was to turn to
jurisprudence or the discussion of the philosophical and theoretical issues behind the
law. Toulmin uses the 'jurisprudential analogy' as a means of bringing out the notion
that what we are concerned with is reasoning as a critical faculty.
A sound argument, a well-grounded or firmly-backed claim, is one which will stand
up to criticism, one for which a case can be presented coming up to the standard
required if it is to deserve a favourable verdict (1958:8).
Thus the standards which logic gives us may play some role in everyday argument.
However Toulmin uses his analogy to bring out another point. This is that in different
types of legal cases what counts as evidence and how this is related to the claims
made will vary. Different evidence may be needed for a civil case than for a criminal
case. Toulmin extends this to everyday arguments. He calls the features which do
not vary with different fields of argument the 'field-invariant' features. The former
include the force of an argument, its formal structure and the stages through which it
develops (see Rowland, 1982). By the force of a term Toulmin means 'the practical
implications of its use'. Toulmin uses the term 'cannot' in illustrating this notion. The
force of the term is the same in any domain. However Toulmin would argue that the
criteria and standards for its use vary across different domains. The criteria for the
correct application of 'cannot' in a game are different from those in common sense
reasoning. This can be exemplified by the contrast between 'If it is X's move, Y
cannot move' and The sun cannot go from west to east during the day'. These
criteria for assessment along with different data and the different types of claim-data
relations are what Toulmin calls 'field-dependent'. Thus from the legal model Toulmin
derives a notion of argument in which procedure is as important as standards and in
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which different domains have different ways of arguing and hence different modes of
assessment. Toulmin's model of argument thus goes beyond narrow logical models of
argument. Whatever the merits of logic for representation it has no greater claim for
the formalizing of thought than have other models such as the present one of legal
argumentation.
In line with this Toulmin produces a more complex analysis of the components of
an argument. In what follows I shall refer to this as a toulmin structure and to the
graphical representation of it as a graphical toulmin structure. This analysis is in
terms of six components. These can be illustrated as in Figure 4.2. The principal
components are:
• The datum or evidence which we use in our argument;
• The claim which we make as the outcome of our argument;
• The warrant which allows us to derive the claim from the datum;
• The backing or grounding for the warrant;
• The model qualifier which shows how strong the derivation of claim from datum is;
• The conditions of rebuttal which indicate when the derivation does not apply.
This can be illustrated with an example drawn from Toulmin (1958: 105)
Claim:
Qualifier:
Datum:
Warrant:
Backing:
Rebuttal:
Harry is a British subject.
Presumably.
Harry was born in Bermuda.
A man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject.
The relevant statutes and other legal provisions.
Unless both his parents were aliens or he has become a naturalised
American
Another, more recent example, comes from Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1979: 253).
Here they present as a typical scientific argument the following:
Claim:
Qualifier:
Datum:
Backing:
Warrant:
The earliest known anthropoid apes lived in the African Rift Valley.
Evidently.
Geological and palaeontological reports from Africa, China, Java, etc.
Our experience in developing a systematic interpretation of
palaeontological evidence indicates that
The presence of fossilized anthropoid remains in earlier rock
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formations in one place than in another indicates the earlier existence
of living anthropoids in the one place than in the other.
There is no rebuttal given for this since, as they say (ibid: 255):
[Ajrguments between paleontologists about the chronology and genealogy of the
early anthropoid apes often turn on the respective plausibilities of rival - and
sometimes contrary - interpretations. Given the available observations, any claim
in this field can afford to be presented with some modesty and appropriate modal
qualifiers ... Correspondingly the unavoidable inconclusiveness of arguments in this
field shows up also in the variety of possible rebuttals that might be advanced
against any particular interpretation.
These remarks could equally well be applied to archaeologists.
While this analysis predates the use of knowledge based systems by some
decades it is easy to see how the above could be mapped onto the components of an
expert system. The datum and claim represent the antecedent and consequent of a
production rule which itself is the warrant. The modal qualifier is the certainty factor.
More recent work on the design of expert systems even makes use of explicit
representations of conditions under which the rule will fail (e.g. Mott and Brooke,
1987). The only element which does not have a role in expert systems is the backing.
As we shall see below this forms an important element in my own work.
In this work I have made no use of the modal qualifiers or conditions of rebuttal. In
the case of the former this is because the opportunity for ongoing argumentation
circumvents the need for the calculation and presentation of qualifiers; all arguments
are considered to be provisional. I have avoided rebuttals since, as the above quote
suggests, in many domains there will be too many possible ways of rebutting an
argument. Furthermore I prefer to use the term ground rather than datum for the
evidence. Thus Figure 4.3 represents the simplified structure I shall use. This figure
also illustrates some of the different types of warrant which can be used as well as the
different kinds of backing. These will be dealt with in section 4.3. They are introduced
here to show the value of toulmin structures as an easy way of encapsulating the
various elements. As we shall see, when represented computationally as frames they
provide a simple means of moving between the various elements.
Although Toulmin stresses the procedural notion of legal argumentation he is more
concerned with the structure and assessment of arguments than with these
procedures. He is not at all concerned with the actors in the various procedures nor
with the nature of the dialogues into which they enter. In attempting a computational
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model of argumentation it is perhaps necessary to take account of the participants as
well as the arguments they produce. These components will be dealt with in my own
model below.
4.2.2 A simple model of argumentation
If an exchange between two participants is to be regarded as an argument it must
have at least the following components. Human argument exchanges will include
other components some of which, such as common sense knowledge, are not easily
captured on a computer.
• Argument is an exchange between two or more participants. As such it must have
a symbolic medium capable of sustaining at least an approximation to natural
language interchanges.
• An argument, like other conversations, is composed of moves (cf Reichman-Adar
1984). A move is a description of a chunk of the interchange which is described in
terms of the purpose of the agent instigating the move. For instance, during the
course of an argument, a participant will attempt to defend a claim s/he has made by
means of a support move.
• These moves have rules which govern whether or not they are regarded as legal by
the participants.
• Participants take turns. In any well ordered debate an implicit mechanism for turn
taking will be in operation.
• During a move an argument step is produced. By argument step I mean the set of
related propositions which make up the contents of a move in an argument exchange.
An argument step is composed of a claim with supporting grounds. Grounds can be
related to claims by warrants or derivation rules drawn from common sense or
accepted as conventional in the particular domain. The warrant can be given a backing
or statement of provenance or authority (Toulmin et al. 1979). Note that grounds,
backing and warrants can in their turn become objects for argumentation. Thus we
could have an argument in support of a particular backing. Grounds can of course be
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the claims of sub-arguments and so on.
• An argument exchange or debate is composed of a sequence of these steps which
may be spread over several turns in the argument. There are relations of support or
attack between the claims of previous and subsequent steps.
• One of the participants can win the argument. This should result in a change in the
beliefs of the loser. Since we are not ideal reasoners it is rarely the case that
human/human arguments have this result.
• If a participant can win/lose, s/he can also have strategies or plans which represent
a means to the goal of winning. Conversely the other participant can have counter-
plans which attempt to subvert those of his or her antagonist.
• Again, if there are to be winners and losers, there must be a means of assessing
the strength of the overall argument.
• Arguments can be said to represent the viewpoint of the arguer. They are also
frequently argued from some other point of view adopted for some specific occasion or
in responding to a particular antagonist.
• It is possible to distinguish different types of argument depending on the type of
reasoning involved. Thus we have deductive, causal and analogical arguments. Most
arguments, however, are composed of mixtures of the different types of reasoning.
• Humans commit to memory at least the gist of arguments, standard patterns of
argument for an academic discipline (such as archaeology) and good or successful
arguments.
4.2.3 An improved model of argumentation
The above seems unintegrated and ad hoc. Perhaps it is not possible to construct a
structure for argumentation which has the required rigour and includes all the
seemingly diverse sense of the term from logical proof to a quarrel in a pub. In this
section I will elaborate the above model so as to make the relations between the
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various components somewhat clearer.
Following the work of O'Keefe (1977), Willard (1979a, 1979b) and Rowland
(1987) on distinguishing between argument as a conversational interaction and
argument as a set of propositions (and from which the convention of referring to these
using numerical suffixes derives), I have formed a tri-partite model of argumentation
(See Figure 4.4). This tripartite model of argument has much in common with the
systems approach to the modelling of argument adopted by Pfau, Thomas and Ulrich
(1987). Here the principal components are advocates, opponents, allies and critics.
However, the components of my model are not simply the agents in the interaction but
include the result of the interaction (the argument) and the processes which produce
it. According to the theory there are three levels for discussing argument:
• Argument-2 where argument is viewed as a conversation or debate;
• Argument-l where argument is viewed as a set of propositions in which one
proposition (the claim) depends on the others (perhaps a series of sub-claims) .
• Argument-O which is a step in the set of propositions which make up an
argument-I - an argument-O can be viewed as a toulmin structure as discussed
above.
The relations between these are straight-forward. An argument-2 is composed of
a series of interchanges which make up one or more argument-Is. An argument-l is
composed of one or more argument-Os, Thus argumentation can be viewed as a
coherent activity in which logical proofs (extremely deductive forms of argument-Os)
can be linked to quarrels in the pub (extremely loose forms of argument-2s). This is
shown in Table 4.1.
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Argument level fonnal informal
========================================================
Argument-1
Argument-2
step in proof
mathematical calculation
proof
mathematics debate
step in interpretation
section of conversation
interpretation
archaeological debate
argument in pub
Argument-O
Table 4.1 - Formal and informal examples of the three levels of argument
This theory seems sufficiently general enough to capture the kinds of arguing done in
archaeology where the argument-2s are well-disciplined debates but the argument-Os
which are involved are largely non-deductive (see chapter 2 on archaeological
reasoning). Indeed it is obviously general enough to capture many other domains (see
chapter 7). At the same time we can see how the model of interpretation discussed
above ties in to the model of argument deployed here. In fact this is quite straight-
forward: An interpretation viewed as above is simply an argument-l composed of one
or more argument-Os. Whether these are treated as argument or interpretation
depends on the particular goals of the agent responsible. Nonetheless what is
regarded as an interpretation insofar as it has some support can count also as a step
in an on-going debate. In what follows I will elaborate upon this basic scheme.
As Figure 4.4 shows the model has three components: the arguers, the argument
and the domain or field of argument. The argument component is itself threefold as we
saw above and domains or argument fields can be construed as having three levels. In
what follows I will elaborate upon this sketchy outline.
• Arguers
Each participant is composed of a reasoning mechanism. This reasoning mechanism
embodies the model of interpretation discussed above along with extensions for
dealing with analogy and arguments from principles to be discussed presently. Insofar
as the model of interpretation only deals with a particular task, and there are different
models for, say, explanation or planning, then the reasoner would have to embody
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these as well. The reasoner also encompasses the various dynamic tasks involved in
the production and response to arguments. These are parsing, checking, assessing,
responding and generation. These tasks will be dealt with in more detail in the
discussion of the program design in the next chapter. A control task is needed to
schedule the various tasks. In pursuit of the various tasks the arguer needs to have
access to various forms of knowledge. These include domain knowledge as well as
knowledge of how to argue, common sense and linguistic knowledge.
• Argument
Arguments can be viewed at three levels as we have seen: argument-O, argument-l
and argument-2. An argument-O represents a step in an argument-I. An argument-I
is equivalent to one of Gardin's interpretations. An argument-2 represents the on-
going dialogue between two or more participants each of whom deploys a series of
argument-Is. Each of the levels of argument has a characteristic graphical
representation. We have already seen how these are related in Figure 1.1
• Argument-Os, argument steps or Toulmin structures - Figures 3.2, 4.3
These may be represented as in Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1979) as a series of
related propositions. An argument step is a structure which is composed of a
claim and a set of propositions representing grounds, warrants or backing.
Grounds can be related to claims by warrants or derivation rules drawn from
common sense or accepted as conventional in the particular domain. The warrant
can be given a backing or statement of provenance or authority.
• Argument-l s or interpretations - Figure 4.5
An interpretation is taken as a tree-like structure in which a top level claim (or
claims) is supported by a series of propositions or grounds. Each of these sets
{grounds, claim} constitutes an argument-O. Each of the grounds may in turn
provide the claim for a sub-argument. The relations between the propositions are
mediated by the warrants or rules and include relations based on deduction.
analogy. causation and so on. An argument-l may be composed of a single
argument-O.
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• Argument-2s or debates - Figure 1.6
An argument exchange is taken to be composed of a sequence of argument-1 s
which may be spread over several turns in the argument. There are relations of
sUllllortor attack between the claims of previous and subsequent steps (cf
Flowers et al 1982). An argument-2 can be represented as a network.
The different operations possible at each level in the argument and the sorts of
data structure they may be performed on are summarized in Table 4.2. This table will
be expanded in the next chapter when we discuss a design based on this model.
level in model structure operations
======================================================
argument-O
argument-l
argument-2
toulmin structure reasoning/inference
interpretation
argument/debate
tree
network
Table 4.2 - Operations and data structures at each level
• domain
The model allows for argument between one or more participants about a particular
domain. A domain or field can be thought of as having more than one level. As we
have seen in discussing the Gardin work on interpretations a domain can be construed
in terms of levels of interpretation. Thus there are likely to be rules appropriate for
different levels of interpretation. The knowledge of a domain can also be categorised
in terms of how structured the propositions are. Accordingly I have produced a three
level model of fields.! According to this there are three levels at which a domain
can be discussed: theory or principles; model; and, domain facts.
• By theory or principles I mean the set of theories or principles which lie behind all
research efforts in a field. For instance in physics both the theories of relativity
and quantum mechanics fulfill this role. In archaeology there are various high level
theories such as marxism and structuralism. These theories constitute the
backing for a toulmin structure or argument-O in a particular field.
1 I am indebted to my colleague Peter Cheng for long discussions on this topic. Many of the
original notions were his though I have reworked them for my own ends.
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• Intermediate between the notion of theory and domain knowledge there is the
notion of a model. A model encapsulates some systematic relation between
domain objects derived from the theory. It can be used to interpret or guide
reasoning at the lower level. The model may be a propositional model or it may be
a simulation or, as in the case of Crick and Watson's helical models of DNA, it
may be physical object. In archaeology models, derived for instance from systems
theory, are constructed to show how societal change may come about (for
example, see the discussion of Doran's work in chapter 2 above).
• At the lowest level we have a set of data, relations between data and means for
low level transformations of this data. For instance in physics observations and
calculations will take place at this level. In archaeology this is the level of the
basic domain facts and relations. These include information about the artifacts
found on sites and the stratigraphical layers in which these are found.
Of course this three-level view of fields can be related back to our model of
argument. The data forms the evidence or facts for an argument-O, while the lowest
level operations provide the warrant for the argument-Os which make up the lowest
level of interpretation or argument-I. A model can be expressed as a set of warrants
or can provide the backing for warrants. Theories, as we have seen, provide the
backing for warrants at all levels in the interpretations which make up the overall
debate or argument-2.
The above view of argument is perhaps too weighted on the side of those who
would hold that the propositional is the most fundamental; that is, that argument-2s
are defined in terms of argument-Is. Others, especially Willard (1979a) have argued
that the argument-Is depend on argument-2s. Or rather on the cognitive and affective
states of the participants in an argument-2. ' arguments are unique interactions by
virtue of what the arguers think they are doing The best paradigm case of argument
is a fleeting ephemeral experience which cannot be understood apart from the
arguer's perspectives.' (1979a:25). While I accept some aspects of Willard's view I
believe that there is a class of academic arguments or debates which can be
characterized by the sets of propositions which make them up. Obviously this will
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involve factors such as the affective states of the arguers and other tacit elements
which are not captured in the propositional statements. However the most important
elements of the propositions and their relationships will be captured. Another
important element in Willard's discussion is the notion that arguments are context-
dependent - 'The relevance of data and backing, then, can only be understood with
reference to specific encounters which take their character from the constructions of
the actors involved' (ibid:23). I will deal with the notion of context below. However, it
must be pointed out that of necessity a computational means of dealing with context
must miss out many of its elements; those which cannot be formalized (or, at least,
not in advance).
As we shall see in chapter 7 the above model can deal with debates both within
and without archaeology. For instance the continuing debate about the age of the
earth can be seen as a series of argument-Is which go to make up an argument-2.
The same is true of the debate about the origins of the wealth deposited in the
barrows of the Wessex culture of the Bronze age in Britain which will be discussed in
chapter 6.
A fuller model for argument-2s can be produced as in Figure 4.6. Here an
argument-2 is concerned about some topic. The debate takes place within some
argument field between two or more participants (or possibly, if viewed as a model of
reasoning, between an agent and himself). The argument field is in turn situated
within a shared culture. As a result of this many of the assumptions and common-
sense notions are rendered tacit. An assessor (one of the participants or a formal
referee) makes an assessment and decides on the winner.
Contexts are taken as the amalgam of the facts and theories which constitute the
knowledge an agent has about a field or fields. Facts figure as data or grounds in the
argument-O, Theories are accessed via the warrants. A warrant or rule can also form
part of a model (e.g. of the growth of Wessex culture) and may provide inferences of
various types such as analogy, causal, deductive and so on. Thus an argument-I,
while largely drawing upon the context commonly used in the field (facts and theories)
may make use of elements drawn from more than one sub-context. For instance an
archaeological argument may depend on stratigraphical reasoning, on the results of a
radiocarbon dating process, on analogies with modern non-industrialized peoples or
on common-sense. Figure 4.7 shows this schematically.
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Figure 4.7 - Arg ment-Is and contexts
In order to deal adequately with argumentation it must be thought of as the action
of a set of processes on a field. Thus when we discuss the implementation of the
ASParch system below we will discuss both the domain and how it is organized and
the argumentation processes which operate on this to produce an argument-2.
4.2.4 The uses of the model
The model outlined above has several important consequences. The most important of
these are as follows:
• The model provides firm backing for the design to be presented in the next
chapter as opposed to ad hoc construction.
• The model integrates interpretation and arguing.
• The model integrates different sorts of reasoning such as analogy and deduction
in terms of different warrants.
• The model integrates theory and reasoning via the warrants and backing.
• The model clarifies the different operations and representations needed at each
level.
• Relevance. context and topic shift are easier to deal with using this model as we
shall see in section 4.4 below.
• Level shift can be dealt with by the extensions to the model discussed in the next
section.
4.3 Argument style
While the above is a good general account of argumentation it is inadequate in many
ways. As we shall see in chapter 8 there are many reasons why programs which
attempt to simulate human processes such as the above are largely doomed to failure.
The particular problem we are concerned with arises because, as we have seen in
chapter 2, there are modes of reasoning which are specific to domains such as
archaeology. The account given above shows what archaeological interpretation is
and how it may relate to argument in archaeology. However, there is no systematic
way in the above model of distinguishing the domain or field of archaeology from any
other domain. The above model could apply to any domain. Of course this is a
strength as well as a weakness as we shall see in chapter 7 below. However for the
purposes of producing a program which can aid argumentation in archaeology it is
necessary to find a way of specifying the particular kinds of argument common in
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archaeology or, for that matter, any other domain. Thus, paradoxically, the addition of
a means of specifying particular types of reasoning allows greater applicability of the
model. Any system designed in terms of such a model should be able, as we are, to
switch happily from arguments in one domain we are knowledgeable about to those in
another. The knowledge of the domain is one aspect of this. And as Clancey and
others have pointed out (see chapter 3 above) the different forms of knowledge in a
domain must be explicit and separate. Here I am suggesting that yet another step
must be made so that a domain or field has stored somewhere explicit knowledge of
the types of argument which are possible. In order to deal with the differences
between different domains I have introduced the notion of an argument style. An
argument style identifies the types of warrant and fact which are commonly used in a
domain. How relevant tokens of these are determined is discussed in the following
section.
This section will discuss the following issues in the context of a notion of argument
style:
• the identification of the different types of analogy appropriate to argumentation in
different domains and the formation of appropriate responses
• the mechanisms for using models and theory to facilitate argumentation about a
domain
Two main styles of argument will be introduced. Mode-based argument is primarily
analysable in terms of its underlying reasoning style. Level-based argument depends
on higher levels of model and theory. A variety of reasoning styles (such as analogy
and deduction) are possible and hence a variety of mode-based arguments. There are
only two level-based styles: those which depend on models and those which depend
on more general theoretical principles. The discussion of argument style will be
pursued with particular reference to the domain of archaeology and the design of
ASParch. In the rest of this section I discuss what I mean by argument style, consider
some of the mechanisms involved and mention some of the inadequacies they contain.
In the following section I will discuss the notion of relevance as a counterpart to that
of style.
4.3.1 What do I mean by argument style?
In linguistics, stylistics deals with the differing components which go to make up a
particular author's style, or the style of language appropriate for different contexts.
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Style is partially determined by subject matter. It also includes such things as the
kinds of metaphor chosen, the tendency to use metaphor as opposed to metonymy, the
particular vocabulary, the particular syntax and so on.
In argumentation a style involves a) the subject matter or the conceptual structure
appropriate for a particular domain and b) different uses of different types of argument.
Differences in the actual language used and in rhetorical devices may also play (a less
significant) role. Canons of good reason (as opposed to canons of reason) are related
to the style appropriate for a discipline.
The notion of an argument style derives from the seminal work of Toulmin (1958,
Toulmin, Rieke and Janik 1979) discussed above and especially the notion of field-
dependence. In his work on the uses of argument he argues that different disciplines
have different canons of argument:
... all the canons for the criticism and assessment of arguments ... are in practice
field-dependent ... we can ask, 'How strong a case can be made out?' ... and the
question we ask will be how strong each case is when tested against its own
appropriate standard. (Toulmin 1958:38)
We take Toulmin to mean that there are different kinds of argument for different
disciplines (or fields) and that these need to be assessed differently. Since any
discipline will in practice use a mixture of many of these kinds of argument, even if one
dominates, we have adopted the notion of argument style. By this we mean the
admixture of different argument kinds characteristic of a discipline. In archaeology the
dominant argument kind is analogy. Given the lack of historical documents relating to
remote periods in the past one of the principal means of acquiring knowledge about
these periods is by analogy with modern non industrialized peoples. This use of
analogical reasoning is a characteristic archaeology shares with the legal domain
(MacCormick 1988, Adam and Taylor 1987).
At the same time a piece of archaeological argumentation will include other kinds
of argument; for example, causal arguments about the natural processes which affect
buried artefacts. Furthermore, another form of argumentation is frequently used by
archaeologists i.e. arguments which are based on certain theoretical principles. There
are for example marxist models of societal change as opposed to historical models in
terms of invasions or some other mechanism.
Given the three-level model of fields discussed in section 4.2.3 above we can think
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in terms of inter and intra level reasoning processes. Thus there can be a process of
deduction using facts at the lowest level. We can deduce that since all flint tools will
have traces of wear this tool will have traces of wear. We can also make deductions
between levels. The level referred to need not necessarily be the next level up. An
argument about the lowest level facts can make use of theories or principles. Thus in
legal reasoning a case may depend on the facts plus an appeal to some high level
principle such as 'freedom of speech'.
We can now draw up a table of a range of fields and their concomitant argument
styles. In this table, the two main kinds of argument style - mode based and level
based - are marked by the use of plain and italic text, respectively. A mode-based
argument style is a simple admixture of argument types while a level-based style
appeals to higher field levels.
Domain Task Style Forum Medium
=============================================
Archaeology Interpret Analogy Papers Language
Models
Principles
Law Trial Analogy Court Language
Principles
Lit. Crit. Interpret Principles Papers Language
Physics Explain Causal Papers Maths
Models
Table 4.3 - A range of fields and their concomitant argument styles
Argument generation and comprehension as well as checking will depend on the
dominant mode of argument for a field. If the dominant mode of an argument field is, as
is the case with literary criticism, principle-based reasoning then there is little point
in producing analogical arguments for users in that field. Nor will the system get far in
understanding user arguments if it attempts to understand an analogy as a deduction
and so on. In literary criticism long leaps to high level theories are the order of the
day. In archaeology a system such as ASParch must be prepared to argue
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analogically much of the time and to countenance appeals to models. This does not
mean that there will only be analogical or model based arguments but that these are
more likely.
As I have mentioned above the main point however in making this distinction (or
series of distinctions) is that different argument styles have different methods of
assessment. Thus a deductive argument should be amenable to a formal proof. An
analogical argument should fulfill some of the criteria to be set out below and so on. In
fact it will be the case that the comprehension of an argument depends on the checking
of that argument. Thus a system will be aided in checking, comprehension and
production if there is some classification of argument styles.
4.3.2 Computational mechanisms and responses
As an example of the notion of how argument style works in the domain of
archaeology I will discuss the use of reasoning and extrinsic theories in what follows.
A full computational model would have to provide means for all the different types of
style possible. The following is meant to be representative. It is hoped that the
discussion of these in this and later chapters will show how any component in a
particular style might be implemented.
4.3.2.1 Analogies
Analogy has played a large part in the reasoning of archaeologists. However it is
important to note that the primary use has been in determining the use or function of
some artefact. The focus is mainly on the retrieval of analogies rather than their
understanding (Gentner 1983) or the mapping of problem-solving knowledge
(Holyoak et al. forthcoming, Keane 1985, 1988b, Kedar-Cabelli 1985). There are three
principal sorts of analogy used in archaeology: simple, historical and relational.
A simple analogy represents the case where the attributes (or relations) of case Cl
can be matched with those of case C2, thus allowing a future mapping of any attribute
which may be of interest. In archaeology this will usually be the use or function of an
artefact.
An historical analogy (of great importance to archaeology) represents the case where
there is some historical continuity between Cl and C2. For instance it is possible to
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make analogies between modern Hopi Indians and ancient Anasazi since it is believed
that they are historically related. Keith Anderson (1969: 135) makes this point:
Important for interpretation of the Anasazi is the fact that they are the close
ancestors of living Pueblo Indians. Anasazi cultural patterns are still preserved in
the conservative Pueblo Indian villages of New Mexico and Arizona ...For
analogical interpretation of this well-preserved material, we can use the culture of
the Hopis ...
The third type of analogy, relational, owes its name to Ian Hodder's discussion of the
theme in his book on the use of ethnography in archaeology (1982b). A relational-
analogy is one in which there is some relationship between the attributes of each of
the base and target pair. The most common form of relation will be derived from some
account of how these attributes fit together into a nexus of material, social and
psychological interactions. As Hodder says, '...1 would search for a relational analogy
which examined more adequately the relevant causal links between different parts of
the analogy.' Interestingly, given the background of the different researchers,
relational analogies have much in common with those dealt with by Gentner (1983) in
her structure-mapping theory of analogy which has been mentioned above (in chapter
2). Gentner's favourite example is the analogy between the structure of the atom and
the solar system. Here the success of the analogy depends on the second-order
relation cause which relates first-order relations such as attracts and
revolves_around. These interrelations in the solar system hold within the atom.
Analogies of this kind have also been discussed by Wylie (1987) and Chouraqui
(1985).
The rules for these analogies can be used as a means of generating arguments or
in responding to arguments. Response to an argument is achieved by means of a
strategy for response which deals with analogies used in argument. The most likely
response is to examine the analogy for further attributes which lead to the the
rejection of the analogy. The following informal conversation shows one way of
rejecting an analogy.
A: According to environmentalists the greenhouse effect means that the earth will
2 The term 'relational' as Hodder uses it is not related to other more common uses within
computer science - e.g., 'relational databases'.
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rise several degrees in the next hundred years
F: If its a greenhouse effect won't that mean that it will get warm very quickly in
summer and cold very quickly in winter
The response here attempts to show that if the analogy is taken seriously there is a
contrary result to the usual accepted use of the analogy Le. that there will be warming
and cooling.
In general, there are two main means of responding to an analogy: (a) a rejection
of the analogy because it is inadequate or because some feature of the base is ignored;
(b) a rejection of the analogy because other analogies leading to contrary results can
be found. These points have been made by Keane (1988a) when he says 'The central
process in using analogies and counter-analogies is matching and establishing
whether asserted correspondences are in fact valid and refuting them by using other
analogies which highlight other aspects of the target domain'
The first kind of response to an analogy involves a process of checking the
matching attributes and relations of X and Y. This check might show up a) wrong
matches and b) significant features unmatched. Since nothing is ever a complete
analogue of anything else (or it would be that thing) it will always be the case that
only some of the attributes will match. Since this is so two conclusions follow: a)
there are many potential analogues and b) important matches may not be made. Thus
a response to an analogy in which Attl of X is unmatched with anything in Y plus the
claim that Attl is significant is sufficient to count against the analogy and hence the
argument as a whole.
The finding of an analogy to support a case involves the matching of attributes of
the present case with those of a case which supports the claim required. In this
process the finding/matching is uncritical. This can be modelled simply by finding the
first simple analogue or in a more complex way by finding (or constructing) an analogy
which satisfies some goal (Keane 1985, Kedar-Cabelli 1985). The responder to an
argument must be more critical of the analogy. This involves an identification of the
significant features of a case and an attempt to see if these are matchable. The
related notion of relevance is discussed below. It is implausible to suggest that
knowledge of what are significant attributes of a potential analogue can simply be
stored by the implementer of a system. The system must be open-ended enough to
cope with circumstances in which significance depends not on some overarching
principle but on the particular point of the current argument. Thus while the date and
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size of artefacts are always important in archaeology, in particular cases and for
particular purposes, such attributes as provenance and material composition will
become important. We suggest that significance is probably determined both by the
goal (for example, refute the argument) and by the model or theory currently being
used.
The second main way of responding to an analogy is by finding other analogies
which have different implications. The following dialogue (freely adapted from
Thouless 1930) illustrates this. Thouless calls this use of analogy argument by
forced analogy.
A: We should cut welfare provisions. Look at lions they are magnificent animals
because they are subject to natural selection.
B: But there are other species which have been produced by natural selection
which are hardly magnificent. Sharks for instance or slime molds. Anyway, there
are animals which exhibit altruistic behaviour towards the apparently weak and ill.
In this case the analogy (man::lion) is attacked not by finding deficiencies in the
attribute matching but by finding an alternative analogy (man::altruistic animals)
which tends to a diametrically opposed conclusion.
The notion of a sub-division of analogical arguments allows us to posit responses
to the different types. This is something which has not been dealt with in other
discussions of analogy in argumentation (e.g. Reichman's analysis (1981) of argument
claim and challenge). For instance, simple analogies might be rejected for being
simple analogies and therefore implausible. Historical analogies may be rejected for
the lack of or weakness of the historical link. Relational analogies may be rejected for
lacking some aspect of the causal linkages between attributes. Since there are no
general laws in archaeology, it will always be possible to reject an analogy on this
basis. This suggests that (as Hodder thinks) analogies in this third sense may need
other forms of argument for their support.
4.3.2.2 Models/principles
Model or principle based argument has much in common with model based reasoning
as discussed by Clancey (1986). Intuitively it is an attempt to capture the awareness
that a) we use models/theories in our interpretation of the world and b) we rely on
such theories when generating, comprehending and defending claims. (Similar work
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on the simulation of political ideologies has been conducted by Abelson, 1973 and
Carbonell, 1981. Ennals, 1986, has made suggestions as to how a computational
polities might work). As part of the bottom up interpretation of an archaeological site
various transformations or rules which are theory dependent may be used. That is to
say that these have as their backing a body of theory of some kind. The set of rules
can be construed as a model. In a top down mode, a theory may be used to generate
the hypothesis which is tested by searching for the appropriate data. Such a
hypothesis may also be generated in a bottom-up manner. If we have a more complex
model (like that suggested in section 4.1 above) in whieh each node acts as a
hypothesis created by reasoning bottom-up and verified or changed as the result of
top down reasoning (which may lead to more bottom up reasoning and so on) theory
may be said to playa role at almost every node in the network. Thus theory plays a
major role in interpretation and hence in argumentation. As Shennan argues (1988):
A piece of work and the conclusions drawn from it have to be evaluated not just in
relation to evidence but to the theoretical position which lies behind it and the
adequacy of that position ...
To recap. In our model of argument an argument-l is taken as the set of related
propositions which make up the contents of a move in an argument exchange and is
composed of a claim with supporting grounds. Grounds are related to claims by
warrants or derivation rules derived from common sense or from the bodies of theory
operating in the particular domain. The warrant is given a backing which may simply
be a statement of provenance or authority or a set of higher level principles.
In order to deal with arguments from principles we make use of a simple model of a
theory as a set of principles. A principle is a generalized statement of some belief
held by the theory. For example it is a part of marxist theory that there there will be
divisions within society. Such principles can be coded as frames which in turn have
grounds and so on. Obviously at some point the sequence of grounding theories will
have to end. Some grounds will have to be simply accepted as given whether by the
theoretical viewpoint or by the common sense viewpoint which structures the
individual's experience and hence argument. Indeed there are probably only a very few
such ultimate grounds (mostly to do with harm to a person and his/her immediate
family and so on3).
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We can think of a viewpoint in a spatio-temporal sense. That is to say that two
viewpoints may differ in the physical and temporal location of the observer. This is not
really important here though it would be in a court case concerning say a street
mugging. We can also take viewpoint in an ideological sense. Here I mean the set of
views, opinions, beliefs and ideas which we all carry around inside our heads. We all
have this and interpret / make decisions in its light. Further we are all capable of
entertaining more than one viewpoint at once. I am indebted here to Roger Fowler's
(1986) discussion of this in a literary criticism context. Indeed, the discussion of
viewpoints in terms of the viewpoints that characters in literary texts have or convey
has much of interest for the argumentation theorist. A field can be taken to mean a
discipline such as archaeology or literary criticism. A viewpoint on a field is the set of
warrants and so on which are used to interpret the field; that is, what the interpreter
knows about the field or is experienced in. (A similar notion of viewpoints is
suggested by Wilks and Bien, 1983). If we have a dynamic view of field such that
what constitutes a field is determined by the collective purposes of the arguers within
that field (Rowland 1982) then the purpose could be said to be part of the viewpoint
or ideology. Thus we have the following marxist principle and its common sense
ground:
principle: :
name: marxist_principle_l
claim: cause(class divisions, conflict within groups)
grounds: common_sense_principle_2
principle: :
name: common_sense_principle_2
claim:
cause (divisions between groups based on X,
conflict within groups based on X)
grounds: basic_ground
A warrant or rule based on these would be of the form:
W123
IF
evidence for class division
3 Midgley (1980) is a useful attempt relate practical reasoning to our nature as animals.
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THEN
evidence_for conflict_within_groups.
This warrant and others derived from one or more theoretical viewpoints would
allow the construction of an interpretative argument. This argument can be attacked
by finding a weak link or links and attacking these, by defending another claim and so
on. Another way of attacking it is to take a warrant such as W123 above and attack
the principle or principles on which the warrant is based. Thus the use of W123
allows the responder to attack the argument by attacking the principle which grounds
one step in the interpretative argument. One advantage of the model of arguing
outlined above is that it can provide this possible response, which I have called level
shift. An argument, in my model, is generated by warrants derived from different
theories including common sense theories. These theories can also provide a set of
beliefs which can be used to justify a decision. Level shift occurs when the argument
focus moves to a discussion of one or another of these theoretical positions. To give a
concrete example: consider the debates generated by Martin Scorsese's film The
Last Temptation. An argument about the merits (or demerits) of the film can focus
on (see Figure 4.8):
a) The facts of the film - (e.g., whether Christ is recorded in the gospels as having
sex with Mary Magdalene).
b) A warrant drawn from a particular backing - (e.g., whether Mary Magdalene
and Christ having sex is blasphemous given the legal definition of blasphemy as
the depiction of Christ in a manner likely to give offence).
c) Completely within the backing theory - (e.g., an argument about the use of legal
sanction to support theology, the theological reasons for blasphemy, sociological
reasons for blasphemy and so on).
4.3.3 Inadequacies in this approach to analogy and principles
As Hodder points out, it may well be that relational analogies demand a theoretical
framework for their proper application. He says, 'The use of relational analogies
depends on a good theoretical framework within which one can identify what is
relevant in a particular case.' (ibid). Thus there may be no plausible analogy without
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theory. Although I have made no attempt to show how analogies can make use of
theories (models or principles) I have shown how a system is possible which makes
use of both arguments from analogy and those from theory. There is no reason why
our model should not be able to fully integrate the two styles of argument into a long
chain in which an argument from analogy has as some earlier step an argument from
theory. This sort of approach to analogy is similar to that of Keane (1985) and Kedar-
Cabelli (1985) where analogies depend on the purpose of the maker of the analogy.
But while the arguer's intention may be relevant, it is more important to identify the
theoretical framework which can determine that the attributes of the base and target
analogues are related within the base and the target in the appropriate way. This can
only be given by some model or theory which constrains the analogizing process.
4.4 Relevance
In our attempt to characterize fields for argument we have so far dealt with one aspect
of the problem - that of characterizing the operations which can be applied. An
argument style is one means of specifying the types of low level reasoning operations
which may be applied in a given field. However the context of a field is more than the
style or operations. It includes the relevant facts as well as the particular examples
of the reasoning types - the warrants or rules. We can think of the relevance of an
argument as depending on a) the relevance of the operation types (Le. style) and b)
on the relevance of the facts operated on and rules which do the operating. The proper
context for arguing is given by the relevant facts plus the relevant operations. In the
previous section we dealt with relevance of operation types; in this section we will
deal with relevance of facts and warrants. As in the case of style, it is important to be
able to deal with relevance here since the machine will need to have some idea of
what is relevant in producing a response. At the same time this knowledge will aid in
the comprehension of the point of a user's argument. There are three types of
relevance: immediate, indirect and tangential.
• Immediate relevance is the kind most easily dealt with in a knowledge base. The
relevant facts are those which together with a warrant (or operation token)
produce a particular proposition, end-state or goal. Thus if the goal is the answer
to the question 'What is X?' then the immediately relevant facts are those which
satisfy the conditional side of rules which conclude about X.
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• Indirectly relevant facts and rules are those which need to be reached by a
process of chaining to make the conclusion. The indirectly relevant facts, where
the goal is as above, are facts which appear on the right hand side of a rule whose
left hand side appears on the right hand side of another rule which concludes about
X or which appears on the left hand side of a rule which indirectly concludes about
X
• Tangentially relevant facts and rules are those which compose an argument-l
which does not appear immediately or indirectly relevant to the topic at issue.
Thus for example an argument-I may address the topic of euthanasia by
addressing the question of the suffering of AIDS patients. The latter is only made
relevant as the result of some inference on the part of the other participant or as
the result of a subsequent move on the arguer's part.
Relevance is an attribute of argument-Os which can be inherited by argument-l s.
It doesn't make any sense to speak of argument-2s as relevant or not.
Relevance is also related to the notions of topic and level shift which have been
mentioned above. Level shifts are relevant changes in the level of the argument from
object level to the theory or models which back the object level warrants. The level
shift is legitimate if a) there is a backing to some node which leads to the theory or
model and b) this node is part of the current argument-2 (Le in the argument net). It
will also be legitimate if the node is immediately, indirectly or tangentially relevant to
some node in the argument-2. Topic shifts are shifts from topic to topic. The relevant
topics are those which are given by nodes on the argument-2 or which are relevant to
nodes in the argument-2.
The notion of relevance shows how context goes beyond a set of facts and
warrants grounded in theoretical principles (which constitute a viewpoint). The
context grows as each participant adds to the argument. The overall context is made
up of many sub-contexts (or many viewpoints on the facts).
There are of course other ways of dealing with relevance in systems of this kind.
In his work on the use of critical argument in tutoring musical structures, Baker (1988)
suggests a spreading activation model of relevance. 'Topics which are possibly
relevant are those which are sufficiently active, in terms of spreading activation to
other concepts in the semantic network.' (ibid:15)
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Another method of dealing with relevance has been proposed by Sperber and
Wilson (1987). In their discussion of communication they define communication in
terms of contextual effects produced by the speaker by changing the hearer's cognitive
environment (or the facts which a hearer is aware of or could become aware of).
These contextual effects are the result of relating assumptions the hearer holds to
new information bringing about changes in old assumptions or new assumptions.
Relevance is defined in terms of this. 'An assumption is relevant in a context if, and
only if, it has some contextual effect in that context' (ibid:702). The most relevant
information is 'information likely to bring about the greatest improvement of knowledge
at the smallest processing cost' (ibid:700). There is some unclarity about the notions
of effort and effect adopted by Sperber and Wilson. For instance they say (ibid: 703):
We assume rather that the mind assesses its own efforts and their effects by
monitoring physico-chemical changes in the brain. We argue then that effect and
effort are nonrepresentational dimensions of mental processes: That is, they exist
whether or not they are represented ...
At the same time they suggest that relevance could be defined as a quantitative
concept (ibid) presumably functioning in a manner similar to certainty factors. This
would then depend on the values for effort and effect. Effort might be defined in terms
of ease of access (see Sperber and Wilson, ibid: 703-4) to facts and rules (and would
therefore depend on the particular architecture adopted) and effect would be a measure
of the changes in the number of propositions believed (before and after) and the
combined strength of belief in these (before and after). This is not incompatible with
notions we are adopting and could be added so that X is the most relevant response if
a) accessible as part of the current argument-2 i.e relevant at all, and
b) it is most easily accessible (least effort) and produces the most effect.
Any system based on the model of argumentation given above needs some notion
of relevance as well argument style since:
a) It has to be able to select the operations which are best suited in a field to the
production of good arguments and comprehension of/response to user arguments.
This is given by argument style. This allows the system to attach to a field the
more likely types of argument in that field. Thus producing arguments which fit the
field and aiding processing of user arguments.
b) It has to be able to select the facts and warrants for use in arguments -
immediate, indirect or tangential.
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To summarize, relevance is determined by the relations of facts and warrants to
possible targets for attack or support. Warrant or fact X is relevant to topic T if there
is an argument-O, A, which is about T and is in the current argument-2, and which can
be supported or attacked by another argument-Owhich contains X. Any argument-O
which is part of the current argument-2 is thus a relevant target for attack or defence.
It will be a target for attack if it belongs to the arguer's opponent, defence if it belongs
to the arguer.
Relevance is used for selection and comprehension. It is also used for
assessment. In a system where there are meta-rules for assessment, the relevance
of the arguments may be taken into account. Thus we could have the rule:
If
Argl uses more relevant arguments than Arg2
Then
Argl is better than Arg2
The kinds of relevance could be ordered {immediate, indirect, tangential} as a means
of making the assessment. It is not clear however that the tangential relevance is
least valuable. Often it is the point which becomes relevant after a couple of moves
which is most telling. Thus the assessment rules would have to have some notion of
tellingness as well as relevance.
4.5 Conclusion
In summary we have introduced a model of argument in terms of three levels.
Interpretation is integrated into argumentation via level argument-Is. Various forms
of reasoning are integrated at the argument-O level. These include analogical
reasoning which as we have seen is of the utmost importance to archaeology. It is
also possible to integrate other modes of reasoning such as causal or other forms of
plausible reasoning in this way (see Collins 1978). We have also introduced the
notion of argument style as a means of distinguishing different domains in terms of the
types of argument they employ and relevance to determine the appropriate warrant
tokens. In the next chapter we shall discuss a computer program which has been
designed in the light of these theoretical considerations.
-000-
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Chapter 5 - Design principles and design
Argument: A set of design principles is introduced. In the light of
these a program design is expressed, firstly, as a set of definitions
and, secondly, in terms of the principal components both operational
and representational of an arguer. In brief the argument process can be
seen as the acting of an arguer on domain knowledge to produce an
argument structure. In terms of the tripartite model, the procedural
elements fulfill the role of the arguer, the data structures the role of
representing the argument and the interpreter that of providing
interpretations of the domain knowledge.
In this chapter I will provide a more detailed rationale for the the components of the
program which embodies the ideas of chapter 4. The next chapter will deal with the
actual details of the partial implementation of the model and provide example sessions
using the system. This chapter will thus deal (a) with the functional architecture of
the argument module and (b) with the structure of the underlying interpreter. I shall
begin, however, with a brief preamble about the nature of models and a discussion of
some of the principles which I have followed in designing the program and their
rationale. I shall also include some semi-formal definitions which are embodied in the
program design (see Figure 5.1).
5.1 Preamble about models in AI
Before I move on to a discussion of the system architecture I would like to say a few
words about the thorny question of the relationship between programs, models and
theories in AI. It is often naively supposed that that an implemented program
represents a theory of some domain. This is perhaps because it is assumed that a
theory can be defined as a set of propositions in terms of some formal system and a
computer language is a formal system. However this will obviously not do. This is
what we mean by a theory in logic but not in science (pace Hempel, 1968). A theory
in science has to have some explanatory and/or predictive force (as Hempel, 1985,
suggests). A model, on the other hand, is a set of objects (whether propositional or
physical) which mirrors certain aspects of some real world object or system. As Moor
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Figure 5.1 - The program design
points out (1978) , we can have a theory without a model and a model without a
theory. Moor further points out that in order for a computer program to count as a
model it must be given a '...symbolic interpretation which goes beyond the standard
symbolic understanding of the the program in order to make it a model'. Moor makes
use of Weizenbaum's ELIZA (1976) to show that a computer model may be based on
entirely ad hoc implementational needs and cannot therefore constitute a theory of
conversation.
It is important however that the programs we build in AI, like the bridges of civil
engineers, are grounded in some theory of the domain they are concerned with. Thus
we can see that we need some theory or model of argument in which to ground our
program. Since, however, a theory is often stated in informal language, some
computational model derived from the theory but taking account of what can be
achieved computationally is required. The running program can then serve not as
experimental evidence for the validity (or falsity) of the theory but as confirmation that
it can partially redescribed in terms of a programming language. This is related to, but
does not go as far as, Thagard's notion (1982) of programs as '... simulations of
models which approximate to theories' where a theory is not thought of as a set of
sentences in some formal system but as 'a kind of definition' of some part of the
natural world. In this view, a program could constitute a theory in the sense of a
specification of some system. That this actually applies to human cognitive processes
is a further claim which could be empirically tested. Because of the sorts of difficulties
mentioned above Thagard resists the temptation to view programs in this way. He
plumps for a notion of programs as simulations of models. A model is like a theory
except that it claims only that there are analogies between the real world and the
system. He concludes:
In sum, a program can not be said to be a theory or a model, but provides, when
executed, a simulation of a system of a kind defined by a model which
approximates to a theory.
In sections 5.4 and 5.5 I will present a design for a program which is partially
implemented. The design and the partial implementation together provide a simulation
of the system described in the previous chapter. To the extent that the design seems
feasible and the program actually works the model put forward in chapter 4 is clarified,
rendered more concrete and shown to have a degree of consistency.
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5.2 Design principles
Apart from general design principles of efficiency and so on, the principles which act as
constraints on the design are as follows:
PI: Since computers are good at the combination, permutation and matching of
symbols but not at judging the resu.lts of these operations, designers of computer
systems should attempt to produce assistants in the task of forming judgements
rather than dogmatic judges.
P2: Any system which is to be used in the humanities must take account of the
nature of the humanities.
P3: Any system which is to be used in the humanities must provide something by
computational means which could not easily be provided in any other way.
These principles have been derived from many sources. In an essay entitled
Cybernetics and Ghosts Italo Calvino makes the following observations (1986: 22):
The literature machine can perform all the permutations possible on a given
material, but the poetic result will be the particular effect of one of these
permutations on a man endowed with a consciousness and an unconscious, that is,
an empirical and historical man. It will be the shock that occurs only if the writing
machine is surrounded by the hidden ghosts of the individual and of his society.
The Calvino essay discusses a notion which has been widely canvassed ever
since the birth of the computer: The computer as author. There have been countless
attempts to produce poetry writing programs using various stochastic techniques.
There have also been attempts to get the computer to produce stories. For instance,
James Meehan produced a program in the seventies for the generation of fable-like
narratives (Meehan, 1977). The Calvino quote expresses both why this has been felt
to be a possibility and why it must ultimately fail. Since the machine is capable of
tirelessly producing all the permutations of some set of basic data, if we could find a
way of representing characters and situations, we could, for instance, encourage the
machine to act as a scriptwriter for a TV soap. Of course there is more to the soap
than the permutation of words or characters. Calvino suggests what this might be.
That, in fact, the machine-author is not a human being with a human being's
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sympathies, needs, desires, emotions, sense of humour, interests. Calvino suggests
further that these are not something that can be codified since they are part of our
lived experience. My feeling is that he is right in this view.
We can accept, then, that there are analogies between the products of writers and
programmers and that artists, critics and other interpreters will go on using this
technology both as a tool and as a source of metaphors. But as Calvi no points out the
machine has its limitations as creator. These limitations are not confined to the
writing machine. All software machines are limited in what they can do. This is
especially true of those which attempt to emulate or model aspects of human cognitive
skills and is something that critics of AI have always seized upon. Hubert Dreyfus
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986) and John Searle (1980) are prominent among the
philosophical critics. More recently, as we mentioned in chapter 4, Winograd and
Flores (1986) have cast some doubt from within the discipline about the viability of
the AI enterprise. They argue that since it is impossible to capture all the the
background knowledge utilized by humans in solving problems it is better to use the
computer not as an autonomous problem solver but as a kind of assistant which
models only a subset of human skills. There are of course visionaries in AI who claim
that the encoding of background knowledge is possible and therefore, by implication,
that at least some of Calvino's ghosts can be confined within the machine. For
instance, work has recently begun on the Knoesphere or CYC project (Lenat et al.
1983, 1986) to represent all the basic concepts necessary for the understanding of a
standard encyclopaedia. Apart from Calvino, Winograd and so on mentioned above,
similar points were made in an address to the 1985 Expert Systems conference by
Margaret Boden.
The work I shall introduce below is an attempt to design a machine which can
produce interpretations, criticize user interpretations and allow the user to criticize the
system interpretations. In accord with the above principle, the system should make
no authoritative pronouncements but should always be prepared to argue for its
interpretations and criticism. Therefore, the project I describe should best be situated
not in the domain of automatic inferencing (or expert systems) but in the domain of
cooperative approaches to work (such as Winograd's 'coordinator', 1986).
Whatever the outcome of the debate within AI exemplified by Winograd and
Lenat, I suggest that expert systems as oracles are largely inappropriate in the
humanities. While in a domain such as oil exploration the user may require the
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system to produce a single result (the most likely place to drill for oil) with perhaps
some rationale for this result, in the humanities, we need to explore the many possible
interpretations of our data. The difference in the needs of the two domains (oil
exploration and the humanities) results from differences in their overall aims. The
principal aim of oil explorers is to find oil and to exploit their findings. The principal
aim of, say, the archaeologist is to add to the sum total of human knowledge. The role
of the archaeological writer is not to hand down oracular judgments but to produce
evidence or interpretations of evidence as part of the ongoing debate which constitutes
the discipline of archaeology. Thus traditional expert systems, viewed as quasi-
autonomous problem solvers, have only a minor role in the humanities and, if
knowledge based systems are to fulfill a significant role, an attempt must be made to
produce a design in accord with principles P2 and P3 (due, not to Calvino and
Winograd, but to common sense insofar as any viable system in any domain must
satisfy them).
As I have already suggested, I view the humanities as an arena (or set of arenas)
where debate at conferences and through the medium of published papers is at least
one means of advancing the body of knowledge which constitutes a domain. If this
view of the humanities is correct, then it seems obvious that the sort of system we
need to satisfy P2 is one which can participate in one or more phases of that process.
The ideal system would be one which can store, display and allow single or multiple
users to interact with vast bodies of data and opinion, which can provide and accept
new interpretations of that data and argue in support of or against these
interpretations. This is not something that can be done easily either by a human
lecturer or by the use of, say, libraries and paper documents. The ideal system thus
satisfies principle P3. At the same time, in accordance with PI, such a system should
not impose its interpretations and evaluations, leaving the decision between
competing interpretations to the user. In other words the system does not act as a
decision-maker but as an aid to acquiring a considered view. The provision of multiple
justified interpretations minimizes the risk of importing inappropriate interpretations,
while imposing only a model of argumentation.
In the following sections we will present a design for a program which
approximates to the ideal system outlined above.
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5.3 Some definitions
The following definitions are derived from the model discussed in chapter 4. They
represent aspects of the model in a well defined and hence computationally tractable
form. In these definitions I have adopted the following conventions:
G = a ground or grounds
C = a claim
G -> C = G supports C
W = a warrant
G -W -> C = G supports C using warrant W
variables are represented by uppercase initial letters (in Prolog style)
5.3.1 Debates, arguments, argument steps
A debate is composed of the interchange of argument-I s. An argument-I is
composed of argument steps or argument-Os and can form an interpretation. An
argument step is composed of a claim, grounds and warrant.
A debate (or argument-2) is composed of a series of interchanges in which
participants a) present views and b) defend and/or attack the views of other
participants. In human debates each side will have a team of two members. One
member from each team will talk for or against a proposal. The other member will then
attack the opposing team's argument and/or defend the other member of his/her own
team. The simplest form of debate is between two participants in which A puts
forward a view, B puts forward a view, A counters, B counters. The debate is then
assessed by a judge and a winner is declared. Usually in the Houses of Parliament,
juries, local councils and radio debates this is determined by the voting of individuals.
In the latter cases the assessment is, so to speak, distributed. The forms of debate
possible with two participants A and B are therefore: ABAB-Assess, BABA-
Assess, ABBA-Assess, BAAB-Assess.
A debate has afield. This determines the rules which (a) govern the production
of arguments, (b) the response to arguments and (c) the assessment of arguments. A
field has both contents (knowledge) and canons of good argument (or style).
A debate has a topic. This determines whether a particular contribution is
relevant or not to the debate in process. A move is relevant if it is related though not
remotely to the topic. The first move by A is always a proposition about the topic with
support for this proposition. The first move by B is always a proposition relevant to
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the topic plus support. This proposition will either be a direct contradiction Le. it
asserts the negation not(Proposition) or a contrary i.e it would be inconsistent to hold
both Proposition 1 and Proposition2.
An argument-l is composed of a series of propositions and their supports.
These supports can in turn be composed of a set of propositions and their supports
and so on.
Each argument step (or argument-O) is composed of a claim, grounds for this
claim and a warrant which allows the derivation of the claim from the grounds. A
warrant in turn has a backing which justifies the use of the warrant.
5.3.2 Moves in a debate
First moves have already been defined in the previous section. Second moves on
either A or B's part can either:
attack the first move of the other OR
defend the first move of self OR
restate the argument OR
mixture of all three.
An attack on another's move can be either an attack on the grounds, the claim or the
inference from grounds to claim. A defence of self's move can be support for the
grounds, the claim or the inference. An attack on a claim is an assertion that
not/Claim) or an assertion that Claim2 which is incompatible with Claim plus support
for this assertion. An attack on a ground is:
an assertion that not(Ground) OR
an assertion that is incompatible with Ground plus support for this assertion.
An attack on an inference is an assertion that:
not (Warrant) OR
no support for Warrant OR
not possible (in any viewpoint) to derive G->C using W or anything like W.
A support for a ground is the claim that Ground because Newsubgrounds. A support
for a claim is another argument for the same claim. A support for an inference is:
a support for a warrant OR
a denial of attack on a warrant.
Typically support will be used for elements of A's argument which H attacks in B's
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second move.
Response to arguments include attacks or supports on claims, grounds or
inferences. Attacks/supports include direct attacks/supports, topic shifts, level shifts.
A topic shift is a move to a (closely) related topic which has bearing on the topic
under consideration. Thus for example the move from the morals of Lady Chatterley's
Lover to the aesthetics of the text. A level shift is a move to a discussion of the
grounds for the backing to a discussion of the principles which compose that backing.
This can be illustrated by an argument about the film, The Last Temptation, which we
have discussed already. Here a move can be made from a claim about the film, based
on a warrant drawn from theology, to a discussion of theology.
An attack will be made on those elements which are found to be weakest. The
weakness/strength of a step depends on its status. The status of an argument step
depends on a) the success of the step, b) the type of the step and c) the argument
field. An argument step is always evaluated in the context of a particular viewpoint
and in the overall context of a particular field. A step succeeds if it is possible to get
from the grounds to the claim using the warrants. Since warrants (and facts) make up
viewpoints, the step is said to succeed in a particular viewpoint (VP) i.e. the one that
contains the relevant warrant. This step may succeed:
in no other VP OR
in a VP with same warrant OR
in another VP with similar warrant.
A step also succeeds if there is a chain of steps which can be found to make the move
from G->C. The warrant (W) in this case may need to be expanded as well or it may
be only applicable to one of the steps in the chain. Thus the expansion is to:
G-W->Gl...Gn-Wn->C (where W is used as the warrant in one step) OR
G-Wl->Gl...Gn-Wn->C (where W is replaced by some new warrants).
The claim G-W->C succeeds if either of above is true. The status of the argument
step depends on whether the step succeeds and how it succeeds. For example a step
that succeeds by using an analogy will have status SI in archaeology where SI is high
and status S2 in physics where S2 is very low because physics can make use of
precise, quantifiable results.
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5.3.3 Argument strength
The strength of an argument is determined by the statuses of its component steps.
An argument is strong if it has no weak steps. An argument is bad if all the steps are
weak. An argument is poor if the ratio of weak to ok steps is high. An argument is
good if the ratio of weak to ok steps is low. The overall assessment of the strength
of the arguments in a debate depends on the assessment of the combined strength of
the two sides two arguments. As a computationally tractable first stab, the
assessment of a participant's argument is given by the formulae:
F1: overall_strength_side(S) = overall_strength(first_arg) +
overall_strength(second_arg)
F2: overall_strength(A) = strength/A) + strength(direct_supports(A)) -
streng th( direct _attacks( A))
The overall assessment may be 'neither wins', 'A wins', 'B wins'. Depending on the
the status of the overall assessment the participants will alter or leave unchanged
their sets of beliefs including their beliefs about the beliefs of the other.
5.3.4 Argument types
The type of argument step is determined by the kinds of grounds and the sort of
warrant. Thus an argument in a physics domain is differentiated from an argument in
literary criticism both by the different evidence (bubble chamber tracks, poems) and
the warrants used to interpret that evidence (laws of physics, common sense). The
available types of argument step include simple rule based (or deduction), analogy,
causal, induction, abduction and so on. It is possible to order these types in a
precedence order. This ordering can be used both in assessing an argument and in
deciding between the different types of argument to use. The precedence is related to
the argument style. Argument step types are ranged in a default precedence order
{simple-rule-based, causal, induction, abduction, relational-analogy, historical-
analogy, simple-analogy}. This means that rule-based reasoning (or deduction)
carries more value than causal and that carries more than analogical. This precedence
ordering captures what I have called mode based argument style. Level based
argument style (the appeal to models or principles as an explicit part of the argument)
can also be included. Thus the full default ordering would be of the form: {simple-
rule-based, causal, induction, abduction, relational-analogy, historical-analogy,
simple-analogy, appeal to models, appeal to principles}.
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5.3.5 Argument fields
The field is composed of the viewpoints (VPs) and the canons of good argument or
style. The VPs are the facts plus warrants. The canons can be expressed as
changes in the default ordering for argument types. Thus a possible precedence
ordering for archaeology would be, {relational-analogy, historical-analogy, causal,
simple-rule-based, appeal to models, appeal to principles, simple-analogy}. An
argument may make use of a single VP or it may be composed of a series of argument
steps embedded in different VPs; that is to say, that the argument steps which make
it up may have warrants all drawn from the same VP or from different VPs. All
arguing is done within a field or a domain. A field is not exactly the same as a
discipline or the subdomains of that discipline but operationally we can take it as such.
A field is a set of warrants, facts and canons. A topic marks out a specific part of the
domain. The argument steps make use of the evidence or data from that sub-domain.
There may be canons for each sub-domain. Knowledge sources (warrants) are used
to reason about the domain data. These may be stored as a series of viewpoints.
VPs may also include facts which are only facts within that viewpoint. A VP can also
be a theory (where its components should be fairly structured), a personal VP,
standard VP or a commonsense VP. These aspects of VPs are contained in the
backing. Backing includes principles, models, simulations and commonsense.
5.3.6 Comments on the definitions
The above represents a stylized, formal and computationally tractable notion of debate
and argument. Real debates are much less formal, more wide-ranging, less confined,
value-ridden and emotionally charged affairs. Listen to the House of Commons or the
radio program, 'Any Questions'. Real arguments are even more wide-ranging. There
are few if any constraints on what can count as a claim or ground in an argument. The
exchanges are extremely elliptical. Thus a single word or even action may contain a
whole argument chain. We are adept at unpicking such chains. Arguments in general
are compressed or elliptical versions of the above formal model. However, while the
above is in many ways unrealistic, it has explicitly many of the elements of a real
debate and even of a real argument. On the other hand the context-determined nature
of real arguments, the common sense and shared background needed in interpreting
and parsing the arguments of other, the wide ranging tracking skills, the keenness
with which we detect aberrant moves in a fluid game are probably beyond the
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capacities of today's technology. We would need at least natural language
understanding and production, a complete range of human reasoning, empathy,
emotion, values, shared backgrounds, common sense and an understanding of games
and social interactions. We have all of these. Computers do not. Since mine is not an
attempt to endow a computer with these but rather an attempt to get clear about some
of the components of debate by modelling them on a computer these inadequacies are
perhaps irrelevant. I shall have more to say about these matters in the final chapter.
5.4 The architecture of the argument system
The argument module is made up of a series of procedural components, which realize
the model mentioned in earlier chapters and conform to the design principles above.
The associated domain knowledge base and archaeological interpreter will be
discussed in the next section. In what follows I will concentrate on what I regard as
the central component of any argument system - the generation of the system's
response to user arguments. I shall discuss the program under the following
headings: procedural elements and representational elements. The former includes:
argument checking; argument assessment; argument response; argument generation;
control; reasoning. The latter includes: the argument node; the argument network;
graphical displays; the system knowledge bases - strategies, trouble makers,
theories. These are summarized in Table 5.1 which is an expansion of Table 4.2.
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level in model data structure operations
=====================================================
argument-O node/frame
argument-2 network of trees
inference
forward chaining,
analogizing
slot access
parsing, checking,
generation, response
tree management
assessment
network management
argument-l tree of nodes
Table 5.1 - Data structures and operations for an ASP
5.4.1 Procedural elements
The principal procedural elements which correspond to the dynamic aspects of the
model given in chapter 4 and which constitute the tasks which the arguer performs
are dealt with in tum.
5.4.1.1 Argument checking
The checker takes as input the textual or other input of the user and attempts to
confirm that this is either a viable argument as it stands or to produce a reconstruction
of it which is viable. As a preliminary task the checker requires the parsing of any
natural language input. In the implementation in chapter 6 the checker is realized as a
set of rules for finding the weak status of nodes in an argument-l tree.
Parsing
In the present design I have made little attempt to deal with natural language issues,
preferring instead to concentrate on the model of argumentation. One way of reducing
the problems raised by natural language issues is to use a window, menu and pointer
interface. Another is the implementation of a simple Definite Clause Grammar. It
should be feasible to add a natural language understanding module to the overall
design (as indicated in Figure 5.1).
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Checking
Argument step checking involves a process whereby the system must attempt to
bridge any gap between the user's conclusion and his or her grounds. As Cohen
(1987) has pointed out (see chapter 3 above), most arguments fail to state explicitly
all of the arguer's premises. The system must therefore attempt to reconstruct the
user's argument in cases where there is no warrant with which to derive a claim from a
set of grounds. However there is one main difference between my work and that of
Cohen insofar as I make much more use of analogy and other forms of non-deductive
reasoning than she does. This is an implicit possibility in her work which I make it
explicit. The basic job of the checker is to see if a parsed user argument holds. Since
the system acts not solely as a deductive reasoner but also as a non-deductive
reasoner, in order to determine this the system tries the following possibilities:
1. The claim follows directly from the grounds;
2. The claim follows from the grounds by an intermediate series of steps each of
which makes use of a warrant given or found in the knowledge base;
3. The claim follows from the grounds + other grounds;
4. The claim follows from the grounds by analogy.
A component called the deriver can be used to see if claims follow from grounds. The
deriver works by trying each of the possible means of getting to claim, C, from
grounds, G, in turn, halting when one is satisfied or failing. The ways of getting from
G to C may be ordered in the precedence order mentioned in section 5.3.4. Thus we
could have analogy before the process of gap-filling given as 2 above. In cases where
there is no complete chain between G and C, gap-filling is a three step process:
l.traversing the tree from the grounds as far as is possible, 2 traversing the tree from
the claim as far as is possible and 3. seeing if it is rational to link the claim to the
grounds at this point. It will be rational to link if the user believes a warrant which the
system does not or the user believes in something which will allow the system to
conclude that s/he believes in the warrant. All sorts of knowledge about the user and
other users could be used to make assumptions about possible beliefs and hence to fill
the gap between claim and grounds. This approach has a lot in common with Cohen's
use of user models (discussed in chapter 3) and of user modelling work in general.
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5.4.1.2 Argument assessment
In the preceding section we have dealt with how the system copes with checking
individual argument steps. This can be thought of as a form of assessment of
argument-Os and argument-Is. We now must turn to the overall assessment of an
argument. There are many alternative methods. The problem here is that the easiest
to implement - the counting method - is the least useful for an arguer since a system
using it cannot produce reasons for its assessments. Thus in what follows I will
outline the approach adopted and suggest alternatives which I would prefer but which
are not yet possible.
In outline the assessor takes the overall argument and attempts to produce a
relative evaluation. The simplest way to do this is to give some symbolic or numerical
value to each component argument-l and then to assess the overall value using the
formulae given in section 5.3.3. According to these formulae the overall strength of an
argument depends on the strength of the argument-l itself combined with the strength
of argument-l s which support it less the strength of those which attack it. The overall
assessment (given in section 5.3.3 for a two move debate) would more generally be
given by the total of all the strengths of component argument-Is. The evaluation of
individual argument-Is can be produced in many ways. For example certainty factors
may be attached to the rules used and the overall value of an argument-l given by the
certainty of its claim. In chapter 6 I will show how the evaluation of an argument-l
can be determined by taking the ratio of weak to strong nodes which make it up.
Other possible ways include the following. Using the method exemplified in the
hypertext based system of VanLehn (1985) we could simply count the arguments for
and against and display them in a matrix form like that given in Figure 3.1. A
numerical method is also the approach favoured by Collins and Michalski (Baker,
Burstein, and Collins, 1987, Collins and Michalski, to appear) in their work on
plausible reasoning. Thus overall argument evaluation could be carried out by taking
the graph structure contained in the argument network and counting the number of
arguments and sub-arguments marshalled by each side which fulfill criteria such as
accuracy, simplicity, parsimony, precision and generality. The main difficulty here is in
producing formally defined accounts of these criteria.
Some ideas from the philosophy of science show how this may be possible. This
work is aimed at finding a basis for the comparison of explanations. Since, as I have
argued, arguments and explanations are closely related, this work provides a range of
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possible candidates for argument assessment. Kitcher (1981) has suggested that a
theory is better if it subsumes more facts. Thus Darwin's theory is better than any of
its rivals because it can cope with more situations. However, in the end this comes
down to simple counting. Furthermore, we can envisage a situation where an
explanation does not cover as many facts as another but where it covers more
significant facts. Work by Thagard (1978) has suggested a more satisfactory means
of deciding between explanations. According to Thagard an explanation is better if it it
satisfies the following criteria: a) it is consilient i.e it explains a lot; b) it is simple;
and, c) it makes use of analogies. More recently Thagard (1988a, 1988b, to appear)
has advanced a connectionist model based on these ideas. In this model an
explanation is assessed in terms of explanatory coherence. Using a set of weighting
formulae represented in a connectionist program, his system, ECHO, can determine
the best explanation. The system is based on a theory of explanatory coherence in
which the best explanation is not simply the one which covers the most facts.
Account has to be taken of how the various hypotheses are interconnected. Thus the
coherence of an explanation depends on : (a) consilience - the number of facts (or
pieces of evidence) which are explained; (b) simplicity - the minimization of the
number of hypothetical propositions; and, (c) the existence of links to other
propositions in the set making up the explanation (for instance by relations of
analogy). An explanation coheres better than another if the overall value of these
taken together is greater. Since the calculation of this is not simply a matter of adding
up the values (some tend to count against others) Thagard has opted for a
connectionist implementation of the theory.
In order to allow for the production of reasons for an assessment, the best
approach would be to take some of the insights derived from the philosophy of science
and cast them in the form of a series of meta-rules. Thus the two arguments can be
taken as objects with certain attributes and depending on these attributes they can be
adjudged good or bad. For example a meta-rule for assessment might be of the form:
If
argl subsumes more data than arg2
Then
argl is better than arg2.
This rule is obviously an attempt to capture Thagard's consilience criteria. Other rules
could be created for his other criteria. These might be added to by rules which were
specific to the domain. Thus, following my discussion of analogy in archaeology in the
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previous chapter, a rule which was of the form,
If
argl contains a relational_analogy and
arg2 contains a simple_analogy
Then
argl is better than arg2.
is possible. We have seen already in the previous chapter how considerations of
relevance might be used in assessment rules of this kind.
The main difficulty with this approach is that many of the standardly acceptable
criteria for the acceptance of a scientific theory are not precisely characterized.
Thagard has made an attempt at such a formalization. However as Hempel (1985:
121) points out, 'no exact and generally acknowledged formulation of corresponding
criteria is presently available or likely to be forthcoming'. This suggests that there
may be difficulties in producing other than the simplest meta-assessment rules.
5.4.1.3 Argument response
The responder takes the current state of the argument-2 and by selecting an
appropriate component from the system knowledge base produces another argument-
1 to add to the argument-2. The responder must take account not only of the user's
argument but also of the particular argument style operative in the current field in
order to determine which type of response is most appropriate in the particular case.
The responder can be implemented either declaratively as a set of response rules or
as a procedural module. In chapter 6 there are several examples which show how the
latter option can be implemented.
As I suggested in the introductory chapter, in any automatic argumentation system
it will be necessary for the system to have some means of responding to the user's
arguments. In a reasonably sophisticated system where a range of different
arguments are possible it is necessary to have a sophisticated means of response. To
my mind it is the sophistication of response which is central to an arguer. In human
arguments an argument-l may be followed by another argument-l in response which
at first glance seems totally irrelevant. Yet over a period of time the relevance and
cogency of the response will become obvious (that is, it is tangentially relevant as
discussed in chapter 4). Thus the main difficulty in an automatic responder is in
making sure that the response is relevant and as strong as possible.
The response which the system produces can be thought of as having been
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produced as a result of a plan or strategy. However this term should be reserved for
the overall strategy which is involved in highly manipulative persuasive
argumentation. Characteristically the arguer here will be attempting to set a trap or to
block his or her opponent's possible moves. The argument becomes, as it were, a
game with all that that implies. The concept I am seeking here is more that which
determines in a grammar-like manner what are the possible next moves and which is
the best. This notion is similar to that we found in discussing the work of Reichman
(see chapter 3 above). However I am unwilling to accept that the grammatical
approach is best suited for an arguer. It does not seem likely that all of the possible
moves can be encoded in advance. Even if this were possible it does not seem
psychologically plausible. Nonetheless the approach has much to recommend it and I
will offer a set of productions for response in a formal debate in chapter 6. The
argument units of the Yale group also provide a means of analysing and responding to
arguments. However these have a certain ad hoc feel. Thus while the approach of
Reichman seems to be over-theoretical that of the Yale group seems under-
determined. We need something which can stand as the basis for the system's
response but which is grounded in empirical studies. There are two bodies of work
which exhibit the necessary empirical basis and which are not over-determined: (a)
The work of Perkins, Allen and Hafner (1982) on the analysis of everyday reasoning;
and, (b) The work of Keane, Baird and Johnson-Laird (1988) on cognitive models of
argumentation .
• In their paper Perkins et al. analyse responses to human arguments in terms of the
use of mental models of situations rather than the committing of logical fallacies. As
part of their account Perkins et al. give a summary of the kinds of counterarguments
(they call them 'objections') which are used in everyday reasoning. In an analysis of
about 2000 objections they found that eight types of objection accounted for 80% of the
total. They call these objections the 'troublemakers'. I will give them in the order
listed in the paper. In their discussion, relying as it does on a mental models approach
they discuss the troublemakers in terms of causal models of situations. However, I
feel that their categories can be applied more widely. Hence in what follows I have
generalized from their causal line.
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Contrary consequent. This is used when the same grounds are used to produce a
different claim which is not consistent with the opponent's claim.
Contrary antecedent. In this case the claim of the opponent's argument is shown
as following from a different set of grounds. Thus the opponent's argument is
weakened since, while the claim may still be valid, there may be other reasons for
that claim. Typically the responder will go on to claim that there are reasons for
preferring the alternative grounds. This is not an attack on the claim but only on
the means of arriving at it.
External factor. In this case an argument is refuted since some factor is present
which affects the derivation of the claim from the grounds. In their example the
claim that" We have a large population that would pull through in a military crisis"
is objected to in the following manner: !lAlarge population used to help, but today
modem nuclear weapons can make short work even of a large population ".
Disconnection. In this case the opponents grounds are perceived as having
insufficient or no weight in support of the claim. In other words they are regarded
as irrelevant.
Scalar insufficiency. This is Perkins et al.'s term for response to arguments which
involve matters of degree. The arguer responds by showing that some factor is
insufficiently present for the argument to follow.
Neglected critical distinction. Like the external factor response this involves the
addition of some additional factor to the argument which allows a different claim.
In this case the extra ground is that there is a critical distinction which is not made
by the opponent but which allows a contrary claim.
Counterexample. This involves the falsification of some general claim or ground
by the provision of counterexamples.
Alternative argument. This is the case where the arguer has put forward a claim
and grounds which have been attacked by the opponent. The arguer's next move is
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to produce an alternative argument for the same claim.
These troublemakers have the virtue of being empirically grounded. They are also
clearly stated and thus reasonably easy to render in a computational form. On the
other hand they are sometimes difficult to distinguish. For instance it is not easy to
see the difference between external factor and neglected critical distinction. They
are sometimes given over-specific definitions. For instance there is no reason why an
alternative argument shouldn't be a response to an opponent rather than to an
opponent's response. In this case alternative argument would act like contrary
consequent and contrary antecedent except that a totally new argument for a claim
relevant to the original is produced. Furthermore, two troublemakers may work
together. For instance a counterexample is one way of showing that there is a
disconnection between grounds and claim. In fact, the response is usually a two
stage process in which the actual response is preceded by a process of discovering
faults in the opponent's argument. Thus, in the case of contrary consequence, the
contrary consequence is found and then this is used as the support for an argument
attacking the opponent's original claim. If only the contrary consequence is given the
argument will remain elliptical and require that the opponent infer the relation between
the two arguments.
• Keane, Byrne and Johnson-Laird
On the basis of a series of experiments conducted at the Human Cognition Research
Laboratory at the Open University, Keane has suggested that we can divide
arguments into consequent, antecedent, negative-consequent, negative-antecedent,
generalisation and specialisation forms.
A consequent type argument is one in which the logical or causal consequence of a
proposition is derived, found to be either true or good and presented as evidence for
the proposition. Thus
If the ballet is subsidised by the government
then it will be available to everyone
It should be available to everyone
Therefore, it should be subsidised.
This is the expanded form of
Proposal: Ballet should be subsidised
Argument: It should be available to everyone.
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On the other hand, an antecedent argument argues for or against a proposal by looking
for something which causally or logically implies the proposal and which is true or
false (or good or bad). The negative forms of these take the negation of the proposal
and use this in deriving either an antecedent or consequent which is either true or
false (good or bad). A generalisation is an argument in which the response to a
proposition is in terms of a generalisation which subsumes the original proposition.
The example given is as follows:
Proposal: Ballet should be subsidised
Argument: All the Arts should be subsidised.
In my terms this represents the case where a claim is supported by an argument
whose claim is the generalisation and whose grounds are unstated. A specialisation
represents the case where a claim is answered by something which can be subsumed
by the claim. The example given is
Proposal: Hanging should be made law for certain criminal offences
Argument: It should be made law for really violent crimes.
Perhaps in this case the 'argument' is less a response than a restatement of the
proposal.
Keane et al. claim, firstly, that their research shows that there are a limited set of
responses which arguers use; secondly, that more positive than negative arguments
are produced; and, thirdly, specific proposals are met with specific arguments and
similarly for general proposals. The first claim fits well with the point made by Perkins
et al. that there are a limited number of generally used troublemakers. This bodes
well for the computational model of arguing I am attempting to construct. The second
claim suggests that certain sorts of argument will only be produced in certain
circumstances; that there is a high level dictum which limits processing. This fits well
with the notion of domain dependent argument styles which I have developed and
suggests that we need to go further in characterizing not only whole domains but
particular sets of circumstances which will call forth particular argument types. Keane
et al. go on to suggest that convincingness may be a function of the amount of work
required by a hearer. This final point is related to Sperber and Wilson's view of
relevance discussed in chapter 4 and suggests that there may be easily accessible
strategies for response. Thus the first choice when presented with a generalisation
will be to produce a generalisation. More work needs to be done on what the
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succeeding choices may be.
The work of Perkins et a1.and Keane et a1.has much in common with that of Allan
Collins and his associates (Collins 1978, Baker, Burstein and Collins 1987, Collins
and Michalski, to appear). This research is aimed at building a computer
implementation of a model of human plausible reasoning. It is therefore intended to
model reasoning rather than argument. But as we have seen above reasoning and
arguing are closely related in that it takes reasoning to produce the argument-Os
which make up argument-Is and ultimately argument-2s. Their system (the Plausible
Reasoning Simulation System) is more closely related to our concerns in that it
attempts to deal with the sort of reasoning humans actually use when knowledge is
uncertain and incomplete. It includes the capacity to use different types of inference
depending on the kinds of relations between the objects found in its memory. Thus if it
finds mutual dependencies it will try functional analogies. Baker et a1.mention four
types of relations between memory contents and the questions asked of the system:
generalization, specialization, similarity and dissimilarity. These are obviously similar
to those of Keane et al. above. Thus if the system needs to reason about the flower
type of England it can use more generalized knowledge about the flower type of
Europe, more specific about that of Surrey, analogies between England and Holland or
disanalogies between England and Brazil.
This approach goes some way towards a theory of response since it is grounded in
empirical studies and is computationally tractable though relatively untested. The
sorts of responses which can be generated by these are numerous. Perhaps not
enough for a human argument but sufficiently close. At the same time they are general
and not tied to particular domains (as those of the Yale group are - see chapter 3).
5.4.1.4 Argument generation
Arguments are generated using the responses to argument as input and outputting
either textual or graphical forms of these. If the system is called upon to select an
argument to start the ball rolling it will simply forward chain on the knowledge base
and select an argument at the highest possible level (social organization or higher).
The system will need to take account of the most appropriate types of argument for
the current field. The argument is presented via toulmin structures or via canned text
templates encoded in the trouble makers. Pruning is possible and perhaps necessary.
System arguments should have the 'gappy' quality of user arguments. Argument
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generation could be performed by transforming the proof traces provided by the rule
interpreter. This could be achieved by using a set of predicates which (a) extract sub-
arguments which have been used previously in exchanges with a particular user and
(b) produce the best ordering for the argument step. The notion of argument as tree
transformation using knowledge of the structure of actual arguments is based on
Weiner's work on similar transformations of tree structures for explanation in BLAH
(Weiner 1980, Goguen, Weiner and Linde 1983). The partial implementation simply
produces graphical forms of the argument-Is produced during the reasoning process
when generating a response.
5.4.1.5 Control
Ideally the control module in an ASP acts as a form of meta-level architecture. This
notion derives from the work of Genesereth and Smith (1982) where they suggest that
various generally applicable forms of reasoning in expert systems (such as forward
chaining) can be encoded declaratively as a high level set of rules which are used to
decide which object level rule is tried next. From this point of view the meta-level
knowledge about arguments contained in the assessment rules and the troublemakers
can be used as a meta-level of control which determines the actions of the domain
interpreter. The main difficulty with this approach is that, while it is feasible and
attractive, it is very inefficient. Thus it is more likely that control will be dealt with by
use of an algorithm of the form presented in the next chapter.
5.4.1.6 Reasoner
The principal component of the reasoner is the interpreter to be discussed below. The
reasoner could be used by the other components of the arguer as a central component
for the manipulation of rules. Thus the various structures manipulated could be dealt
with by the same reasoner using rules for assessment, response and so on. It is more
likely that the reasoning will be distributed throughout the various modules. In the
implementation discussed in chapter 6 the various reasoning tasks are implemented
as procedural Prolog code with domain interpretation kept as a separate task.
5.4.2 Representational elements
The representational elements represent the arguer's storage structures. In part,
these correspond to the argument of the tripartite model of chapter 4 with the domain
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knowledge dealt with by the interpreter.
5.4.2.1 The argument node
There is no great originality in either of the following data structures. The work I am
concerned with is less to do with finding new ways of representing than in finding new
things to represent.
At the base of this system is the argument node. This is the representation which
stores a step in an argument exchange or debate (an argument-D). Without this it
would not be possible to store the system or user argument, check it, respond to it,
display it either graphically or textually. At its simplest, as we have seen above in
chapter 4 an argument can be seen in terms of some claim or conclusion supported by
some grounds or evidence
G1, G2, ...Gn -> C
However, while this may be sufficient for logical or mathematical proofs and many
everyday arguments, there are aspects of argument which are simply not captured by
this. Primarily, as we have seen, the above notation does not capture the theoretical
context in which the argument is taking place. Thus it is necessary to extend the
simple notation above to deal with warrants and backing. Thus I have adopted a
modified form of Toulmin's argument structures as described in chapter 4.
The argument node can be seen as a frame structure with slots for its various
constituent parts. A typical frame would have the following slots and contents as a
means of capturing the content of a typical argument (we will see in the next section
that other slots are needed to deal with the network management).
type: argument node
owner: user
name: argnodel2
subfield: millie's camp
claim: 'there is cooking at areal'
datum: 'there is a billie pole and lard bucket at areal'
warrant: 'if there is a billie pole and lard bucket at A then
A is for cooking'
backing: [common_ sense, cree ethnography]
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This node will be created when an argument is parsed. The various slots are filled (in
a way similar to the work of McGuigan and Black 1986) during subsequent
processing. Only the final slot - warrant - is problematical. In the case of an
argument generated by the system, the warrant is the rule used to infer the claim. The
case of an argument generated by the user is more difficult and requires more
processing. The warrant can be produced in three ways:
• A suitable rule is found
• A suitable rule is constructed from the claim and grounds
• The current background theories are used to produce a new rule
The backing is the set of background principles which either ground the warrant or
which are currently operative.
As I have suggested already, the argument node can be used not only to store the
argument step but also as a means of generating textual and graphical versions of the
argument. Textual versions simply fill the appropriate slots in an argument template
with the contents of the claim and grounds slots of the argument node. (It is possible
that a mode for particular users could be employed to restrict or admit access to the
other slots.) Display is simply a matter of taking the various slots from the frame
representation and mapping them onto the appropriate graphics variables.
5.4.2.2 The argument network
While the argument node provides the basic node for the storing and display of
arguments - the atoms if you like - it is the argument structure which captures and
can be used to display the overall ebb and flow of the argument. The argument
network (see McGuigan and Black, 1986, Cohen, 1987, Alvarado et al., 1986) can be
compared to a semantic net or to a hypertext (see Conklin, 1987a, 1987b). It basically
consists of argument nodes which bear relations of support and attack to each other.
Thus a claim such as There is cooking at areal (with its attendant justification) can
form part of the support for another claim, for example, Areal was used as a domestic
area. At the same time the original claim can serve as an attack on yet another claim
such as Areal was used as a refuse area. If we number the first node NI, the second
N2 and the third N3, this can be represented in terms which the system can use in
reasoning about the state of the argument. Thus for example we can have the
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following propositional representation of the argument-2:
supports(Nl,N2) &
attacks(N 1,N3)
Again as in the case of the argument node the overall network can be displayed to the
user as a set of such relationships or in a pictorial form.
In order to maintain this network the argument nodes require additional slots.
Thus the following might be added to the example given in the previous section.
supports: argnode2
attacks: argnode22
supported_by: [argnode12,argnode34]
attacked_by: []
The argument network has several interesting properties:
• It can be stored between uses by a particular user. This is accomplished by
saving the nodes to a text file and recovering when needed. Thus the system can
support more than one user or even more than one network for each user.
Furthermore there is no reason why the system should not have more than one
network in memory at the same time thus allowing the current argument to relate
to previous arguments either of this user or of other users.
• The network stores the dependencies between the various arguments in terms of
supports and supported_by, attacks and attacked_by links. The system as a
whole acts as a form of reason maintenance system in Doyle's sense (Doyle 1979,
1980). The dependencies are necessary since, apart from the need to show the
complete relationships between nodes, there is also a need to update the network
when some fact has been shown to be wrong, some rule inadequate or some
previous piece of argument subsequently proved false. Thus both the network and
the domain knowledge base may be subject to the system's changing its mind.
• This network can also act as a sort of blackboard. One of the main difficulties in
computational models of dialogue is a mechanism for dealing with topic change as
discussed above. Reichman attempts to solve this by means of an ATN grammar.
Given the nature of the data structure as described so far, it seems that the
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simplest way of managing topic change is by marking the nodes with a status slot.
status: active
In this way the system can either move to another topic (by means of topic shift
rules) by selecting an active or current topic. The system can also use these
values as a means of deciding whether the user's move is legal. In general the
system can use the network with its status slots as a means of keeping touch with
the state of an argument. If a status slot contains the value winner then the
argument is over. If it contains the value loser then this argument cannot be used
in another argument and so on. If there are still active arguments then these
must be dealt with (unless the user explicitly calls a halt to the argument). The
system can be seen as taking values from other slots as a means of filling these
status slots with winner or closed.
In summary then, the network which is produced as a result of the user system
exchange is composed of a series of nodes. Each of these nodes is of the following
form:
type: argument node
owner: user
name: argnodel2
field: millie's camp
claim: 'there is cooking at areal'
datum: 'there is a billie pole and lard bucket at areal'
warrant: 'if there is a billie pole and lard bucket at A then
A is for cooking'
backing: [common-sense, cree results]
supports: argnode2
attacks: argnode22
supported by: [argnodel2,argnode34]
attacked_by: []
status: active
The network discussed above acts as the argument-2 of the model. As we shall in
the next chapter extra links are needed in each frame in order to deal with the
argument-Is which are made up of argument-Os and compose argument-2s.
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5.4.2.3 Graphical displays
It would be possible to conduct an argument exchange with an ASP entirely in terms
of textual interchanges. While this is how I sometimes present argument exchanges
there are several reasons why this is inconvenient:
1) Interactive arguments are not normally typed - this is too slow and unnatural
2) ASPs have limited natural language capabilities and must therefore rely on a
very stereotypical and constrained form of input. Typing all of this would be time-
consuming and lead to errors.
3) Modem computers are capable of interchanges which make use of various
menus, graphical displays and pointing devices.
4) Users in archaeology are well used to various forms of graphical display
containing data of many kinds. These range from maps to drawings of pots to
reconstructions of houses.
For these reasons I suggest a predominantly graphical display for the interface
with pull down menus and selection via the keyboard and the mouse. I shall describe
in what follows the principal graphical displays and how the user interacts with them.
• Graphical toulmin structures
The basic form of the toulmin structure or argument node is as portrayed in Figure 3.2.
This is derived from Toulmin et al. (1979) and Marshall (1987). Its principal use is as
a means of displaying argument-Os. Figure 5.2 gives an example. However a series
of hypertext like links could be made to other components such as the overall
argument network and the preceding and succeeding argument-Os which, with the
current argument-O, form an argument-l ,
• The graphical argument-I
In its graphical form this is exemplified by the display given in Figure 5.3 (where hf1
is the name of a rule which acts here as a warrant). In this case the argument-I is
composed of a single argument-D. Again this acts principally as a means of displaying
information about the interpretations. As we shall see this is the main medium of
communication for the implementation discussed in the next chapter.
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5.4.2.4 The system knowledge bases
The system makes use of a series of system knowledge bases during the various
phases of the argumentation process. During parsing, checking and generation it
needs a knowledge base of troublemakers, strategies and theories. During
assessment a knowledge base of assessment knowledge is needed. During response,
the troublemakers are again needed. By far the most developed of these at the
present time is the knowledge base of troublemakers. I have discussed the origins
and development of the knowledge used here in an earlier section, here the discussion
will be restricted to the implementation.
In what follows I will discuss the troublemakers, strategies and theories.
(1) Troublemakers
I have discussed the background to these in section 5.4.1.3 above. As we have seen
the troublemakers (TMs) can be used as a means of controlling the inferencing which
takes place when responding to the user's argument. The extensions to the basic set
given above are practical extensions aimed at facilitating various aspects of this. I
would claim that they represent intuitively plausible responses to arguments but I
have no empirical evidence for their existence. The full list of trouble makers is as
follows:
contraryconsequence
contrary _antecedent
external Jactor
disconnection
scalar _insufficiency
neglected _crtticai distinction
counter _example
altemative jargument
reductio
ad hominem
response to analogy
topic_shift
level_shift
pick _up _the_thread
capitulate
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An obvious extension to this set would be a group of eight troublemakers which dealt
with the responses to the use of troublemakers. Given that a participant has
employed one of the trouble-makers one likely response is to suggest that that
trouble-maker was employed wrongly. This will be different for each trouble maker.
Thus, for example, an appropriate response to the use of disconnection would be to
show how the claim is connected to the grounds.
As I suggested above, experiments by Mark Keane at the Open University have
suggested that a common strategy in arguments is to take a given view and reason
forward from that to some consequence which can be shown to be 'bad' in some way.
The following troublemakers can be used to take the user's claim and derive a
contradiction with either the users beliefs or systems or other user's.
reductio
This trouble maker takes the user claim as a supposition and tries to derive a
contradiction with either a) a mutually agreed proposition, (b) a proposition the
user holds, or, (c) a proposition from some theoretical viewpoint.
pick up the thread
This TM looks for a currently active user argument node and sees if the argument
can be continued from that point by further attacks.
capitulate
This TM represents the response of a rational arguer when s/he sees that the
argument is lost i.e when there is no response possible.
ad hominem
This TM takes the user's argument and checks to see if any element of it
contradicts something which the user has already claimed. This TM is thus a
specific form of the reductio TM mentioned above. This is implemented in the
prototype system and discussed as example 2 in chapter 6.
response to analogy
This TM responds as appropriate to the use of different types of analogies.
Examples of this are given as example lea) and l(b) in the next chapter.
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topic shift
This TM takes an argument and failing to find an appropriate response otherwise
shifts the focus of the argument to a relevant topic.
level shift
This TM has been discussed in the previous chapter. In essence a level shift is a
topic shift where the new topic is at a higher level in the field. Thus the new topic
is some part of a model or set of theoretical principles. This is exemplified as
example 3 in chapter 6.
As I have suggested already, the troublemakers can be viewed as a means of meta-
level control in the Genesereth and Smith (1982) mould. The most likely form of
encoding is as meta-rules in a production system (Davis, 1980) but other
representations are possible.
These troublemakers usually embody a two stage process in which the actual
response is preceded by a process of discovering faults in the opponent's argument.
While it would be possible to encode each of the troublemakers as, for example, a
Prolog predicate, in the partial implementation of ASParch (Chapter 6) I have
attempted to simulate the two stage process by having rules which find weak nodes in
the argument structure and other rules which attack these weaknesses.
The TMs also need to have access to the knowledge about the argument style of
the field and be able to assess the relevance of a claim. As I have suggested in
section 5.3.5 the information about the field can be stored as a set of argument types
and given a precedence ordering. Thus in the case of the response to analogy TM the
system can use this information to deal appropriately with analogy. In the examples
in chapter 6, the only domain the system knows about is archaeology and the
precedence is encoded procedurally. The system also needs to be able to assess
relevance since several of the TMs require knowledge of what claims are relevant to
the argument currently being considered. These include externalJactor,
neglected crlticaldistinction and topic and level shift
(2) Strategies
Strategies for arguing can be defined in terms of the notion of attack and defence. A
cooperative strategy is one in which an arguer attacks and defends both the
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arguments of its opponent and its own. An uncooperative strategy is one in which
(as with most of us) we defend our own arguments and attack those of our opponents.
An altruistic strategy is one in which we attack only our own arguments and defend
our own and our opponents. A saintly strategy is one in which we attack only our
own arguments and defend only those of our opponents (though the notion of an
opponent becomes unclear here - we are our own opponent). These strategies
operate at a higher level than the troublemakers. They thus represent a meta-meta-
level of control.
(3) Theories
A theory can be implemented as a set of frame structures such as the following
example:
principle (
backing_set: historico_ecological,
name: h_principle_l,
type: explanatory,
claim: cause (invasion,
conflict_within_groups),
grounds : common_sense_principle_l,
strength: 8).
Each frame contains a single principle of the theory. Each principle is either
explanatory or predictive. A theoretical principle is otherwise dealt with as an
argument node with slots for claim and grounds. This representation allows level shift
to occur so that the theory becomes the object of a discussion. The theory can also
figure in explanations or justifications. More will be said about the use of theories in
the next chapter.
S.S The architecture of the interpreter
In accord with the ideas mentioned in chapter 4 the interpreter can be construed in
terms of a set of facts and transformational rules which operate on these facts.
The architecture of the domain interpreter can be exemplified by our work on
designing KIVA, an expert system for archaeological reasoning (Patel and Stutt 1988,
1989). In KIVA the knowledge base consists of facts about the domain and rules for
interpreting those facts.
The main sub-classification of the facts is into features and finds. Finds can be
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taken as the movable objects found on a site. These can further be decomposed into
objects which are shaped for some human purpose - artifacts - and unworked, natural
objects - ecofacts. Features refer to the physical components of the site and include
pits, ditches, post-holes, rubbish dumps, mounds and so on. Facts about the site
might also be divided in terms of the different sorts of evidence. Thus we might have
evidence from the excavation of the site, historical evidence from documents which
mention the site, experimental evidence where similar sites have been reconstructed
and even inhabited, statistical evidence derived from an analysis of the artefacts found
and so on. However, the principal focus has been on evidence from excavations which
has not been analysed statistically.
The above represent the bottom level facts and their structure for archaeological
reasoning. Since, as we have seen (chapter 4 above), archaeological reasoning can
take place at many levels we must have some means of distinguishing between these
levels. The basic levels at which reasoning can occur are activity areas, sites, groups
of sites and cultures. There is a hierarchy of cultural activities which might be inferred
from the material remains found at the site. Figure 5.4 shows the hierarchy of site
facts and cultural activities. The basic process is one of mapping from the former to
the latter and represents an instance of what Clancey (1985b) calls heuristic
classification. This suggests that, while this interpreter is designed for
archaeological interpretation and hence archaeological argumentation, it also conforms
to a general class of interpreters.
Not all archaeologists would agree with these hierarchies but protocols from an
archaeologist taken by my colleague Jitu Patel suggest that this is a fairly
comprehensible approach to the organization of archaeological knowledge. In the
interpretation the archaeologist takes the features and finds and first identifies activity
areas and then assigns activities to them. For instance a hearth may lead to the
assignment of cooking as an activity. In our work on Pueblo societies we identified
four major types of activity area: living areas; storage areas; plazas or the out of doors
places where activities occur; kivas or subterranean rooms used for ritual purposes.
In order to deal with these facts, features and activity areas the interpreter must
have various types of rules. As suggested in chapter 4, the main components of
archaeological interpretation are: classification; reconstruction; and, cultural
interpretation. Thus a computational interpreter will have to have rules of at least
these broad types. In addition there will be sub-divisions of these various types. For
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instance, classification rules will be divided into rules for classifying features and
those for classifying finds. In the KIVA implementation we had seven sets of rules.
These were summarized as follows in Patel and Stutt 1988:
1) features.rules. This cluster of rules discovers significant areas from the size
and placement attributes of features.
2) finds .rules. This cluster derives uses of artifacts from their attributes.
3) content.rules. This cluster takes individual areas and searches for finds and
features within the area. It also checks that the contents are from the same
period in time.
4) areas.rules. On the basis of contents, the main activity areas are identified.
5) activity.rules. From artifact uses, possible activities are inferred.
6) constraint. rules. Expectations derived from the model help prune the possible
activities.
7) site.rules. Worlds are merged to give final interpretation of the site.
In terms of the model of archaeological interpretation portrayed above, rule-sets I,
3 and 4 do some sort of classification; rule-sets I, 2, 3 and 5 do reconstruction; and,
rule-sets 6 and 7 attempt to provide cultural interpretation.
To make this more concrete I will include some of the rules. The following is an
instance of the features.rules set:
if
X instance of hole &
the lining of X is charcoal &
the location of X is Loc &
Y instance_of enclosing_feature &
the border of Y is stone &
the location of Y is Lac
then
the type of Firepit is firepit &
the location of Firepit is Lac.
The following is an instance of the finds.rules set:
if
Artefact instance of pottery &
the base of Artefact is burned
then
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the use of Artefact is cooking.
The following of the areas.rules set:
if
Feature instance_of enclosing_feature &
the placement of Feature is subterranean
then
the type of Feature is kiva.
The following of the activity.rules set:
if
Feature instance_of enclosing_feature &
all enclosed_objects of Feature are Objects &
the type of Feature is living_room &
the use of Artefact is cooking &
(member (Artefact, Objects»
then
the activity of Feature is cooking.
The following of the constraint.rules set:
if
the possible_activity of W is sleeping &
the possible_activity of W2 is butchering
then
the truth value of W is false &
the truth value of w2 is false.
Since arguing involves several types of reasoning (as we have seen in chapter 4)
the basic interpreter presented here needs to have extensions in order to deal with
various forms of plausible and other reasoning which may be used by an arguer. There
are many possible ways of doing this. For instance it would be possible to implement
the search for analogies and so on in terms of procedural code. In our implementation
(as we shall see below) we have extended the basic interpreter by including explicit
rules for analogy finding. This represents another approach to the extensions
required. It remains to be seen whether or not such explicit extensions are possible
for other forms of reasoning.
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5.6 Conclusion
To conclude, in this chapter we have produced an informal design for a program based
on the model above. While we have not specified every component we have dealt
with the principal procedural modules and the data structures these operate on. In the
next chapter we will discuss one possible means of implementing this design. We
have introduced a set of formal definitions which are an attempt to capture in
definitional form the interactions between the various components. These definitions
are, like the design, derived from the model given in chapter 4. We have also
introduced a set of design principles which constrain the form that the design takes.
Thus the design takes account of the nature of the humanities in two ways. Firstly, in
that the humanities use argument the system accords with the humanities. Secondly,
the system takes account of the particular form in which knowledge intended to form
the basis for arguments must be encoded. The design obviously provides something
in the humanities which could not be provided in any other way. No individual is likely
to have access to the speed of computation, the storage facilities and the graphical
display of a modern computer. Finally the system does not attempt to impose
judgements. The principal aim of the system is to attack and defend arguments. The
user is enabled, by means of the argument-2 structures produced, to decide more
confidently between the various alternatives.
-000-
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Chapter 6 • Implementation and examples
Argument: An implementation of the design is possible and is capable
of dealing with realistic arguments. There are many extensions which
can be made to the prototype system.
While the model presented above will cover many cases it is beyond the scope of this
research to fully implement it. Thus, in order to lend some support to the claim that
such a system is possible I have implemented a restricted version of the model. This
makes no claim to being a fully releasable computer program. Indeed, as its main aim
is to provide examples in support of my thesis it is far from that. Nonetheless it
provides at least a hint of how such a program would appear while at the same time
lending some support to my claims.
In order to render the program readily tractable I have confined myself to a model
of formal debate. That this says anything about the full model of argumentation given
above depends on the reasonable assumption that formal debate can be seen as a
sub-set of informal argument and that each individual move in an argument can be
equated with a move in a debate. On the other hand, the moves possible in a debate
are much more restricted in that it is possible to tell in advance whose turn it is and
what the intent of the move is. In short, a debate is a more formal version of an
argument.
By formal debate is meant the sort of thing which goes on in debating societies and
which is common in schools. In this two participants or two teams of participants are
allowed a period of time in which to talk for or against a motion. At the end of the
allotted period a judge (or in some cases, the audience) will decide who the winner is.
Each team will have a first move in which their position pro or contra the motion is put
forward and a second move in which further support is given to their first move or in
which the first move of the other participant(s) is attacked. If we assign the letters
Al and A2 to one sides moves and BI and B2 to the other's then the possible
combinations are AIBIA2B2-Judgment and BIAIB2A2-Judgmenl as we saw in
section 5.3 above. Given this confined scheme it is possible to implement a program
in which the important issues are clarified. These issues centre on the notion of how
in a given field an argument is assessed and a reasonable response is generated and
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how analogy and theoretical argument are dealt with.
A further restriction is included in the implementation. In a participant's first or
second move many separate (though related) claims could be made. In the program
the user and system are only allowed one claim. Thus while in a real debate many
parts of the opponent's argument will be attacked the ASParch program is limited to
one attack. This is not a serious limitation since a simple algorithm could be
implemented which responds to all the points in an argument.
This chapter discusses the implementation of ASParch and presents some
examples which ASParch can deal with. In the final section inadequacies in the
program are identified and future extensions are outlined. This is included here in a
true Toulminian spirit in that arguments should take account of possible rebuttals.
6.1 The implementation of ASParch
This section has the following structure. I begin by presenting brief details of the
underlying inference engine, present the basic algorithm for the debater and then
discuss the various components which are involved, both representational (nodes,
network, viewpoints, theories) and procedural (weakstatus rules including checking,
response including generation, assessment, graphical display). The full Prolog code
for the more important parts of the implementation is given as Appendix I. The
program is implemented in MacPROLOGTM on an Apple Macintosh™ extended using
the Prodigy-4™ board.
6.1.1 The inference engine
A full description of the basic reasoning mechanism used in ASParch can be found in
the PD624 course text and reference manual from the Open University (Kahney
1989). The system - MIKE - is implemented in various versions of Prolog.
This interpreter is a frame- and rule-based system. In the following section, I will
first describe in brief the frames and the forward chainer and then outline the
extensions I have made to the system to allow for analogy.
• Frames
The basic frame used in MIKE has the following format:
Name instance_of <class> with
Slotl: [Facetl: Facetvalue ....]
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Slot2: [Facetl: Facetvalue ....]
Slot3: [Facetl: Facetvalue, Demon facetl: Demon_code, ....]
An actual example, taken from Kahney (ibid):
patient_l instance_of patients with
name: john_doe,
eats: [fish, meat],
symptoms:
[value: [headache, spots, runny_nose, fever],
inheritance: supersede,
type: medical_symptoms,
cardinality: any].
While this system allows the use of demons such as if_added and if_needed,
ASParch does not make use of this facility. Nor does it make use of features such as
cardinality and type. In fact even inheritance is rarely used.
• Forward chainer
The following is the syntax for legal rules in MIKE:
rule <rule-name> forward
if
<conditionl> &
<condition2> &
<conditionN>
then
<actionl> &
<action2> &
<actionN>
The conditions and actions can include access to the information held in frames as
well as arbitrary prolog code. The actions can include the creation of new frames.
Frames are accessed via the following:
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the <slot> of <object> is <filler>
all <slot> of <object> are <list-of-fillers>
<object> instance_of <class>
<class> subclass of <class>.
Prolog code is indicated by giving it as the argument to the special form, prolog:
prolog «prolog-goal»
prolog {<prolog-goall>, <prolog-goa12> ...)
New frames are created using the special form, note, in the following manner:
note <object> <instance-or-subclass-of> <class> with
<slotl>: <filler-or-list-of-fillers>,
This special form is also used to modify slot values:
note the <slot> of <object> is <filler-or-list-of-fillers>
As the system is implemented most of the reasoning required by ASParch
involves only access to frame slots. The actual inference process is done once at the
beginning of a session. This is required for efficiency reasons since, while MIKE is
fairly efficient, it is still a demonstration program. Thus forward chaining of the rules is
performed and ASParch relies on these to store all its required information.
• Extensions
In order for the MIKE interpreter to function as the reasoning mechanism for the
ASParch program extensions to the deductive inferences possible were needed.
Rather than change the basic MIKE mechanism I decided to implement analogical
reasoning as a set of three rules for analogy. These correspond to the three types of
analogy discussed in chapter 4. The rules make use of the information stored in
frames to find analogies. The reader should bear in mind that I am principally
interested in replacing unknown slot values (in particular use or function).
Analogies depend on matches between slot names. This is crude but serves the
present purpose of generating analogical arguments.
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1. Simple analogy
Al is a simple analogue of A2 if both have the same attributes.
rule analogy_rule_l forward
if
start &
prolog«has_attributes(Artefactl, Listl),
has_attributes(Artefact2,List2),
same_atts(Listl, List2),
not Artefactl = Artefact2»
then
the analogue of Artefactl is
[value: Artefact2,
type: simple_analogy].
2. Historical analogy
Al is a historical analogue of A2 if both have the same attributes and there is a
historical link between Al and A2.
rule analogy_rule_2 forward
if
prolog«has_attributes(Artefactl, Listl),
has_attributes(Artefact2, List2),
linked_historically(Artefactl,
Artefact2) ,
same_atts(Listl, List2),
not Artefactl = Artefact2»
then
the analogue of Artefactl is
[value: Artefact2,
type: historical_analogy].
3. Relational analogy
Al is a relational analogue of A2 if both have the same first and second order
attributes (or relations such as cause) and the second order attributes govern the
first order attributes. For example cause may govern the first order attributes
attracts and revolves_around in the manner Gentner (1983) suggests (see chapter
4).
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rule analogy_rule_3 forward
if
prolog«has_second_order_attributes
(Artefactl, Listl),
has second order attributes- - -(Artefact2, List2),
has_attributes (Artefactl, List3),
has_attributes (Artefact2, List4),
same_atts(Listl, List2),
governs(Listl, List3),
governs(List2, List4),
not Artefactl = Artefact2»
then
the analogue of Artefactl is
[value: Artefact2,
type: relational_analogy].
From this it can be seen that in any derivation ASParch will make use of steps
which might be deductive or analogical. Thus an argument can be composed of a
mixture of types of steps.
While the MIKE system has its own explanation facility I have chosen to store the
system's reasoning in the following manner. My basic rationale is that I think of
explanation as a process whereby an object - in this case a proposition - is
interrogated as to the warrant and grounds which allow it to be asserted. Standard
expert system explanation would thus proceed by following the chain of grounds and
claims. In order for this to be possible the system makes use of rules such as the
following:
if
Feature instance_of enclosing_feature &
all enclosed_objects of Feature are List &
the type of Firepit is firepit &
prolog (member (Firepit, List)
then
note(the type of Feature is
[value: living_room,
justification: living_room_rule,
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grounds:
[Feature instance_of enclosing_feature
all enclosed_objects of Feature are List,
the type of Firepit is firepit, ...])
By means of this rule the system stores all the justifications and grounds for all of
the changes made in a frame. This can be exemplified by the following:
featurell instance of site features with
name: featurel1,
type:
[value: living_room,
justification: living_room_rule,
grounds:
[featurell instance_of enclosing_feature,
all enclosed_objects of featurell are
[firepit6, artifact2],
the type of firepit6 is firepit, ...]
It is important to note that these justification and grounds slots are only used if either
the user or the system makes use of the claim to which they are attached. Thus, seen
in this light, a frame for an object in the domain knowledge base can be thought of as a
congeries of propositions about that object. As the reader can see the individual
claims about each attribute value in the frame are stored as the facets: value,
justification and grounds.
6.1.2 The basic algorithm for ASParch
The code for the central parts of the system is given in Appendix I. In this section I
intend to give a simplified version of the actual algorithm in Prolog-like form in order to
present the bare bones of what the system does and how it does it. For those readers
unfamiliar with Prolog syntax there are a number of introductory text books such as
Bratko (1986). I make use of the popular Edinburgh syntax for Prolog. The important
point is that Prolog operates as a logic programming language. As such a clause or
rule either fails or succeeds. Thus in the dummy code
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X:-
Y,
z.
X will succeed if Y succeeds and Z succeeds. The ':-' sign is equivalent to a reversed
If...then rule, with the conditions to the right of the sign. In this case - If Y and Z then
X. In Prolog 'and' is represented by the sign ',' and 'or' by';'. Variables are given in
uppercase. A clause succeeds if it finds an appropriate fact in its database or if it finds
another rule which succeeds. The Prolog interpreter thus works as a backward
chainer performing a depth first exhaustive search.
In the succeeding sections I will discuss the central components of the system in
greater detail. Basically the algorithm allows the user to request either the system-
user-system-user (SUSU) or user-system-user-system (USUS) form of debate. If
the former the system looks for an argument, displays it, requests the user's first
argument, responds to this and then asks for the user's second argument. A similar
procedure is followed for the USUS form. The pseudo code is fairly self-explanatory.
Where necessary I have included comments (marked by %s) and referred the reader
forward to the following sections.
maincontrol:-
get_field(F) ,
get_topic (T),
decide_first_rnove_and_proceed,
see if assessment needed.
%% User-System-User-System form of debate
decide_first_move_and_proceed:-
yesno(['Do you want to go first?']), %% answer = yes
ask_for_user_argument,
display_user_argument,
see section 6.1. 8
look_for_initial_system_argument_ususform,
display_system_argument,
ask_for_user_response,
display_user_argument,
decide whether to attack_or_defend,
display_system_argument.
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%% System-User-System-User
decide_first_move_and_proceed:-
% answer = no
look_for_initial_system_argument_susuform,
display_system_argument,
ask_for_user_argurnent,
display_user_argurnent,
dec ide_whether_to_att ack_or_de fend,
display_system_argument,
ask_for_user_response,
display_user_argurnent.
ask_for_user_argument:-
get_claim,
get_grounds,
store_user_argurnent_as_node,
see section 6. 1.3
recursively_get_sub_arguments.
look_for_initial_system_argument_susuform:-
forward_chain_on_domain_kb,
current_topic(the Att of Obj),
prove (the Att of Obj is Valuel),
%% call the MIKE slot retrieval mechanism
convert_production_traces_to_argument_node.
see section 6.1.3
look_for_initial_system_argument_ususform:-
forward_chain_on_dornain_kb,
current_user_clairn(the Att of Obj is Value),
(prove (the Att of Obj is Valuel);
prove (the Att of Obj is not(Value»),
convert_production_traces_to_argument_node.
see section 6.1.3
ask_for_user_response:-
get_response_type(Response_type) ,
clairn_or_grounds(Focus),
% see if focus is claim or grounds
ask_for_user_argurnent,
manage_links_new_arg_node_to_arg_net(Response_type),
see section 6.1.3
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store_response_type(Focus) .
%% If no weak nodes found then support the system argument
decide whether_to_attack_or_defend:-
get_user_argument(Arg),
find_weak_spots_in_user_argument(Arg,Weakspots),
see section 6. 1.5
Weakspots = [], %% none found
defend_system_argument.
decide_whether_to_attack_or_defend:-
get_user_argument(Arg),
find_weak_spots_in_user_argument(Arg,Weakspots),
attack_weak_spots_in_user_argument(Arg,Weakspots) .
defend_system_argument:-
find_alternative_arguments_with_same_claim;
find_alternative_arguments_for_a_ground.
find_weak_spots_in_user_argument(Arg,weakspots) :-
examine_each_node_for_weakness(Arg,Weakspots) .
%% This clause recursively examines the roots node and all the
%% sub-nodes of the tree for an argument-l and builds up a
%% list of lists with each of the sublists representing a
%% {node, status} pair.
examine_each_node_for_weakness(Node,
[[Node, Status] Restofstatuses]):-
get_node_claim(Claim),
get_node_grounds(Grounds),
get_node_warrant(Warrant),
weakstatus(Claim, Grounds, Warrant, Status),
recursively_examine_grounds(Grounds, Restofstatuses).
attack_weak_spots_in_user_argument(Arg, [Weakspot I
RestofWeakspots]) :-
attack_a_weakspot(Weakspot),
recursively_attack_weak_spots(Arg, RestofWeakspots).
%% attacks on analogy depend on argument field
attack_a_weak spot (Arg, [Node, Status]):-
Status = analogy_ground,
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see examples 1(a) and 1(b)
current_field(archaeology),
find_analogy_type(AType),
deal_with(Arg, Node, AType).
attack_a_weakspot(Arg, [Node, Status]):-
deal_with(Arg, Node, Status).
%% 1. look for saliency failure
deal_with(Arg, Node, simple_analogy):-
get_node_claim(Node,Claim),
Claim = (the analogue of A1 is A2),
current_field(Field),
check_for_unmatched_salient_attributes(Field,A1,A2),
make_system_argument(not(Claim), saliency).
see example 1 (a)
%% 2. Look for another contrary analogy see example 1(b)
deal_with(Arg, Node, simple_analogy):-
get_node_claim(Node,Claim),
Claim = (the analogue of A1 is A2),
find_another_analogue(A1,A2,Anotheranalogue),
current_field(Field),
check_for_contrary_analogue(Field,Anotheranalogue,A2),
make_system_argument(not(Claim), another_analogue).
%% 3. Look for selfcontradiction see example 2
deal_with(Arg, Node, arguable_principle(p»:-
get_node_claim(Node,Claim),
make_system_argument(not(Claim), selfcontradiction).
%% 4. Look for weakprinciple see example 3
deal_with(Arg, Node, arguable_principle(P»:-
get_node_claim(Node,Claim),
check_possible_level_shift,
make_system_argument(not(Claim), weak_principle).
6.1.3 Nodes and network - storing and relating argurnent-Os
An argument-l is represented as a series of linked frames each of which represents
an argument-O, Each frame has the following structure:
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Arg instance_of argument with
claim: (the Att of Obj is Val),
grounds: ListofGrounds,
warrant: Warrant,
supports: Argsupported,
supported_by: Argsupporting
external_supports: Nodel,
external_attacks: Node2,
external_supported_by: Node3,
external_attacked_by: Node4
The argument-O is composed of the contents of the claim, grounds and warrant slots.
The grounds slot contains a list of the supporting propositions. The supports and
supported_by slots provide pointers to other argument nodes as a means of relating
the argument-O to the other steps in the argument-L The external support and attack
links provide access to the other argument-1s which are related as either supports or
attacks as discussed above in chapter 5. They thus serve as links in the overall
argument network or argument-2. Code is needed to transform the results of the
system's forward chaining (where the slots of frames for features and finds and so on
are manipulated) into the frames which represent the argument. The argument-2
structure is thus kept separate from the domain knowledge. The justification, grounds
and value slots of the features are used in this process.
6.1.4 Viewpoints and theories
The system as implemented has two viewpoints in the sense of system and user
knowledge bases. These are handled as separate sets of frames held in the
predicates sys_beliefand user_belief. The domain knowledge is held in the main
knowledge base. Theories (or theoretical viewpoints) are held in frame like structures
representing principles which are linkable to the warrants used in arguments. There
will be further discussion of these in example 3 below.
6.1.5 Response - the weak status rules
As we shall see in the examples below the prototype system includes a set of rules
which are used when searching the nodes which make up a user argument for any
weak spots. I will deal with the rules used in the examples and which are therefore
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reasonably tried and tested. These are intended to deal with analogies and arguments
from theory as discussed above in chapter 4. Other rules which are more speculative
will be discussed in section 6.3 below. These rules are closely related to the
troublemakers introduced in chapter 5 above. There we pointed out that the
troublemaker often can be broken down into a two-fold process whereby the arguer
firstly finds some fault in the user's argument and then argues against it with another
argument. The weakstatus rules represent an attempt to capture the first part of this.
The second stage is performed by the deal_with clauses 1-4 shown in the above
pseudo-code.
1. Analogy
The system uses a simple rule which finds an analogy_ground if the proposition which
is the claim of that ground is of the form the ana 1ogue 0f Xis Y.
%% analogy
weakstatus(P,G,W,analogy_ground) :-
p = (the analogue of X is Y) .
Here, and in the remaining rules, P stands for the claim of an argument node (or
argument-O), G stands for the set of grounds and W stands for the warrant which
relates G to P. The fourth argument in the clause, 'analogy-ground', is returned by the
clause as the status of the node. In this rule the second and third arguments are not
made use of. For instance, in example, la below:
P is bound to (the analogue of featurel l is feature] 0);
G is bound to an empty list (Le. there is no ground given for this);
W is bound to an empty list.
2. Self-contradiction
The system returns the status self_contradictory if the user holds a belief which
contradicts a belief which counts as a claim in an argument node making up an
argument-I.
%% self-contradictory
weakstatus(P,G,W,selfcontradictory(X)) :-
assert_user_kb,
user_belief (X),
contrary (X,P).
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The code for contrary is given by the following:
contrary (X,Y) :-
X = not (Y) .
contrary(X,Y):-
X = (the Att of Obj is Vall),
Y = (the Att of Obj is Va12) .
3. Arguable principle
Here the system constructs a warrant from the grounds G and claim P and uses that
to access a set of backing principles. The lowest valued principle is then returned and
becomes the focus for attacks. This is fully illustrated in example 3 below.
%% arguable principle
weakstatus(P,G,DummyW,arguable_principle(Pr)) :-
not G = [],
G = [Gl],
W = (Gl -> P),
backing_for(W,B),
min_valued_principle(B,Pr) .
This rule checks that the ground is not empty, then constructs a warrant from one of
the grounds (in these examples, there is only one ground) and looks for the principle
which provides backing for this warrant and which has the lowest value. The bindings
for the variables is as above except that Pr will be bound to the principle which is
found. In example 3 below, Pr is bound to (causetpower, show ofprestigei).
6.1.6 Response - control rules
In the implemented program the rules which control what sort of response is made are
embedded in the procedural code give above as decideftrst move andproceed,
decide_whether_to_attack_or_defend and so on. These are not implemented as rules
in a knowledge base but they could be (if a more efficient interpreter was used). In
this section I collect together and present in one place the distributed knowledge of
what the next move should be. In these rules SI and S2 refer to the system's moves,
VI and V2 to the user's moves. E refers to an element in a user argument (a
particular argument-O in other words).
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If
no move made and
the form is SUSU
Then
the system finds an argument Sl
If
no move made and
the form is USUS
Then
the user provides an argument U1
If
form SUSU and Sl provided
Then
user provides U1
If
form USUS and U1 provided
Then
system provides Sl
If
SUSU and Sl given and U1 given and
element E of U1 weak
Then
S2 = attack E or
S2 = defend Sl
If
SUSU and Sl given and U1 given and S2 given and
S2 = attack E of U1
Then
U2 = defend E or
U2 = attack S2
If
SUSU and Sl given and U1 given and S2 given and
S2 = defend Sl
Then
U2 = attack S2 or
U2 = attack Sl or
U2 = defend U1
If
USUS and U1 given and Sl given and
element E of Sl weak
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Then
U2 attack E or
U2 defend Ul
If
USUS and U1 given and Sl given and U2 given and
U2 = attack E of Sl
Then
S2 = defend E or
S2 = attack U2
If
USUS and U1 given and Sl given and U2 given and
U2 = defend U1
Then
S2 = attack U2 or
S2 = attack U1 or
S2 = defend Sl
6.1. 7 Assessment
A simple form of assessment has been implemented in the program. This implements
the formulae given in section 5.3 above:
F1: overall_strength_side(S) = overall_strength(jirst_arg) +
overall_strength(second_arg)
F2: overall_strength(A) = strength/A) + strength(direct_supports(A)) -
strength! direct _attacks(A))
The algorithm for this is given below. It must be borne in mind that tests on this
algorithm are limited to the confined range of example arguments which ASParch is
designed to simulate. Appendix IV tabulates the results of using this algorithm on the
examples given later in this chapter.
overall assess (Value):-
get_user_root(R1), %% i.e. user's first argument
get_user_aux(R2), %% i.e. user's second argument
assess_argument(R1, Value1),
assess_argument(R2, Value2),
get_sys_root(R3), %% i.e. system's first argument
get_sys_aux(R4), %% i.e. system's second argument
assess_argument(R3, Value3),
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assess_argument(R4, Value4),
combine_overall_values(Valuel, Value2, OVaIuel),
combine overall values(Value3, Value4, OValue2),
winner (OValuel, OValue2, Value).
assess_argument(Arg, Value):-
assess_root(Arg, Valuel),
get_directly_attacked_by(Arg, External_attacked_by),
get_directly_supported_by(Arg, External_supported_by),
assess_attacked_by(Arg, External_attacked_by, Value2),
%% recursively assess this root
assess_supported_by(Arg, External_supported_by, Value3),
%% recursively assess this root
combine_values(Valuel, Value2, Value3, Value).
assess_root(Arg, Value):-
get_total_nodes(Arg, Nodecount),
get_weak_nodes(Arg, Weaknodecount),
check_ratio(Nodecount, Weaknodecount, Value).
%% If both same then argument full of weak nodes
check_ratio(N,W,V) :-
N = W,
V is O.
%% If weakcount is greater than half possible nodes then poor
check_ratio(N,W,V) :-
NI is (N/2),
W > NI,
V is 3.
%% If weakcount is equal to half possible nodes then middling
check ratio (N,W,V):-
Nl is (N/2),
NI = W,
V is 5.
%% If weakcount is less than half possible nodes then
reasonable
check_ratio(N,W,V) :-
NI is (N/2),
NI > W,
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V is 7.
%% If weakcount is ° then strong
check_ratio(N,W,V) :-
W = 0,
V is 10.
%% Formula Fl above
combine_overall_values(Vl, V2, OV):-
OV is V1 + V2.
%% Formula F2 above
combine_values(V1, V2, V3, V):-
V is (V1 + V3) - V2.
%% If the the value of the user's combined argument-1s is
%% greater then the winner is the user
winner (OValue1, OValue2, Value):-
max (OValuel, OValue2, OValuel),
Value = user.
%% else the winner is the system
winner (OValue1, OValue2, system).
6.1.8 Graphical display
In ASParch I have provided graphical representations of the user and system
argument-Is. In the present implementation argument-Is are represented as trees.
See Figure 5.3. In this I have attempted to show the different parts of the argument
(Claim, grounds, warrant) graphically. I have also attempted to show the different
kinds of propositions which make up the grounds. Argument-Os can be displayed as
graphical toulmin structures (see Figure 5.2).
6.2 The examples
The three examples illustrate: (a) how ASParch deals with analogies; (b) how the
theory level and the domain level interact; and, (c) how viewpoints are utilized. More
specifically they illustrate the operation of the weakstatus rules and the use of the
deal with clauses discussed above.
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Examples lea) and l(b)
In these two related examples the system responds to the user argument by first
finding an analogy as one of the grounds and then dealing with that analogy. To find
the analogy the system inspects each node in the user's arguments VI and V2 and
checks for weak spots using the rules outlined above. In this case the system notes
that an analogy is being used at a particular node. This is reported back and forms the
basis for the second step - the selection of a response. The system as implemented
discovers the analogy simply because of the use of the key word analogue in the
ground in question. In order to respond to the analogy the system first checks to see
what type of analogy it is. Given that the field is archaeology the system knows that
certain types of analogy are appropriate while others are not (see chapter 4 above).
Thus if the analogy is a simple analogy the system will attack it purely on that basis.
If the analogy is historical or relational the system needs to find a more appropriate
response as outlined above. The system as implemented only deals with simple
analogies. In example l(a) the system finds that there is a salient feature which any
analogue of feature11 must have. Since this is missing the analogy fails. This is
reported to the user. In the second example l(b) the system discovers an alternative
analogy. (See chapter 4 above for a discussion of the appropriate response to analogy
use in arguments).
Examples l(a) and l(b) are based on a knowledge base based loosely around the
following passage from Bonnichsen (1973) which was mentioned in chapter 1:
Activity area 7 occurs north and west of activity area 6, on the slope leading down
into the gully. Two dead poplar trees leaning at approximately a 450 angle are
supported by two live poplar trees at their top and a cross brace at the bottom.
Hair from a large game animal, perhaps an elk, is scattered along the bottom edge
of the frame. The frame construction is similar in shape and size to frames used in
contemporary Cree camps for hide stretching.
Here Bonnichsen is using a simple analogy. This chunk of interpretation could
conceivably be coded as a single knowledge base rule. However it seems more
general to decompose into a set of rules. One will conclude about game animals from
the existence of animal hair. Another about the existence of a structure from the
existence of poles plus cross brace. Finally a rule will argue (by analogy) that these
show the use as hide-stretching. S I will be analogous to S2 if SI has received an
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analogy value S2 of type simple, historical or relational.
To avoid unnecessary complications at this stage, the knowledge base for
examples l(a) and l(b) is as follows. The knowledge base for example 2 contains a
fuller representation of the reasoning in the above quote.
%% FRAMES
featurell instance of structure with
height: 2,
width: 2,
angle: 45,
use: hide_working.
activity_area_l instance_of activity_areas with
centroid: [10,10],
contents: featurell,
discovery_at: deer_hair,
activity: unknown.
% Rules
rule hfl forward
if
the contents of AA is F &
the use of F is Use
then
the activity of AA is
[value : Use,
justification: hfl,
grounds:
[the contents of AA is F,
the use of F is Use]].
Example J(a) - dealing with analogy by finding a missing salient attribute
This example will be followed through in a fair degree of detail to illustrate both the
specific point of how the analogy is dealt with and also generally to show how a full
system could work as based on this partial prototype.
When the program is run the user first meets the screen shown Figure 6.1 where
the user is requested for the field of the argument. Since the prototype only knows
about archaeology this is the only sensible designation. In Figure 6.2 the user is
requested for a topic. This necessary element of an argument is rarely given explicitly
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in everyday arguments; however, in the program, it functions as a means of narrowing
the set of knowledge bases which have to be searched. In the examples the
appropriate knowledge base is loaded by hand. The system also uses the topic as a
check to see if the argument(s) it produces are relevant. (See chapter 4 for a fuller
discussion of relevance.) Relevance is defined in terms of whether the argument
supports a value for the topic given. In the example the user opts for the SUSU form of
debate, in which the system goes first. Thus in Figure 6.3 the system displays an
interpretation of, in this case, the activity of activity _area_I. The display shows all
the supporting grounds for the particular interpretation - that the activity is hide-
working. The propositions which make up claims are shown in rectangular boxes
(Elliptical boxes are used in later arguments to represent grounds which mention the
key word analogue.) Thicker elliptical boxes serve to display the warrant for the
claim - in this case rules such as hfl . The display in Figure 6.3 can be seen more
clearly in Figure 6.U(a) (redrawn from the MacProlog print out - the rather fuzzy
Macintosh™ screens for this example are given as Appendix III). This argument is
achieved by forward chaining and searching in a brute force way for a frame of which
the proposition the ATT of OB] is VALUE is true where the ATT of OB] is the
current topic. The argument is then constructed by searching through the justification
facets of the frames until no further justifications are found (Le. the ultimate grounds
for the claim are found). These related propositions are then converted into a form
appropriate for the display algorithm and for further processing as argument nodes and
displayed.
In Figure 6.4 the user is prompted for his or her claim. In Figure 6.5 the user
enters a ground in support of the claim. The user is then prompted for all the other
grounds (Figure 6.6 shows how an analogy is asserted) and all the sub-grounds for
these grounds (Figure 6.7) until 'stop' is typed. In this case we can take feature l l to
be a hide-working frame and featurelO to be a cooking spit.
At this point the program displays the user argument in full (see Figure 6.11(b))
and attempts to find an appropriate response. In this case the system marks the node
which contains the proposition the analogue of featurel l is featurel 0 as of weak
status: analogy _ground. The system then attempts to attack the weak spot it has
found. Since the domain is archaeology the system deals with analogies by finding out
what type of analogy is being used. As we have seen above in chapter 4 while
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historical and relational analogies are acceptable in archaeology, simple analogies are
not. If the field had been physics for example any analogy would be attacked.
In order to find the analogy type the system prompts in Figure 6.8 for the user to
select the attributes which match between features 11 and 10. The attributes are
taken from the frame (featurell) which is stored in the domain knowledge base as
shown above. If the user selects all or a large number of the features then the analogy
is simple unless there is a historical or other relation. In this case the user in Figure
6.8 suggests that the features have height, width and use in common (the significance
of the omission of angle will become apparent in a moment). The system then goes on
to ask whether there is a historical link between the features in Figure 6.9 and
whether a relational link is held in common in Figure 6.10. In this example the answer
to both questions is negative. Since the analogy is a simple analogy the system now
attempts to deal with it in one of the two ways mentioned in chapter 4 above. In this
case it finds that there is an attribute - angle - which has not been matched and
which is salient for this field (or context). This is stored as a Prolog fact. The system
constructs an argument of the form 'not User-claim' because 'not Analogy-ground'
and displays this (Figure 6.1l(c».
The user is then prompted for his or her second argument. The user can elect to
attack the system argument, defend own or alter own. In this case the user elects to
attack the system argument. The user then enters an argument as before (Figure
6.11(d». In this case the user's second argument is an attack on the system ground -
the use of featurel I is hide_working. After displaying this, the system finishes its
run.
The nodes which constitute the argument network (or argument-2) can be
exemplified by the following:
sysargO instance_of argument with
claim: (the activity of activity_area_l is hide_working),
grounds: [(the use of featurell is hide_working),
(the contents of activity_area_l is featurell}),
warrant: hfl,
supports: [),
supported_by: [sysarg2, sysargl),
external_supported_by: sysarg3,
external_attacked_by: userarg3.
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This frame represents the top level of the first system argument-I. It is internally
supported (as part of the argument-l whose main claim it contains) by sysarg2 and
sysargl each of which has no further support. The userarg3 slot value refers to
the root node of the user's first argument-I, while sysarg3 refers to the second
system argument-I.
Example 1(b) - dealing with analogy by finding a contrary analogy
To avoid the prolixity of the above example I will deal more briefly with the remaining
examples. In this example the system responds to the user argument by discovering
a weak node: analogy_ground and then discovering an alternative analogy.
Here the user elects to present the first argument. Thus the form is USUS and in
Figure 6.12(a) the user's first debating step is displayed. In response the system
presents an alternative first argument (Figure 6.12(b». There would be no point in
presenting the same argument as that of the user. Of course, some elements of the
two arguments might match. In this case the ground - the contents of
activity_area_l is featurel l - is held in common. The user responds to this by
attacking the system claim the use offeaturell is hide working with an argument for
the claim that featurell is used for cooking (Figure 6.12(c». The system responds by
suggesting that the user's first argument fails because there is another analogue for
featurell - feature13 - which has a different use (Figure 6.12(d». The point being
that at the very least some doubt may be cast on the original claim. In this case the
system uses its other rule for dealing with simple analogies to a) find another
analogue and b) discover that it has a different use. Contrary analogue is thus defined
in the implementation in terms of different uses. In a fuller version this might be done
in terms of some more complex process of reasoning probably including some gap-
filling.
Example2
The second example involves the use of viewpoints. This example depends on the
provision of different viewpoints within the system (see chapter 5). There are two
viewpoints - the system and the user. These model the differing sets of beliefs which
are held by the system and the user. The system viewpoint includes the beliefs which
the system is given or which it can infer. The user viewpoint represents the
knowledge that the user either makes use of in arguments or which the system can
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infer from this knowledge. The system can thus know about beliefs which it does not
hold. This is implemented as separate partitions of the Prolog knowledge base. Since
MacPROLOGrM requires that all of the same clauses to be in the same window the
partitions are implemented using two clauses: user_believes and system_believes.
These isolate the user and system viewpoints, respectively, to avoid unnecessary
processing by the forward chainer.
The use of the viewpoint also allows the system to conduct what are arguments
ad hominem. This has a slightly pejorative ring to it but it only represents an attempt
on the system's part to impose some consistency on the user's arguments. Thus in
the example the system finds a node which is weak because some aspect of the claim
or its grounds depends on a belief which contradicts or is contrary to some belief
already held in the user knowledge base. The system then reports this to the user in
the form of an argument in which the claim is a denial of the user claim because the
grounds include the use of a belief which is contrary to another belief held. In a full
system the argument could proceed by refuting this e.g. showing that it is not contrary
or by discarding one or other of the beliefs and so on.
The example used can be seen in Figure 6.13. The knowledge base is as follows
and represents a fuller implementation of the knowledge given the Bonnichsen quote
above:
%% FRAMES
feature11 instance of structure with
height: 2,
width: 2,
angle: 45,
use: unknown.
feature12 instance_of structure with
height: 2,
width: 2,
angle: 45,
use: hide_working.
activity_area_1 instance_of activity_areas with
centroid: [10,10J,
contents: feature11,
discovery_at: deer_hair,
activity: unknown.
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% RULES
rule hf1 forward
if
the contents of AA is Sl &
the evidence_for of AA is game_animals &
the analogue of Sl is S2 &
the use of S2 is hide_working
then
the activity of AA is
[value : hide_working,
justification: hf1,
grounds:
[the contents of AA is Sl,
the evidence for of AA is game_animals,
the analogue of SI is 32,
the use of S2 is hide_working]].
rule hf2 forward
if
the discovery_at of AA is deer_hair
then
the evidence for of AA is
[value : game_animals,
justification: hf2,
grounds:
[the discovery_at of AA is deer_hair]].
In this case the debate form is SUSU. The opening argument from the system is a
simulation of the Bonnichsen reasoning and is shown in Figure 6.13(a). The opening
user argument, however, depends on a claim about the use of featurell; that it is used
for cooking(Figure 6.13(bj). In Figure 6.13(c) the system reports a self-contradiction
which the user makes. In Figure 6.13(d) the user attempts to support this claim by
providing an argument in support. It would then be up to the system to continue the
argument in a full arguing system. The system finds the self-contradiction as before in
two steps. In the first step the system searches through the user argument for self-
contradictory nodes. According to its rules a node can be self-contradictory if the
current node's proposition is contrary to some proposition stored in the user
knowledge base or if the system can derive something from either which is contrary to
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the other. All the real work is done here in this response so that in the second step
the system has only to construct an argument based on the self-contradiction and
display it.
Example3
This example depends on the storage by the system of theoretical principles which
back up the warrants used in arguments. These, along with the warrants and facts,
form the theoretical viewpoint of the system and, with the rest of the current
argument-2, the context of the debate.
In this example the system responds to a user argument by attacking a principle
which can be taken to ground one of the users warrants and hence indirectly attacks
one of the user's claims. As in the above example the system searches each node for
a weakness. In this case there is no self-contradiction or use of analogy. In accord
with the precedence ordering given in section 5.3, analogy will be tried first since in
archaeology it is the more common form of inference and must be identified as a
possible focus of attack. Failing to find an analogy, the system successfully looks for
weak principles. It must be noted, however, that, while this is an example of level
shift, the argument style is not level based since no appeal is made to a model or set
of principles as grounds in the argument.
The third example is slightly different from the others. It depends on the use of a
different domain knowledge base and of an extended system knowledge base. For a
fuller account of the archaeological argument surrounding the Wessex culture see
Appendix II.
• knowledge base for example 3
%% FRAMES
sites_period_l instance of site areas with
contents: [crummy_pots,stone_tools,cremation_burials,beakers],
period: neolithic.
sites_period_2 instance_of site_areas with
contents: [wrist_guards,beakers,gold_earrings,
gold_ornaments,bronze_daggers),
period: eba.
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laterthan(eba,neolithic) .
% RULES
rule wessex 1 forward
if
the contents nature of Sites_period_2 is new_artefacts
then
the cause_of_social_change of Sites_period_2 is
[value : intrusion_of_outside_group,
justification: wessex_l,
grounds:
[the contents nature of Sites_period_2 is new_artefacts]].
rule wessex 2 forward
if
start &
Sites_period_l instance of site areas &
Sites_period_2 instance_of site_areas &
prolog(not Sites_period_l = Sites_period_2) &
all contents of Sites_period_l are Contentsl &
all contents of Sites_period_2 are Contents2 &
the period of Sites_period_l is Pl &
the period of Sites_period_2 is P2 &
prolog(laterthan(P2,Pl» &
prolog(intersection(Contentsl,Contents2,I» &
prolog(length(I,Len» &
prolog(Len < 4)
then
the contents nature of Sites_period_2 is
[value : new_artefacts,
justification: wessex 2,
grounds:
[the contents of Sites_period_l is Contentsl,
the contents of Sites_period_2 is Contents2,
the intersection of contents is small]].
The example is shown in Figure 6.14. Again the debate form is SUSU. The field is as
usual, archaeology, though the topic is now the cause_of_social_change of
sites period Z, In this example the system interpretation (Figure 6.14(a» that the
cause_of_social_change of sitesyeriod_2 is intrusion_of_outside_group is grounded
on a set of grounds and warrants which are concerned with the novelty of the grave--
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goods found in the burial tombs. The user response (Figure 6.14(b» argues for the
contrary claim that the cause_of_social_change of sitesyeriod_2 is
tension_within_groups. This is based on a chained argument about the causes of
social divisions. In Figure 6.14(c) the system responds by attacking the user claim
the socialclimate of sitesperiod Z is conflictwithin groups. In Figure 6.14(d) the
user counterattacks by attacking one of the grounds of the original system argument.
Again in this example we have a two stage process. In stage one the system
searches the nodes for a weakness. Since none of its other rules succeed it attempts
to find a node with a weak backing principle (see section 6.1.5 above). To do this it
constructs a feasible warrant for the move from grounds to claim at that node and
using this finds the appropriate backing principles. There is a single ground (0) at
this node: the soctat division of sitesyeriod_2 is class. The claim (C) is the
social_climate of sitesyeriod_2 is conflictwithin groups. The system constructs
the feasible warrant (the socialjiivision of sitesyeriod_2 is class -> the
sociaiclimate of sitesyeriod_2 is conJlict_within_groups). From this warrant the
system can move from the backing to the set of principles stored as marxism. This
move is stored as a Prolog fact:
backing_for ((
the social_division of sites_period_2 is class ->
the social_climate of sites_period_2 is
conflict_within_groups),
marxism) .
The following code selects the minimum valued principle:
min_valued_principle(Backing_set, OutPrinciple):-
findall([Principle, Strength], findprinciple(Backing_set,
Principle, Strength),Principlelist),
minlist(Principlelist, [OutPrinciple, Min_strength]).
findprinciple(B,Pr,S) :-
principle(
backing_set: B,
name: Name,
claim: Pr,
grounds: Grounds,
strength: S).
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This process is illustrated in Figure 6.15. The system then searches through the
principles which make up the backing_set until it finds the lowest valued principle. It
returns weak status: arguableyrinciple and the particular principle. The weakest
principle is determined by slots for strength which are included in the principles.
These can be illustrated by the following:
principle (backing_set: marxism,
name: marxist_principle_l,
type: explanatory,
claim: cause (class_divisions,
conflict_within_groups),
grounds : common_sense_principle_2,
strength: 7).
principle (backing_set: marxism,
name: marxist_principle_l,
type: explanatory,
claim: cause (power, show_of_prestige),
grounds : common_sense_principle_3,
strength: 5).
principle (backing_set: historico_ecological,
name: h_principle_l,
type: explanatory,
claim: cause (invasion,
conflict_within_groups),
grounds : common_sense_principle_l,
strength: 8).
In the second stage the argument is again merely displayed by the system. The
resulting argument seems fairly elliptical (perhaps a good human-like quality) since
the principle cause(power, showof prestige) does not seem to be immediately
related to the claim the social climate of sitesyeriod_2 is conJlict_within_groups.
However it must firstly be remembered that it is the inference from the
social_division of sitesyeriod _2 is class which is being attacked. It is relatively
easy to construct a chain of argument between the principle and the claim. It must
also be remembered that the system makes no claim to including a fully worked out
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marxist theory. It is only meant to be suggestive of how an argument based on
marxist principles might be attacked. Anyway many human arguments proceed in just
this oblique manner.
Before turning to the extensions to the prototype which have been made apparent
by experiments with the above examples it is worth summarizing for the reader what
exactly the system requires in order to be able to function as it does. In general the
system needs: (a) a suitable knowledge base and (b) code which can identify and deal
with the particular argument type used. The knowledge bases and code, have been
presented above. In addition to these the system requires various values which in the
implementation have been set up to allow the examples to work. Thus in example
l(a) the system simply stores the fact that the angle is salient. In l(a) and l(b) the
system relies on the user inputting the attributes of the object and asserting that it is
not historical or relational. In example 2 the system and user knowledge bases are
set up for the example. In example 3 the strength of the principles is set up as is the
particular 'constructed' warrant.
6.3 Future extensions to ASParch
The prototype program described above would need several additions and
emendations in order to fully embody the model from chapter 4 or to function as a
usable tool for archaeologists or others. The principal areas in which changes or new
modules are needed are: the reasoner; the graphical interface; the weakstatus rules;
assessment; knowledge base refinement.
6.3.1 The reasoner
There are four main ways in which the reasoner must be extended .
• The procedure can_derive must be fully implemented so that both forward and
backward chaining are possible and so that gap filling is possible .
• Extensions must be made either to the interpreter or to the knowledge base to allow
causal reasoning and perhaps other forms of plausible reasoning. These extensions
would deal with what I have called mode based argument style in chapter 4. Further
extensions need to be made so that the system can cope with arguments which appeal
directly to models or principles (as opposed to making use of warrants which are
grounded in backing theories). Appeals to models would entail the use of tokens of
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mode based reasoning types to operate on values derived from models whether these
are represented propositionally or as some form of simulation. Appeals to principles
would require the use of transformative operators on representations of these
principles.
• The analogy rules need to be made more sophisticated. For instance, to take
account of the ideas of Hodder and Kedar-Cabelli discussed in chapter 4. If they are
right, what counts as a good analogy depends on the theory held about the relations
between the attributes of the possible analogues. Finding an analogy is not simply
looking for matching attributes or second order relations. It involves finding a theory
which relates the attributes appropriately (Hodder) or in the light of which the objects
can be seen to have the appropriate attributes (Kedar-Cabelli) .
• More use could be made of the warrants. At present the user is not asked for a
warrant. This could be done and the warrant proffered could be used in checking the
user's argument.
6.3.2 The graphical interface
There are two main areas where extensions need to be made .
• It should be possible to click on any argument-Owhich makes up an argument-l and
get a display which includes as much information as possible about the warrants and
backing for the move from a set of grounds to a claim. It should also be possible to
move through the argument-l by moving from one to another of the argument-Os
which constitute the argument-I. This sort of facility is perhaps more easily provided
in a hypertext environment and has not for that reason been attempted here.
• The implementation displays argument-Is or interpretations and the argument-Os
(or graphical toulmin structures) but is not capable of displaying the full debate or
argument-2 structure. To some extent this latter is not needed in a debate where the
forms are fairly stylized but it would be needed in a full-scale argument. All the
information needed to provide this display is stored so that the real difficulties that
remain here are not artificial intelligence ones but simply to do with getting an
algorithm which displays the largish trees in a comprehensible and tidy manner. With
the addition of the graphical argument-network, the resulting set of displays would
constitute a hypertext like document in which links between parts of the argument can
be traversed easily to show different levels of detail. In other words the user can have
visual access to either the argument-2, its component argument-Is or their
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component argument-Os. Ideally the user would be able to select parts of the display
and zoom in on these (see similar work on Prolog debuggers by my colleagues,
Eisenstadt and Brayshaw, 1987). The user should also be able to select the
proposition or propositions for counter-argument by interacting with the display. It
might also be possible to use colour so that the different contexts and sub-contexts
for reasoning which make up an argument-1 could be displayed in an exciting and
informative manner. Again it seems to be outside the scope of this thesis to deal with
what are largely problems in computer graphics and which have largely been solved
already. In chapter 8 I will discuss a possible way of extending ASParch within a
hypertext environment.
6.3.3 The weakstatus rules
I have only tested fully the weakstatus rules mentioned above. However I have
implemented but not fully tested other weakstatus rules. This section presents
details of these. Some are extensions to rules mentioned above while others are new.
• selfcontradiction
The following rules show how code could be invoked to see if a contradiction can
be derived by making inferences from either P or X or both. The implementation of
can_forward_derive would involve the invocation of the forward chainer and the
subsequent check for appropriate propositions.
weakstatus(P,G,W,selfcontradictory(X)) :-
user_belief (X),
can_forward_derive(Xl,X),
contrary (Xl,P) .
weakstatus(P,G,W,selfcontradictory(X)) :-
user_belief (X),
can_forward_derive(X2,P),
contrary (X,X2) .
weakstatus(P,G,W,selfcontradictory(X)) :-
user_belief (X),
can_forward_derive(Xl,X),
can_forward_derive(X2,P),
contrary (Xl,X2) .
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• OK status
The system would return OK if it can in fact derive the claim P from the ground G using
the warrant W. The predicate would include a variety of inference methods. It could
try forward and backward chaining in an attempt to find a connection between P and G.
%% ok status
weakstatus(P,G,W,ok) :-
can_de rive (P,G,W) .
The converse is given by the following:
%% cannot make inference at all
weakstatus(P,G,W,false_inference) :-
not can_derive(P,G,W).
• Unknown fact
One main way for an argument to fail is if faulty evidence is used. In this case the
system can only tell that the fact is not known to it. It may find it in the user
knowledge base or itmay need to query the user for confirmation of the fact.
%% an unknown fact
weakstatus(P,G,W,fact) :-
on(F,G),
not prove (F).
• Too few grounds
This represent the case (see troublemakers external factor and neglected critical
distinction) where the system can derive the claim P from G only if other grounds are
added.
%% not enough grounds
weakstatus(P,G,W,too_few_grounds) :-
can_derive(P,Gl,W),
sublist(G,Gl) .
• Wrong warrant
The system can derive the claim from the grounds using another warrant.
%% wrong warrant
weakstatus(P,G,W,wrong_warrant(Wl» :-
not can_derive(P,G,W),
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can_derive(P,G,Wl) .
• The use of causal reasoning
This could be marked (as in the case of analogy) with a keyword cause. On the other
hand the system could make some inferences from the content of the proposition in
question to its type as causal. In either case causal reasoning will be weaker than the
deductive reasoning represented (if somewhat inadequately) by the rule-based
methods.
%% causal model
weakstatus(P,G,W,causal_model) :-
on (Gl,G),
Gl = (the cause of X is Y).
• Gaps
Gaps may be found which can be filled
%% gappy
weakstatus(P,G,W,gap) :-
not can_derive(P,G,W),
can_fill_gap(P,G) .
or not as the case may be
%% unfilled-gap
weakstatus(P,G,W,unfilled_gap) :-
not can_derive(P,G,W),
not can_fill_gap(P,G).
6.3.4 Assessment
While I have suggested one way of implementing a form of assessment using
numerical values in section 6.1.7, I am unhappy about this for a variety of reasons.
These have already been rehearsed in my discussion of assessment in chapter 5. My
main problem is that the rationale for assessment is not available for argument. A
secondary worry is that the method I have adopted for weighing the strength of nodes
- the ratio of links to weak links - does not take account of the fact that some parts of
an argument are more telling than others. A weakness in what should be a telling
argument is important while weaknesses in other parts of an argument with a telling
node are irrelevant. Finally the assessment should take account of, say, the different
types of analogy. Assessment is thus to some extent domain-dependent. This
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implies that the weakstatus rules should return some weighting for the weakness of
the node. For instance, selfcontradiction should incur a greater penalty than the use of
simple analogy.
Thus I would like to see extensions of three kinds in an attempt to deal with
assessment while permitting the result to be arguable.
• It would be possible to extend the expectation based reasoning used in KIVA, the
archaeological interpreter implemented by myself and a colleague (Patel and Stutt,
1988, 1989). This technique is used to cut down on the number of interpretations.
Here it could be used to determine which interpretation is best in relation to a model of
an ideal site. However this could meet the objection (raised by Gardin in a personal
communication) that the use of an ideal model does not by definition provide a means
of dealing with previously unknown knowledge which might figure in what constitutes
the best interpretation. The use of the ideal model would entail that this new
knowledge was rejected.
• The meta-level assessment discussed in chapter 5 could be implemented. This
would allow the system to make an assessment which was subsequently arguable.
Argument would proceed at the level of backing for the assessment rules. However
as I have said already, there are great difficulties here providing a viable set of meta-
assessment rules .
• The system could be extended to cope fully with the multi-dimensional nature of
arguments. Thus every proposition including warrants and backing principles and
assessment results could be arguable.
6.3.5 Knowledge base refinement
There are two aspects to this: adjustments to the knowledge base as the result of
argument exchanges and the acquisition of new knowledge.
• The relationship between assessment and knowledge base alteration is close. For it
is as a result of a negative assessment that the system will need to alter its
knowledge base. Assessment also depends on the values which are stored in the
knowledge base. If numerical values are used, a simple means of implementing the
outcome of the assessment process is possible: That is, changes in the system or
user knowledge base could involve strengths of belief stored as slots. When the
system loses an argument the appropriate strengths are lowered and conversely if the
system wins. It is psychologically implausible to suggest that a belief will be given up
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altogether unless an overwhelmingly convincing rebuttal is given. It is therefore more
likely that a belief will fallout of use over a period of time. This can be rendered by
successive diminishment of the values for strength of belief over a series of
arguments. This has not been implemented for the prototype program since there
seems little point in implementing this for a system which is only capable of one formal
debate exchange. (For what it's worth an untested piece of code for evaluation of
strength of belief is given as the last page of Appendix I.) As I have already
suggested, I am unhappy with the use of numerical values. They themselves are
psychologically improbable. It would be possible to use some symbolic terms to
represent different values. This is more plausible and indeed reflects the intuitions of
archaeologists. Again however it suffers from similar defects to the numerical
approach. The best approach seems to be that of researchers in Truth or Reason
Maintenance Systems (Doyle, 1979, 1980) and indeed the ASP including assessment
and knowledge base refinement acts as a sort of non-monotonic reasoner .
• As the process of arguing goes on, the system viewpoint will come to include
elements of the user viewpoint if these are supported sufficiently. On the other hand
the system viewpoint may by the same process lose some of its contents. Of course,
the user viewpoint is always provisional since the system may be erroneous in its
ascription of beliefs. By this means the system acquires new knowledge about facts
and warrants and how these are related to other elements in its knowledge base.
This includes knowledge of the attributes of objects and the analogies between
objects. An ASP does not only produce a set of unrelated rules and facts but a
structured high level representation of the relations between these in the argument-I s
and argument-2s.
6.3.6 Response
In general a more complete model of debate would allow multiple argument-I s per
move. Thus response would have to take account of this and attack multiple nodes.
In turn this would result in a more complex representation for the argument network
and more work for the assessment module. The system should be able to gauge
whether or not an opponent has made an implied rather than explicit attack on some
part of its argument and hence whether or not that component needs support. An
entirely new situation may be brought about by the user's first move (that is, the
context changes). Thus the system looks for weak spots in its own argument and
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attempts to salvage these before attacking the weak spots in the user's argument.
In dealing with analogies the system should be able to deal with historical
analogies (perhaps by attacking the historical links) and relational analogy (perhaps,
in the light of the discussion of analogy in section 6.3.1, by attacking the theory which
grounds the relation).
In generating arguments the system should go beyond the mere statement that a
weak spot has been found to a full counterattack.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented a partial implementation of the program design
discussed in chapter 5. While the program has only been fully tested on the examples
given, ASParch could perform similarly for any topic within the domain of archaeology
if the appropriate knowledge base were available. By appropriate, I mean one which
has facts stored as MIKE frames and rules coded using the MIKE syntax. Indeed the
system as it stands could deal with arguments from any domain if there is a
knowledge base encoded in a suitable fashion. In this case, however, domain specific
use of analogical arguments would not be used. Argument claims and grounds must
also be framed in terms of the syntax available in MIKE as in the above examples.
With the extensions proposed in section 6.1.3 ASParch would approximate to a
complete implementation of the program design of chapter 5. In the next chapter we
will investigate the possibility of applying the ASP approach to other domains.
-000-
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Chapter 7 - Other argument fields
Argument: The ASP model can, in theory, be used in any field or
domain which is similar in appropriate ways to archaeology. Such
domains include: literary criticism, legal argument and darwinian
theorizing. Hypothetical examples are presented to illustrate how an
ASP might work in each of these domains.
In developing the design for an ASP I have concentrated on applying the model to the
domain of archaeology. However, the model can be applied to other domains. In
section 7.1 I discuss the possible use of an argument support program in literary
criticism; in 7.2 the application to legal argument; and in section 7.3 to Darwinian
theory. I would thus claim that an ASP can be widely applied both within and without
the humanities.
Before turning to a consideration of the use of the ASP model in literary criticism I
will outline the criteria for a successful application of the model to a domain. These
are derived from a consideration of the sorts of features which are required in
designing a system to support archaeological argument.
• Possible domains must be interpretative, justificatory or explanatory disciplines
since it is the differences between argument-Is embodying these which form the basis
for argument-2s. The model given above deals primarily with argument-Is as
interpretations. I have also suggested that both explanations and justifications can be
regarded (in some cases at least) as sets of propositions in support of a conclusion or
claim. In general argument-Is will be generated in any field where the data is
uncertain, incomplete or changing. While not all such fields can be labelled as
interpretive many will include an element of interpretation. Taken in this way a
discipline is interpretive (or includes interpretive elements) if there is no certain
means to derive results. If there were it would be calculative and there could be no
argument.
Interpretation is of course a widespread process. We do it every day in decoding
the signs and symbols which surround us. We also interpret when we hear utterances
and see images. However for a debate to arise about these interpretations and hence
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for interpretation to be an argument generator, the interpretation must be at a
conscious level. Thus while it may be possible for systems such as Hearsay (Erman
et al., 1980) to interpret utterances, there is no role here for debate. Indeed it is
psychologically improbable that at that level debate takes place. Of course as the
interpretation rises higher in the semantic hierarchy debate becomes possible. The
dividing line is unclear. However, in all the examples discussed here - archaeology,
literary criticism, the law and darwinian theory - the interpretation (or argument-I)
and hence the debate are at a conscious level.
The following represent criteria for the optimum use of an ASP. However, while
they spell out the characteristics of a domain which an ASP is designed to deal with
there is no reason why an ASP should not deal with a domain which, for instance,
uses only deductive reasoning and never appeals to theory. It's just that there seems
little point in this since there would be little room for argument about the decisions of
such a system.
• Possible domains can use analogical reasoning and other forms of plausible
reasoning. An ASP can deal with analogy as one form of non-deductive reasoning.
• Possible domains can make use of theories internal to the domain in their
interpretations. (Internal and external theories will be illustrated in the next
section). For the system to build the appropriate Toulmin structures this criterion
is necessary. The level shift exemplified in example 3 from Chapter 6 above
shows how the system can make use of this knowledge.
• Possible domains can make use of theories external to the domain in their
interpretations.
• Possible domains must proceed by debate not only about the facts and the
interpretations but also about the theories used in interpretations. Thus, if there is
a domain in which there is no possible debate about some claims, an ASP will not
apply. This may be the case with mathematics since mathematical conclusions are
based on proofs (precise argument-Is) which are often amenable to only one
conclusion. On the other hand recent work on the suitability of mathematical
proofs as a means of showing program correctness has shown that this view is
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over optimistic (De Millo, Lipton and Perlis, 1979).
• Possible domains can deploy their interpretations at different levels. The
interpreter is designed to take account of the different levels at which a site can be
discussed. In the case of archaeology these are, for instance, areas within a site,
the overall site, its economy, the social organization of its occupants, the
mechanisms for trade, the mechanisms for culture change. The levels of possible
reasoning in archaeology are illustrated in Figure 7.1 in which the idea, that
interpretation proceeds by argumentation at the different levels using theories or
common-sense knowledge, is illustrated.
7.1 Literature
As I have suggested, the approach embodied in ASParch could be applied to other
disciplines in the humanities. For instance an ASP could be created for literary
criticism (ASPlit). The features which literature and archaeology have in common and
which make this possible are given below.
• They are interpretative disciplines. The interpretation of a site is not radically
different from that of a poem, a novel or a play. Umberto Eco (1985) suggests that
the generation of many possible interpretations is one of the jobs of a novel in
discussing his own novel, The Name of the Rose, when he speaks of, '...a novel,
which is a machine for generating interpretations ...'. The interpretation of an object
is something which can be expressed as an argument and can, in turn, become the
object of argumentation. There are other literary critics who suggest that
interpretation should not be the main aim of the literary critic. For instance, Culler
(1988: 28819) suggests that literary critics should move towards the study of
interpretations as data and away from interpretation as a goal:
Study of the interpretive moves illustrated in both the tradition and our
response to that tradition would show how genres, such as lyric, are sets of
reading strategies for making sense of language, ways of convincing
ourselves not only that language is meaningful. that it will give rise to an
intuition or understanding, as would be amply illustrated by our interpretive
examples, but also that this is an understanding of the world.
Nonetheless Culler still accepts that the 'present goal' of literary criticism is 'the
production of new interpretations of literary texts as the aim and the test of literary
- 184-
BASIS OF
ARGUMENT
e.g.
marxism
e.g.
theories
from
geography!
social
sciences
e.g.
common-
sense
e.g.
strati-
graphy
/
"""
cultural
reconstructions
'- ..)
j~
/
"""interpretation
of
site use
\.. ..)
~
/ """interpretation
of
regions of sites
'- ~
4~
/
""'"
site
facts
'- ~
Figure 7.1 - Levels of reasoning in archaeology
studies.' Of course the interpretation of a site is different from that of a book in one
sense: The transformations which are applied to the literary data are different from
those applied to the site. The aim is similar, to produce a higher level, meaningful
and integrated description. This convergence is shown in its extreme form in the
title of Hodder's 1986 book - Reading the Past.
• They appeal to theories internal to the domain in their interpretations. In
archaeology a range of theoretical positions is available from the laws of
stratigraphy to Binford's middle range theory. In literature there are, for example,
the rules of prosody and reader response theory.
• They can appeal to theories external to the domain in their interpretations. For
example structuralism and marxism provide useful tools in discussing sites and
poems.
• They proceed by debate not only about the facts and the interpretations but also
about the theories used in interpretations.
• They can deploy their interpretations at different levels. The notion of levels in
archaeological reasoning can be compared to Olsen's notion of the 'hierarchy of
levels' in literary criticism (Olsen 1978). In other domains in the humanities, such
as comparative religion, the notion of levels is best replaced by the notion of a set
of intersecting dimensions of interpretation.
The main use of the computer in literary studies has been for statistical research
(e.g. Burrows 1987). More recently it has been suggested by Potter (1988) that the
computer can also be used in literary criticism. Indeed she suggests that computing
offers 'evidence, precision of measurement and universally-accepted standards of
validity' (1988:93). The son of computing here is akin to statistically oriented
approaches. Closer to our own approach, Corns and Smith (1987) posit the computer
modelling of theoretical positions (seen as structured bodies of propositions):
Another use of expert systems would be to construct a knowledge base that would
enable the user to explore whether their critical assumptions at any juncture were
primarily structuralist, reader-response, materialist, etc.
Miall (1986, 1988a) has also proposed the use of expert system technology as a
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means of modeling and teaching response to literary artefacts. In a recent conference
paper (1988b) he suggests that the proper use of the computer is as a tool which
facilitates the student's own research. As a component of this, some capacity for the
analysis and storage of arguments would be necessary. At the same conference
Slatin (1988) suggested the use of hypertext for the teaching of poetry. This is similar
to the work of Catano (1979) on modeling debate about poetry by computer.
It thus seems that a priori there are good reasons for suggesting that literature is
a possible area of application for ASParch. The existence of work which is similar to
ASParch in this domain supports this. In the work of Olsen referred to above there is
a well worked out scheme for literary criticism which bears close resemblance to the
notion of interpretation we have adopted from Gardin. In Olsen's work (1978) the
process of interpreting the literary work is described as follows (ibid:83):
For each segment [or chunk of text] singled out for attention, the reader provides
an interpretative description. It is a way of thinking about the segment which
brings it into a class or a category. The segment is brought into relationship with
the other segments either by the fact that the same interpretative description
applies to several segments, or by the fact that the different interpretative
descriptions under which different segments have been subsumed can themselves
be subsumed under a new interpretative description. If all the segments of the
work have been subsumed under some description, and some segments have been
interrelated in this manner, it is possible to interrelate more descriptions by
introducing a new set of descriptions bringing the first level of descriptions into
more general categories. This process of redescription may be continued until all
the segments of the work are interrelated by being subsumed under some
description which also subsumes all the other segments. The single interpretative
description becomes a part of an explanatory grid of concepts which covers the
whole of the work and relates different parts of the work together ... This process
can be repeated until all the segments are interrelated in a network of descriptions
which articulates the 'meaning' of the work.
This approach can be illustrated by Olsen's treatment of Mack's interpretation of
Hamlet. I A schematic diagram of the resulting interpretation is given as Figure
7.2. In this the lowest level redescription involves the redescription of various chunks
or segments of text as, for example, The famous questions'. At a higher level these
are redescribed as 'symptoms of the mysterious quality of Hamlet's world'. At the
highest level the redescription is that 'Hamlet's world is inherently mysterious'. My
main point in including this diagram is to draw attention to the similarities between
1In another context Winston (1980) has made use of Macbeth and Hamlet as test cases for his
theory of analogy.
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(Redrawn from Olsen, 1978, page 93)
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Figure 7.2 - Olsen's diagram of an interpretation of Hamlet
this approach and that of Gardin in archaeology. To this end I have indicated which
parts of Olsen's interpretation represent Gardin's Po, Pi and Pn propositions. I will
present an ASP-like debate based on this example below.
The approach of Olsen is well-suited to representation in expert system terms.
The facts, in this case, are the segments of text and the rules are the rules for
redescription of these segments and of other descriptions. At the same time the
approach is lacking in four ways:
1. The rigour which is imposed by the computational approach is lacking. For
instance, there seem to be large gaps between some of the levels in the Hamlet
example.
2. Olsen seems to think that a work can have only one meaning - 'some
description which also subsumes all the other segments'. This is unlikely. Indeed
our whole approach is predicated on the assumption that, because interpretation is
uncertain and multifarious, more than one interpretation of a work will result.
Competing interpretations lead to argument and debate. The whole history of
Hamlet criticism should make this clear.
3. The sorts of relations possible between nodes at the different levels are not
clearly stated. It is not enough to say that 'Redescription is constitutive of a
reader's response to a literary work' (ibid:89). There are different kinds of
redescription. Olsen accepts this to some extent. On page 95/6 he suggests that
redescriptions can be made plausible in three ways: by being sanctioned by the
reader's background (non-literary) experience; by following from some notions
introduced by the author; and, by depending on 'a shared knowledge of literary
practice and conventions'. Nonetheless we need to add to the Olsen account some
of the non-deductive transformations which have been discussed above.
4. There is no attempt to deal with the use of theory. The mention of the shared
background of common sense and of literary knowledge is as near as Olsen gets.
However, I would argue that the account given in earlier chapters of this thesis is
a clearer means of relating theory to interpretation.
In Figure 7.3 I illustrate an exchange over the Olsen claim. I have reproduced only
part of the Olsen interpretation but enough to show how ASPlit would deal with this
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case. As the response shows the system might well respond by rejecting the claim
that Questions which point beyond themselves are therefore Questions which draw
attention to their interrogative mood on the grounds that an X which points beyond
itself does not point to itself.
The method of analysis provided in an ASP seems to provide a better way of
dealing with an interpretation such as the above. The analysis is based in a well-
founded theoretical approach to argumentation (that of Toulmin) and lends itself well
to graphical reproduction on a computer. In addition, an ASP would provide a means of
graphically representing exchanges of interpretations (or argument-Is). Finally,
ASPlit would provide a means of interacting with the views of previous interpreters
and of testing current interpretations against these. This accords well with the
notions put forward by Newton in a recent book (1986). According to a review by Ian
Saunders (1987) Newton recommends 'an interpretive practice which frankly admits
that its own coinage is relative power, not truth, and engages with other
interpretations. Interpretation ought not to be atomistic but, as Newton puts it,
'agonistic".
7.2 Legal reasoning
We have discussed the nature of legal reasoning above in our formulation of the
tripartite model of argumentation which, following Toulmin, derives largely from a legal
model. Given this it seems prima facie likely that an ASP could be applied to legal
reasoning.
As Dworkin (1982) suggests, legal reasoning can also be seen as a matter of
interpretation. This interpretation can be construed as a generator of arguments using
diverse forms of inference. It is commonly held that legal reasoning is largely
reasoning from precedent i.e. reasoning by analogy (Adam and Taylor, 1987).
However as MacCormick (1976) point out, some legal arguments depend on deductive
reasoning. Thagard (1988a, forthcoming) suggests that, apart from deduction from
legal rules to particular cases and analogical reasoning in the use of precedent, legal
reasoning also makes use of explanatory inferences from events to what happened.
Thus a lawyer will attempt to show that explanation E explains the evidence ED; a
sort of reasoning typical in science and everyday life.
Apart from this, as MacCormick (1978) shows, judges frequently make use of
appeals to principle in their judgements. He cites the case of the use of the principle
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(ibid: 163, quoting Lord Macmillan) that 'The duty to take care is the duty to avoid
doing or omitting to do anything the doing or omitting to do which may have as its
reasonable and probable consequence injury to others'. This principle can be restated
in less legalistic language as follows: We have a duty to avoid actions or omissions
which we could reasonably expect to result in injuries to others. MacCormick also
points out (ibid: 161) that 'no clear line can be drawn between arguments from
principle and from analogy'. It is often the case that a principle can be used to
determine whether an analogy is legally relevant (a point similar to those made by
Hodder with regard to relational analogies and discussed in chapter 4). 'So the
relevance of the analogy is dependent upon perceiving a rational principle within which
the two items compared can both be contained...' The above principle, for example,
allows the comparison of attempts to rescue property with attempts to rescue life
insofar as there is a duty to prevent circumstances which could lead to an attempt to
save property or rescue life with the possibility of injury to the salvor or rescuer.
Dworkin also suggests that the law progresses by what Newton calls 'agonistic'
interpretation. He argues against the notion that interpretation in the law (and indeed
in literary criticism) is purely objective (legal judgments follow inexorably) or purely
subjective Gust made up). He suggests that legal interpretation is like the case of a
group of novelists who are set to write a novel. Each novelist has to provide an
extension of the novel which flows naturally (and indeed, logically) from that of earlier
novelists. In the same way legal reasoning is a "chain enterprise". Results are not
simply given. However they depend on the previous decisions and practices of
lawyers and judges (or of critics) rather than personal whim. ASPlaw might function
as a means of making explicit some of the results of these practices and how they bear
on current decisions. This assumes that the law (or other forms of interpretation) is
not simply a matter of fashion. On the other hand, insofar as some of these practices,
conventions and so on (or the understanding of them - the internalized awareness of
the tradition) remain tacit and cannot be articulated, an ASP can only act as a partial
aid.
While legal reasoning seems to be a good domain for the use of the techniques
discussed in this thesis, there has been much debate in recent years about the
feasability of using computational models of legal knowledge to decide legal questions.
It may simply be impossible to use computers to produce such decisions. Dworkin
himself holds this view (1982) - There is, of course, no algorithm for deciding whether
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a particular interpretation sufficiently fits that history [legal history] not to be ruled
out'. Sergot, Sadri, Kowalski, Kriwaczek, Hammond and Cory (1986) suggest that it
is possible to formalize in a computer program statute law (the specific example is the
British nationality Act of 1981) and to use this 'to determine whether in a given
circumstance a particular individual is or is not a British citizen' (ibid: 377). Leith
(1986: 545) has argued that the work of Sergot et al. is 'a dangerous oversimplification
of a research field'. He suggests that there is no such thing as a clear rule of law and
that therefore the use of expert systems to model these is invalid. Leith argues that
'the legal process is principally a process of negotiation' (ibid: 549) and draws
attention to the use of 'ouster' clauses in legislation. These are inserted by the
legislature to control the judiciary but are frequently overruled by judges. The effect is
that, looked at from the point of view of deductive logic, there are contradictions
embodied in legislation. For example one clause may suggest that the decision of a
government official cannot be appealed to by a court while another provides a general
right of appeal.
Lying behind this debate is a confusion about the exact nature of legal expertise. If
Sergot et al. are only attempting to provide a tool which derives the logical
implications of certain clauses in an act then Leith should have no quarrel with them.
Insofar as they attempt to portray this tool as capable of making decisions then they
are wrong and Leith is right. The logically derived claim can only form part of an
interpretation by a lawyer or a judge; it cannot take its place. Judicial or legal
knowledge is not simply the logical deductions from a set of clauses in a statute book.
It includes at least the knowledge of other statutes and cases, and the ability to
reason from these. More than this, it includes the ability to assess evidence, produce
causal models of situations (if Thagard is right), take account of the mitigating
circumstances and interpret the legal statutes in a manner free from political
interference but nevertheless in accord with generally accepted social norms.
An ASP cannot take the place of a lawyer or judge but it may provide a tool which
can store in a structured form the exchanges between lawyers and provide for trainee
lawyers a means of interacting with great arguers of the past.
Thus in Figure 7.4 we can see an argument adapted from the example from
MacCormick discussed above with an appropriate response. In this case the
argument is that the widow of X should get compensation because:
(a) he was killed in attempting to avert an accident involving a train which was
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running loose because of someone else's carelessness;
(b) 'It was settled in Scots law that a rescuer's act in saving another person
endangered by the wrongful act of a third person is entitled to reparation from the
latter if he suffers injury'
(c) There is an analogy between rescuers of life and salvors of property.
The ASP-like analysis shows that Cl is supported by (a) and (c). Item (b) above
is treated as a ground here though it might more properly be dealt with as a warrant.
In this latter case the reasoning would be more complicated with the analogy acting as
ground for the use of (b) as a warrant in this particular case. I have illustrated the
former for simplicity but it should be noted that there is no theoretical reason why a
warrant should not be argued about using an ASP. The counter-argument is based on
the position taken by Lord Mackay. He rejects the analogy on the grounds that a
rescuer is different from a salvor which in turn depends on the ground that there is a
difference between human life and property.
Again as with ASPlit, ASPlaw provides a means of analysing and displaying both
individual argument-Is and the argument-2 which they constitute.
7.3 Darwinian theory
In a famous debate in 1860 at the British Association 'Soapy Sam' Wilberforce, the
Bishop of Oxford, confronted T.H. Huxley in a debate about Darwinian theory. The
Bishop lost decisively, thus allowing the shift to the Darwinian paradigm which
underpins modern biology.2 This shows the importance of debate in the evolution of
scientific world views.
It would be interesting to attempt to implement the debate between Huxley and
Wilberforce. However by way of an example I present the following argument from
Darwin's Origin of Species with a putative reply. I have, so far as I can, attempted to
analyze the argument in a Toulmin-like manner. The following deals with only a small
part of the overall argument of the book. Interested readers can turn to Thagard
(1988a, forthcoming) for an examination of the overall theory in the context of an
2 In a famous incident in a later debate (see Huxley and Kettlewell, 1965) Wilberforce asked
Huxley whether he claimed descent from a monkey through his grandfather or his grandmother.
According to Huxley and Kettlewell, Huxley replied to the effect 'that if he had to choose
between a poor ape for an ancestor and a man highly endowed by nature and of great influence,
who used his gifts to introduce ridicule into a scientific discussion and to discredit humble seekers
after truth, he would affirm his preference for the ape'.
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analysis of its explanatory coherence.
Darwin argues for the following conclusion in chapter 1 of the Origin of Species
(Darwin, 1979):
(C) "From these several reasons, we may conclude that all our domestic breeds
are descended from the rock-pigeon with its geographical sub-species."
His argument (in a much simplified form) has the following grounds (where On = a
top-level ground, SGn = a ground in a sub-argument and W = a warrant):
(G1) One original is adequate.
(SO1) Columba Livia has required characteristics
(G2) Only Rock Pigeon possible
(SG2) only rock pigeon has correct colouring
(S03) when breeds crossed rock pigeon colours appear
(S04) there is reversion to ancestral characteristics of rock pigeon
(WI) well known principle that reversion shows ancestry
(G3) Only one ancestor
(SG5) Mongrels all perfectly fertile
(W2) most hybrids of two species are infertile
The counterargument suggests that ground G1 is erroneous:
(C2) One original is inadequate.
(S06) 7 original stocks needed.
(S07) 7 needed for all different breeds.
In fact this argument is considered by Darwin himself and rejected using the following
argument:
(C3) Not 7 originals
(SG8) hard to breed even one species under domestication
(S09) unlikely primitive man domesticated 7 species.
The graphical form of this is shown in Figure 7.5. We can see from this example
that the ASP methodology is particularly useful for the automatic display and
interaction with argument-2s. As I have said Darwin's argument proceeds by first
putting forward counterarguments and refuting these. Apart from the methodology, an
ASP represents a computational aid in this process of arguing with oneself and/or
producing lengthy argument-2 structures.
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7.4 Conclusion
In general terms the progress of any science can be seen in terms of a debate which
never reaches a conclusion (i.e. there are never any final answers) but which, for a
time, is satisfactory. In Figure 7.6 I present an example from the history of science
surrounding the dating of the earth. Where Bishop Usher of Armagh had worked out
from the Bible that the date was 4004 BC, Lord Kelvin showed in 1862 that the date
had to be much greater, from extrapolations of the rate of the cooling of the earth. He
proposed an age of 24 million years. Subsequent research has put that figure back
even further (to something like 4.5 billion years). The flaw in Kelvin's argument being
that some of the rocks are radio-active and therefore produce their own heat. Possibly
new research could serve to put the results back even further. We can think (as
Gardin does) of this process as a continual spiral towards a mythical omega point.
Notice however that it is a spiral and that the context within which the argument
proceeds depends on the prior contexts. Typically the context will get smaller (as
scientific disciplines get more specialised). Thus, what counts as a good argument
will change as the context of the inquiry changes. Put baldly, the bible is no longer
seen as a source of empirical evidence about the origin of the earth. Since Kelvin's
time, other discoveries have been made (not least by Kelvin himself) and these now
need to be taken into account.
There is another sense in which argument-2s enter into scientific discourse. The
above might be termed the macro-argument-2. The micro-argument-2 represents the
case where debate among a group of scientists is used as a means of advancing a new
theory. This can be illustrated vividly by the case of Crick and Watson's discovery of
the helical nature of DNA. Both the book by Watson (1968) and the recent TV
dramatisation show how the young scientists continually argued over the details of
their models, collected new information, rebuilt models (both physical and notional)
solicited comments and acted on the comments. The resulting model stands
unchallenged (until some new discovery or reformulation of theory either advances our
knowledge to a new stage or completely overturns our understanding of genetics).
There is an interesting quote, from our point of view, which illustrates how the Crick
and Watson laboratory went about their work. This comes originally from a paper by
Platt (1964) which was drawn to my attention by Stefik et al. (1987).
On any given morning at the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge,
England, the blackboards of Francis Crick or Sidney Brenner will commonly be
found covered with logical trees. On the top line will be the hot new result just up
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from the laboratory or just in by letter or rumor. On the next line will be two or
three alternative explanations, or a little list of "What he did wrong." Underneath
will be a series of suggested experiments or controls that can reduce the number of
possibilities. And so on. The tree grows during the day as one man or another
comes in and argues about why one of the experiments wouldn't work, or how it
should be changed.
I envisage ASParch both as a Crick and Brenner blackboard and as one of the
colleagues who suggests and criticises. Thus the computer is doing two tasks for
which it is well suited (Design Principle PI above): (a) storage, retrieval and display
in graphical form; (b) formalised inference (albeit using heuristic rules augmented to
simulate various forms of plausible reasoning). I would suggest that there are two
main processes which occur in scientific disciplines: experiment and debate. The
debate is useless without the data provided by experiment. The experiment depends
on argument for its proper interpretation and for the necessary design. In other
disciplines (such as archaeology) experiment has a minimal role though there is a
branch of archaeology which attempts reconstructions of ancient artefacts, buildings
and agricultural practices (see Coles 1973). Here the evidence on which argument is
based is provided by excavation, historical sources, ethnographic surveys and so on.
Argument also aids in the design of excavations and surveys. Archaeology as a
science is closer to cosmology where the variables involved cannot be easily
manipulated (e.g. temperatures within milliseconds of the creation of the universe). In
the law, argument is based on evidence gathered by police and by the questioning of
witnesses. In literary criticism the evidence is the text. However, argument, as well
as being based on the evidence, can also be involved in selecting the appropriate
evidence. As Potter (1988) suggests, the use of computational methods for selecting
and manipulating this data can add a greater objectivity to the discipline. Debate will
still be required as to which computational techniques to use as well as about the
proper interpretation of the results.
As the examples show the ASP methodology is principally important in enforcing a
coherent method of analysis, in providing graphical displays of the relationships in
argument-Is and argument-2s and in providing an automatic colleague to try
arguments out on in an attempt to assess and strengthen them. The above discussion
and the hand-crafted examples do not show that ASPs can be applied widely. They
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only make it more likely. Such proof will only come when a full implementation of the
program design is carried out and applied in these areas. The above discussion is only
meant to be suggestive. Nonetheless it seems probable that if ASPs work in a single
domain they will work in any domain which is similar. A domain will be similar if it the
criteria put forward at the beginning of the chapter are met. Of course more needs to
be done than to implement the ASP shell. Each domain requires a knowledge base
encoded in the standard ASP format and which includes all the intrinsic theories of the
domain and any extrinsic theory not known to the system. The initial knowledge base
can be created using standard knowledge engineering techniques and augmented
during use. However, unless we make use of a system (such as OpEd - see chapter
3) which includes the capacity to comprehend arguments expressed in natural
language we must rely on a method of hand-crafting to extract, from texts, the
arguments we wish to simulate. This method has been followed in all the examples
used in this thesis including those given in the present chapter. It involves:
• the use of the model of argument as a means of analysing the texts and defining
the components which are to be expected;
• the use of textual clues (such as 'because' or 'since') as a means of deciding
which propositions have which function - Cohen (see chapter 3) includes a theory
of clue words in her computational model;
• the use of the semantics of the contents of the propositions as a means of
determining the relations between parts of the argument-2.
We also need to identify the argument style for the domain and hence what sorts of
response and assessment rules are needed. Given these the ASP could function as a
sort of high level shell into which knowledge bases could be slotted and by means of
which stylized argument exchanges about a domain could proceed.
-000-
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Chapter 8 • Discussion
Argument: While we have, to some extent, succeeded in our three
aims there are inadequacies in our approach. There are several
possible reasons for our inability to construct a complete arguer.
Nonetheless, in one possible development, ASPs can provide a basis
for a mixed AI/Hypertext environment for promulgating arguments.
This final chapter is intended to summarize and assess what has been achieved and to
suggest improvements and directions for research which might build upon what has
been achieved. I will start with a section summarizing the results, then discuss some
of the failings of the approach and close with some thoughts about future directions.
8.1 What has been achieved?
We have presented a design and implementation of a computer program which is
intended as a means of supporting arguers from archaeology, and, as we have seen,
other areas of the humanities. In brief, this program can:
• provide argument-Is about limited domains
• respond to user argument-Is about these domains
• display user and system argument-Is in a graphical form
By these means the system:
• provides a means of communicating knowledge about a domain
• provides a means of producing and testing argument-Is
• reveals the grounds for pieces of archaeological reasoning
• acts as an informal tutor for a method of analysis
• acts as an informal tutor for domain-specific responses
The program provides assistance in at least three ways: (a) ASParch enforces a
method of analysis on the user; (b) ASParch displays in a diagrammatic form the
arguments produced by users and the system; (c) The program provides a rudimentary
means of interacting with the machine in relation to the argument.
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(a) An ASP provides more than the objectivity and clarity given by the use of
computers per se - it provides a method of analysis and a language for arguing.
Indeed the benefits accruing from the objectivity of the machine may be
exaggerated. It has been argued that in fact the computing machine embodies a
particular (,rationalist') view of thinking. For instance Hunter (1988: 19) has
recently argued against a misconception she identifies - '...that the computer is
only a tool and that therefore its use is not subject to interpretation ... ' She also
points out (ibid) that '...most modern science and technology constructs its
representations of the world through a rational analytic logic ...In contrast,
humanities teachers often use dialectic, or overt metaphorical and analogical
systems to produce representations.' Thus it is necessary to extend the machine
so that it can cope with 'real' arguments from users in the humanities. Not only
because it needs a formal language for arguments before it can deal with them but
also because we need to circumvent the hidden metaphors which the machine
contains while seeking to impose as 'few of our own as we can. However, because
all formal languages will contain hidden assumptions, the 'arguing' machine must
go further than the provision and evaluation of an argument language. It must
interact with the user in order for its own assumptions to be tested.
(b) The diagrammatic method of displaying propositions is common in the kind of
argument analysis which informal logicians employ. Toulmin (1979), Scriven
(1976) and Fisher (1988) all employ some diagrams. Thus the method is natural.
The use of advanced computer graphics allows the possibility of interaction with
the diagram (requests for further information, responses to particular propositions)
as well as the 'animated' display of an entire argument. The use of computer
graphics also renders vivid the contextual nature of inference and argument. Thus
while an argument may take place in an overall context of beliefs and theories,
individual elements in the argument may depend on entirely different contexts. An
argument in a law-court may depend on a piece of physics. An argument in an
artificial intelligence thesis could include an appeal to common sense. Whatever
position we adopt on the question of how we assess such arguments (using the
techniques of the overall field or those of the specific field) there is at least
something to be gained by showing how an argument is composed of these
differing elements.
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(c) Interaction is possible because of advances in artificial intelligence which allow
the encoding of domain knowledge as well as the representing of insights drawn
from psychological studies of how arguers respond to arguments. As we have
seen, there are three aspects to this process: firstly, the system must be able to
create arguments (Le. follow a methodology for argument making which fits with
the method of analysis); secondly, it must interpret or analyse user arguments and
assess their weaknesses; and, thirdly it must come up with a satisfactory
response. Note that the method of analysis and assessment is not simply the
methodology of formal logic by another name. We have attempted to render in a
computational form some of the insights and methods of students of informal togv».
Thus we have not presented a method of analysis and assessment which depends
on the logical/orm of a piece of argumentation. The meaning of the propositions is
taken account of at least to the extent that the meaning is determined by a
particular context (of facts and operations) which differs from domain to domain.
This leads to a second major divergence from formal logic. In everyday arguments,
and in some fields more than others, non-deductive methods of inference are
employed. In the above we have concentrated on the use of analogies.
As well as the design of a tool to support arguing we have also shown how this
new approach can deal with inadequacies in the explanation capabilities of expert
systems insofar as explanation (or, at least, justification) finds a natural place within
the context of argument. At the same time we have produced a model of argument
which clearly distinguishes the different components of argument, the levels of
argument and how they are interrelated and how argument is related to interpretation
and explanation. This model has been substantiated to some extent by the
implementation of a program design derived from it.
Furthermore, we have gone some way towards replying to the worries of domain
specialists such as archaeologists as mentioned in chapter 1 above. If we reduce
these worries to three main items we can more clearly see to what extent they may
have been quelled. The three main worries are:
(1) The/ormalization problem Le. an inadequate model of an area of
archaeological expertise may be used.
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(2) TheJossilization problem i.e. the domain knowledge contained in the expert
system may come to be regarded as fixed and complete.
(3) The problem of the partially non-deductive nature of archaeological reasoning.
Item (3) is dealt with insofar as the program is able to deal with analogical reasoning
in archaeology since this seems to be the main non-deductive form of reasoning in this
field. Items (1) and (2) are not dealt with by the implemented program. However the
model allows for the system to assess an argument and as a result change its
knowledge base. Thus the knowledge is not fossilized and can be changed by the user
either by changing the knowledge base directly (entering new rules) or during an
argument exchange. Since the system is capable of dealing with the theoretical
backing for the warrants or rules used in reasoning the danger of the knowledge base
builder imposing an alien model on the field is minimized. The formalization problem is
trickier since any formal system can be objected to in this way. Given that the system
can be changed during use and given that there is a reasonably flexible data structure
for storing knowledge, this difficulty is again minimized.
Apart from the main goals of this thesis there are two subsidiary benefits of the
ASP approach in that this approach provides a means of dealing with two important
problems in expert systems research: knowledge acquisition and uncertainty.
Know/edge acquisition
As well as problems to do with explanation, another major problem in the
development of expert systems has been the acquisition of knowledge from domain
experts. For archaeologists this manifests itself as the formalization and fossilization
problems mentioned above. The knowledge acquisition problem arises because of the
need to transform the informal expertise of the expert into the sort of formalism
required for a computer program to be able to function. There have been many
approaches to this problem (Wielinga and Breuker 1986, Bylander and
Chandrasekaran 1987, Gammack and Young 1985, Boose 1985, Boose and Bradshaw
1987, Eshelman, Ehret, McDermott and Tan 1987, Clancey 1985a). The ASP
approach can be viewed as an integrated approach to explanation and knowledge
acquisition. It has similarities to the system described by Kim and Pearl (1987) which
integrates knowledge acquisition and advice-giving in the situation assessment
domain. It is also similar to one of the more interesting of these systems, in the
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context of the present thesis, Mole, which is produced by McDennott and his
colleagues (Eshelman et al. 1987). Mole is a performance program as well as a
knowledge acquisition system. Basically the system works by comparing its analysis
of a problem (to do with a steel rolling mill) with that of the expert. If there is a
disagreement then the system sees if there is a path from what it knows to the
expert's solution. If there is, Mole sees if it can re-evaluate the support values so
that this becomes the favoured solution. Failing this, it asks for more supporting
information. If there is no path to the solution then there are two possibilities: either a
hypothesis was rejected when it should have been accepted or accepted when it
should have been rejected. If the former, then the system asks the user for some
extra symptom which needed the support of the hypothesis. If the latter the user is
asked for some other hypothesis to explain the symptom explained by the accepted
hypothesis. This system incorporates some ideas which are very similar to those in
ASPs in that it acquires its knowledge from the user in an argument-like manner.
An ASP can be said to acquire knowledge in a Mole-like manner when, in the
course of an argument session, the user puts forward evidence and/or warrants which
are new to the system. If the system finds no means of combatting this evidence (or
its means are weaker than those of the user by some assessment procedure) then the
system will have acquired new knowledge. Not only that but it will have acquired it in
a natural exchange and in a manner which allows it to be readily assimilated into the
rest of the knowledge base in that the system will have acquired with the knowledge
various links between it and other knowledge. The system, insofar as it can lose an
argument or debate, may also change its mind about its own knowledge. Thus new
knowledge will be acquired and old knowledge will be continuously updated and
revised as a result of argument exchanges. This process is akin to that which we all
experience in our acquisition of knowledge about the world. This should not be
surprising since, as I have suggested above, one of the principal points in argument
exchanges is an epistemic one. They are a means of communicating and acquiring
knowledge. Apart from the naturalness of this means of interaction an ASP scores
over a system like Mole in that the ASP has a fully worked out model of
argumentation.
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Uncertainty
As we have seen in chapter 4, there are two forms of uncertainty in archaeological
reasoning:
a)That which arises because more than one interpretation of the data will always
be possible;
b) That which arises because the data is incomplete.
The standard means of resolving these sorts of problems include various conflict
resolution methods, certainty factors and fuzzy logics (e.g. Shortliffe, 1976, Zadeh,
1988). These methods do not lend themselves readily to the provision of
explanations, justifications or arguments for the system's conclusions.
One further technique for dealing with uncertainty which is more closely related to
our own is that of Paul Cohen (Cohen, 1985, Cohen and Grinberg, 1983) in which he
takes an endorsement based approach to uncertainty. In Cohen's approach,
endorsements or explicit records of reasons for belief are attached to rules and facts
and propagated by the system during reasoning. The endorsements are used to
decide between conflicting possibilities. In Cohen's words an endorsement is a record
'for believing or disbelieving a hypothesis' (Cohen et al, 1983:355). Using this
approach different types of evidence can be treated in different ways and weighed
differently in different contexts. This is comparable to the different sorts of argument
type which make up an argument style. As Cohen says, 'it makes little sense to
speak of certainty except with respect to a task' (ibid: 356). Cohen shows how this
techniques improves upon the standard probability based methods in his analysis of
an argument to do with hominid origins in Africa.
In chapter 4 we saw how the expectation-based approach to modelling
interpretation could be used to reduce uncertainty. Here we shall briefly indicate how
the full ASP model can be used for this purpose.
Cohen's theory differs from my own in that there is no propagation of the reasons
for certainty values in my approach. The reasons for X being held are stored locally in
an argument node. Assessment procedures can access these as necessary. Thus it
is unnecessary to propagate all the endorsements or reasons for believing X. I
would go even further and suggest that the best way to deal with uncertainty in
archaeological reasoning (and other forms as well) is to regard the conclusion as
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provisional; as satisfactory for the moment. At any future point new evidence may
cast doubt on the conclusion or conversely add strength to it. This sort of rational
revisability requires a system which can deal with argumentation - an ASP - so that
reasons can be associated with conclusions, arguments can be weighed against each
other and knowledge can be updated and revised.
8.2 Weaknesses in the approach and some possible reasons for these
I have already given details of the inadequacies of the implementation of ASParch in
the final section of chapter 6. Here I am more concerned to highlight what I take to be
inadequacies in the overall approach.
• While ASParch produces argument-Is, the question arises of the relationship of
these to real arguments. They differ in many ways. For instance real arguments
are wide-ranging, subtle and complex. This inadequacy is partly explained by the
incompleteness of the knowledge bases used in the above examples. This can be
remedied. Nonetheless the arguments produced will still seem unrecognizable to
some users .
• The sorts of response produced don't seem always to the point. Nor do they
reflect the idiosyncrasies of an individual's response.
• The influence of theoretical, ideological and other viewpoints is more complex
than that incorporated into the program.
• There is much more to analogical reasoning than the simplified approach adopted
suggests.
• ASPs do not deal with natural language and have no knowledge of the structure
of dialogues. Both are needed before the program becomes a usable tool. Without
them the arguments seem stilted and unnatural.
• While the approach allows for multi-dimensionality of arguments there is still a
great deal of inflexibility in how arguments are input, output and represented. This
may be inevitable given the need for computational tractability but it narrows the
range of possible arguments.
• If we take the design principle PI seriously then it seems wrong to have any form
of assessment in the machine. This should be left to the human user while the
system presents all the possible arguments.
• Apart from the fairly ad hoc methodology for extracting arguments from textual
sources mentioned at the end of chapter 7, there is no real theory of how this
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should be done. As we suggested in chapter 1, written arguments can be
interpreted in many ways and each interpretation can be argued for or against.
While the ASP methodology provides a means for acquiring the complete structure
of an argument during interactive exchanges it does not provide a means of
acquiring knowledge from texts. This is the function of natural language programs
such as OpEd. It may, however, be possible to extend ASParch so that it can
choose between multiple interpretations of an argument as given in a text (using a
more computationally precise set of procedures based on those given in chapter 7)
and hence acquire knowledge from texts as well as from users.
I will now attempt to suggest reasons for some of the failings mentioned above. I
have identified nine main difficulties which lie behind the above failings. Some of these
were apparent at the outset, others have only become clear through making the
attempt to model an arguer. Furthermore, some are generally applicable to AI as a
whole while some are only applicable to the modelling of argumentation. The
difficulties are:
• Inability to capture all the background necessary for arguing.
• Argument is inherently metaphorical.
• Argument is culturally relative.
• Argument includes tacit elements.
• Argument touches on value systems.
• Arguing is not something done in a cold, unemotional manner.
• Arguments are never divorced from personal, social and political considerations.
• Arguments are creative.
• Interpretation is not simply the application of transformations to data.
As we shall see as we deal with each of these in turn, there are many
interrelationships between the nine issues.
8.2.1 Inability to capture all the background necessary for arguing
This is basically the point made by Winograd and Flores (1986: 74 ff.) which we have
alluded to already. As they say:
...our openness to experience is grounded in a pre-understanding without which
understanding itself would not be possible. An individual's pre-understanding is
the result of experience within a tradition. Everything we say is said against the
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background of that experience and tradition, and makes sense only with respect to
it. Language (as well as other meaningful actions) need express only what is not
obvious, and can occur only between individuals who share to a large degree the
same background. Knowledge is always the result of interpretation, which
depends on the entire previous experience of the interpreter and on the
situatedness in a tradition. It is neither 'subjective' (particular to the individual)
nor 'objective' (independent of the individual) ... Artificial intelligence is an attempt
to build a full account of human cognition into a formal system (a computer
program). The computer operates with a background only to the extent that the
background is articulated and embodied in its programs. But the articulation of the
unspoken is a never-ending process. In order to describe our pre-understanding,
we must do it in a language and a background that itself reflects a pre-
understanding. The effort of articulation is important and useful, but it can never be
complete ... At the other extreme [from building systems which deal with a limited
articulatable domain] lies the attempt to build systems that allow us to interact as
though we were conversing with another person who shares our background. The
result can easily be confusion and frustration, when breakdowns reveal the
complex ways in which the computer fails to meet our unspoken assumptions
about how we will be understood ... We must be especially careful in dealing with
so-called 'expert systems'. The ideal of an objectively knowledgeable expert must
be replaced with a recognition of the importance of background.
Even if were possible to capture all this knowledge it would be an immense task.
Although there are recently reported attempts to capture, for example, the whole
contents of an encyclopaedia (e.g. the CYC project, Lenat, Prakash and Shepherd,
1986) there is also the question of how this knowledge is processed in the creation
and comprehension of arguments. And as the above quote suggests it is the unsaid
and the tacit (see below) which ground our knowledge claims and interchanges. Thus
I would suggest that even if Winograd and Flores are wrong, aspects of human
arguments will always elude an arguing machine.
8.2.2 Argument is inherently metaphorical
In their seminal work on metaphoricity in everyday discourse, Lakoff and Johnson
(1980a, 1980b) discuss the metaphorical nature of the concept of argument. They put
forward instances in which it seems obvious that we regard an argument as a war.
For example 'He shot down all my arguments'. Such instances could be multiplied
indefinitely. However as they point out '... we don't just talk about arguments in
terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are
arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and defend our own' (Lakoff and
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Johnson 1980:4) They go on, (ibid: 5):
ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in
terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is
metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically
structured. Moreover this is the ordinary way of having an argument and talking
about one.
However, as they go on to point out, the metaphor of war, while it may be the
dominant one in our culture, is not the only means of structuring argument we have.
An argument can also be considered as a journey, a container and a building (ibid 89).
Nonetheless, the primary metaphor for argument is war. But war is something
humans engage in as part of wider political and national struggles. Thus an argument
can be seen as a means of gaining, asserting and defending power. 'Part of being a
rational animal, however, involves getting what you want without subjecting yourself
to the dangers of actual physical conflict. As a result, we humans have evolved the
social institution of verbal argument' (ibid 62). Even academic argument (Lakoff and
Johnson call it rational argument) is conducted in a warlike manner. 'The tactics of
intimidation, threat, appeal to authority, etc., though couched perhaps, in more refined
phrases, are just as present in rational argument as they are in everyday arguing and
war' (ibid 65).
As archaeologists are well aware, the use of elaborate displays of one kind or
another (e.g. the building of Stonehenge) can be seen as one means of asserting and
maintaining power. The ostentatious display of a lawyer or a young academic at a
conference is another means of gaining or displaying power. Seen in this light, the
young academic has much in common with warriors as diverse as the ancient Gaul, the
medieval knight and the American Indian. Display and prowess are the dominant
themes.
Of course, as is the way with real wars, the notion of an argument can be
construed as a game. We talk of war games. People re-enact the famous battles of
the Peloponnesian War. However as with war-games, the games we play with
arguments are often close to the real things. Soldiers work out tactics and develop
skills by simulating the real thing. The school child debating in the class room for the
first time is acquiring the skills necessary for a wide range of occupations from lawyer
to local councillor. In our everyday arguing a game argument often turns into the real
thing when some deeply held belief is challenged'. Even philosophy, that paradigm
1 A recent newspaper article with the headline 'Punch-up poet counted out' relates the case of an
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of game argument, becomes a battleground strewn with the corpses of defeated
arguers and, as Derrida (1982) suggests, one whose discourse is filled with hidden
metaphors.
At the same time it is possible to see argument as a means of gaining knowledge
as well as power about the world. Some would say that the two notions are always
interlinked in this way. Argument as a means of clearing away the spurious, of
asserting the real. The metaphors of building and journey are important here. A good
argument is one that stands up to the onslaughts of time and tide; like a good theory.
A journey is often an exploration of what is the case, a coming closer to the truth of
the world and of the journeyer; hence our interest in travel books. An argument can
also figure as part of a spiritual journey. Lakoff and Johnson ask us to imagine (ibid 5)
a,
... culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as
performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing
way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them
differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently. But we
would probably not view them as arguing at all: they would simply be doing
something different.
I don't know of a culture where argument is viewed as a kind of dance but I do know of
one where argument is viewed as part of the intellectual and spiritual path. In
Buddhism (especially Tibetan Buddhism) young lamas perform a kind of ritualized
argument. Not only are the steps highly formalized but the actual physical movements
of the arguer are important. Characteristically the arguer punctuates or underlines a
point by stretching out one hand towards the audience and striking it with the other.
The whole thing is conducted in an atmosphere of great enjoyment. This seems to me
to be a case where argument partakes of spirituality, knowledge, combat, performance
and game at the same time. As Waddell, writing in the 19th century says 'This
exercise is called expressing "the true and innermost essence (of the doctrine)" ..., in
which an endeavour is made to ascertain both the literal sense and the spirit of the the
doctrine ...' (Waddell, 1974: 184).
There are two points in this disquisition: (a) the notion of argument is inherently
metaphorical and (b) this notion is culturally determined. Thus even if someone were
to succeed in automating argument s/he would only be capable (as a representative of
one culture) of automating one view of argument. More importantly, the possibility of
argument over the merits of Defoe which ended with one of the participants 'lying unconscious on
the floor'. The ultimate grounding for one's beliefs one might say.
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such automation is cast in doubt because of the metaphoricity of the discourse and (if
Lakoff and Johnson are right) of the process. It is not just that arguments are spoken
about metaphorically, they are thought about and acted out in a metaphorical manner.
Thus while it may be possible to capture in a schematic form the notion of argument
(as Lakoff and Johnson do) a machine would not be capable of arguing simply by virtue
of having access to this schema. There are at least four reasons for this: (a) There is
more to acting as if X is Y (that is, acting metaphorically) than the following of a
schema; (b) While the change from viewing a conversation as a chat to viewing it as
an argument must involve some cues these seem to be largely tacit and probably non-
formalizable; (c) It is possible but probably not adequate to see this move in terms of
a change in the schema determining the behaviour, however it seems more likely that
such schemas are post hoc rationalizations or descriptions of pieces of behaviour
rather than necessary elements in the internal processing which accompanies the
behaviour; (d) There is more to thinking metaphorically than moving from one schema
to another. This must involve at least some propensity to merge the schemas for two
things.
8.2.3 Argument is culturally relative
We have already touched upon this in discussing Lakoff and Johnson. Another source
for the notion of cultural relativism is the work of the later Wittgenstein, in particular
the Philosophical Investigations. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein introduces the
notion of a language-game. Wittgenstein's views on the nature of the language-game
are summarized by Kenny (1973:163).
Language-games, like games, need have no external goal; they can be
autonomous activities ... But the comparison of language to a game was not meant
to suggest that language was a pastime, or something trivial: on the contrary, it
was meant to bring out the connection between the speaking of language and non-
linguistic activities. Indeed the speaking of language is part of a communal activity,
a way of living in society which Wittgenstein calls a 'form of life' ... It is through
sharing in the playing of language-games that language is connected with our life ...
Language-games include the famous builders' language-game, and others such as
(Wittgenstein, 1953: I, 23):
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Giving orders, and obeying them
Reporting an event
Forming and testing a hypothesis
Making up a story; and reading it...
Play-acting
Making jokes
Asking, thanking. cursing, greeting. praying.
As the inclusion of 'Forming and testing a hypothesis' suggests, Wittgenstein can be
taken to suggest that the whole process of the production of reasons to support claims
(justification or argument) is itself a language-game. This is the opinion of Cook in a
recent article (1988). He suggest that Wittgenstein believes that 'Explanation,
justification occurs only within language-games'. Cook supports this with a quote
from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Grammar (p. 97): 'A reason can only be given
within a language-game. The links of the chain of reasons come to an end, at the
boundary of the game.' Perhaps the most obvious way to gloss this rather gnomic
utterance is to suggest that there can be alternative logics, alternative notions of what
counts as a reason and how it is related to claims. Perhaps indeed there arises the
possibility of a form of life in which the game of supporting claims with reasons is not
played at all (as in Lakoff and Johnson's dance world). We have already touched upon
the notion of relativity to a particular domain in our discussion of argument style in
chapter 4. The notion before us is much more radical. Whether Wittgenstein is to be
taken in this way is irrelevant for our purposes. The fact is that several philosophers
have taken him in this manner. Winch, for example, in his discussion of the Zande
(1970: 93/4) says:
...the forms in which rationality expresses itself in the culture of a human society
cannot be elucidated simply in terms of the logical coherence of the rules
according to which activities are carried out in that society. For, as we have seen,
there comes a point where we are not even in a position to determine what is and
what is not coherent in such a context of rules, without raising questions about the
point which following those rules has in the society.
There are, in fact, strong arguments against the notion of cultural relativism which
Winch and others have adopted. For instance, it might be argued that if all views are
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culturally relative then the notion of cultural relativism itself must be culturally relative
and not therefore applicable to all societies. However, there is enough plausibility in
the notion to give us pause. Enough anyway to suggest why the building of an arguer
may be such a difficult task. Arguments will always be understood and responded to
in relation to a given cultural context. This may not mean that there is a different logic
at work but it may mean that the point in the argument will be missed unless that
background is shared.
It is important to see that there is no single background which is shared by all
human beings. Geertz (1983:76) in discussing common sense as a cultural system
points out that,
If common sense is as much an interpretation of the immediacies of experience, a
gloss on them, as are myth, painting, epistemology, or whatever, then it is, like
them, historically constructed and, like them, subjected to historically defined
standards of judgment.
In short, common sense, as well as grounding our arguments, can also be the object of
argument. Thus arguments take place against diverse backgrounds which are forever
shifting. Until we can deal with all the different common senses possible and all the
possible shifts we cannot be said to have captured a notion of human arguing, only
that of a small section, a culturally specific part. And that process would, if possible,
be a long and arduous one. As Geertz concludes (1983: 92):
If one wants to demonstrate, or even ... to suggest, that common sense is a
cultural system, that there is an ingenerate order to it capable of being empirically
uncovered, and conceptually formulated, one cannot do so by cataloguing its
content, which is widely heterogeneous, not only across societies but within them
- ant-heap wisdom. One cannot do so, either, by sketching out some logical
structure which it always takes, for there is none. And one cannot do so by
summing up the substantive conclusions it always draws, for there are, too, none
of these. One has to proceed instead by the peculiar detour of evoking its
generally recognized tone and temper, the untraveled side road that leads through
constructing metaphorical predicates ... to remind people of what they already
know.
Geertz concludes that this notion of common sense would be a 'plenary jolt' for
philosophy, since it relies on an unexamined notion of common sense. If that is so for
philosophy it is even more so for artificial intelligence which relies on an unthinking
mish-mash of researchers' own "common sense" perceptions and second hand notions
derived from a particular philosophical tradition.
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8.2.4 Argument includes tacit elements.
Arguing is a skill. I have glibly spoken above about knowledge of how to argue and
have presented some representations which are designed to emulate some elements
of that skill. However, there will be many elements which must remain tacit; things
which an arguer can be said to know but which no arguer can articulate. As Janik
(1988:59/60) points out:
There is nothing mysterious or implausible about this inability to put what we
know into words... It is an essential element in what we normally term experience
that experienced persons have a facility for handling a wide variety of unforeseen
situations. Just as it is not possible to describe an unforeseen situation, by
definition, it should be reasonable to think that our ability to deal with the situation
should not be taken to imply that we must be able to articulate the knowledge
which enables us to do so.
It might be suggested that, even if the arguer is unable to enunciate the nature of
his or her skill, the cognitive scientist can capture it in a formal system which, by
manipulating symbols, emulates an arguer. However, as Dreyfus and Dreyfus argue
(1986:35) expert behaviour does not involve the manipulation of symbols in this way.
The expert exhibits 'involved skilled behavior based on an accumulation of concrete
experiences and the unconscious recognition of new situations as similar to whole
remembered ones.' A system which follows rules of the kind in question would be at
best merely a competent arguer. If expertise is an acquired skill, argument is even
more so. The simulation of arguing is possible as I have shown above. However,
there are good reasons for thinking that the machine can only be a passable arguer.
These centre around the machine's lack of the requisite background knowledge.
Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that the manipulations captured in the
simulation bear any resemblance whatever to the processes which underlie the
argument of a human arguer. Stanley Fish (1982) makes similar points about
interpretation:
Interpreters are constrained by their tacit awareness of what is possible and not
possible to do, what is and is not a reasonable thing to say, and what will and will
not be heard as evidence in a given enterprise; and it is within those same
constraints that they see and bring others to see the shape of the documents to
whose interpretation they are committed.
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8.2.5 Argument touches on value systems.
As the quote from Huckleberry Finn in the introductory chapter shows, we don't often
argue in an entirely objective way. We become involved because our values are at
stake. This is related to the notion of argument as war discussed above. It is difficult
to know how to deal with values in computational terms. An argument is pursued
because some value is being threatened. Some value permeates an argument; guides
the moves made in it. Without the value it would be impossible to understand what
the point in the argument was. For example the debate about freedom of choice and
whether we have it under this present, Thatcherite, government, depends on the prior
understanding that freedom of choice is a good thing. Of course this could be
introduced as a step in the argument. However there is more to a value than the
assertion of a proposition. I may hold that it is an evil to kill another human being. I
may also value human life. This latter means that I act towards human beings in
certain ways. I do certain things in certain circumstances and avoid doing other things
in other circumstances. The value permeates my whole way of acting and thinking.
We humans, can understand and react to an argument because we understand and
accept and value the same things. An ASP provides a means of integrating the
proposition that it is wrong to kill humans into its knowledge base. In subsequent
arguments this proposition will be used either for or against other propositions.
However, the system does not act towards humans in some new way. It remains an
open question as to whether a system can corne to have a value as opposed to the
acquisition of a belief which expresses a value. Furthermore, since values and
emotions are tightly interconnected and emotions themselves are not beliefs or
propositions, a computational arguer will never understand certain arguments.
8.2.6 Arguing is not something done in a cold, unemotional manner.
Schank (1979) touches upon the point I wish to raise. He puts forward the notion that
one means of controlling inferences is by having a interest value which can be
attached to concepts. The rules which will be fired are those with the highest interest
rating. I am not really concerned with the application of the notion but only in the
items which Schank counts as interesting. These are death, unexpected events,
danger and personal relatedness. The point is that the fundamental grounding for our
arguments (especially moral ones) is frequently in terms of human good and harm. If
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we think of death and so on as the ultimate grounds of arguments, then, because there
are so few of these it might seem possible to deal with them computationally with
relative ease. Indeed there is work on the role of affect in the understanding of stories
which suggests that the computational representation of emotions and values is
possible (Hidi and Baird, 1986, Dyer, 1983). However I would argue that these
concepts are knit into the nexus of emotions, values and instincts which is peculiar to
us as living, experiencing animals. No machine can hope to share in this life. Thus no
machine can have the interest in certain arguments. Of course a value could be set, as
Schank suggests, and inferences made when certain concepts are over a certain
threshold. But this is hardly the same thing as the emotions which grip us; which
drive us on to pursue an argument (or indeed a train of thought). An emotion is not a
proposition nor is a value. Often of course this emotion is negative and derives from
our need to protect our egos from some perceived threat. Often however the emotion
has positive outcomes. The emotion engendered by the interest drives the arguer to a
positive outcome. Thus Crick and Watson, driven by personal ambition as well as
scientific curiosity, achieved something of lasting significance. It seems to me that it
is wrong to divorce arguing from emotions and interests. At the very least we take
great pleasure in arguing. In this respect we are do not live up to the ideal which Mr
Spock sets himself; nor should we. Thus a machine to whom nothing can matter
cannot be a real arguer (Edelson, 1986).
8.2.7 Arguments are never divorced from personal, social and political considerations.
There is a political dimension to arguments as there is to much else. Debate is often
contrasted with confrontation as a means of settling disputes. Thus we have
arbitration for industrial disputes and the United Nations as mediator in war
situations. As Churchill said 'Jaw, Jaw is better than War, War'. Argumentation,
through the medium of books or journalism is often seen as a means of getting things
changed. As the process by which opposing views are revealed, debated and
criticised. At the centre of our democracy is the debating chamber of the House of
Commons. However it is impossible to resist commenting that while free speech is
regarded as a right in a democracy, all states, including Western democracies, will
silence debate when the state feels threatened in some manner. This is particularly
true of the present government which, on a range of issues ranging from the Zircon
affair to the Peter Wright book Spycatcher, has shown an unwillingness to allow free
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debate. As Enoch Powell said in the Guardian of 3-8-87, 'In real life the strength of
any case is not the strength of any arguments for it, but the strength of the political,
personal and often economic investments which have been made in it.' We cannot
hope to have much free debate in a society in which the press is owned by a few
millionaires, television is attacked for the slightest anti-government opinion and
parliament itself is simply a means of expressing overwhelming right wing power. At
the same time, given that the only alternative is the gun, we must encourage debate
and teach skills in debate so that individuals can assess and oppose the arguments of
those with real power in our society. Argument (and artistic creations) are the only
means of achieving this. As Fisher (1988: 1) says,
We learn most of what we know from teachers and experts of one kind and another
and this is not surprising in a highly specialised modern society. However, it is
possible to rely too heavily on experts and this approach to learning and
knowledge tends to encourage passivity and receptiveness rather than
inventiveness and imagination.
Argument is one means of combating the relative impotence of the individual in
modern industrialised society.
Argument is politically and socially determined in another way. As a result of
political changes a shift can occur in a culture so that where there were once clear
notions, say, in the moral sphere, rooted in fixed patterns of political and social control,
the meanings of the terms become loose, multivalued and fuzzy. This notion derives
from Newbold's (1988: 229) discussion of the contrast between polysemy and
univocality.
A univocal code can be used to construct complex chains or hierarchies of
reasoning, since every relatively unambiguous step in the process can be grasped.
Univocality and the precise definition of terms is necessary for abstract argument,
the linear progression of syllogism, jurisprudence, and the efficient functioning of
organizations such as large armies and empires. Polysemy undermines pyramidal
and convergent structures, and favors imagination, intuition, unpredictable leaps,
fields of association, and lateral, fluid relationships.
Newbold is discussing the breakdown in authority in the late Roman empire and the
resulting changes in political discourse. Since there are close analogies between the
state of late Roman civilization and the contemporary west it may well be that we are
in a period of transition to a polysemous code.
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8.2.8 Arguments are creative.
We hold as obvious both the view that reason is mechanical and that reason is
mysterious. The mechanical view envisages thinking as the transparent cranking
of an old hand-cranking machine... This is the view of reason ... as a set of
operations which can be mechanically performed. I do not understand the
psychology of it, why it seems comforting to view reason as a transparent machine
and why the view of the mechanical or automatic part of reasoning seems clearer
than the logician's view of reason as deductive validity of inferences, no matter
how they were arrived at. This logician's view seems somehow disturbing ... it is
much inferior, emotionally, to the view that there is something mysterious and
magical in the operations of reason. The logician's view ... may be supplemented by
the view that the premises of rational thinking are arrived at neither by calculation
nor by a mysterious and magical act, but by a mysterious nonmagical act, or by a
nonmysterious, nonmechanical act, or by no act at all but by sheer luck. (Agassi,
1982:105)
We can apply what Agassi says about reason to argument and debate. Even if we
can use mechanical (computational procedures) in the justification of a piece of
reasoning or an interpretation (the context of justification) we cannot, of necessity,
apply these in the creation of the interpretation, the finding of a novel argument in the
first place (the context of discovery). This will always be essentially mysterious. The
creation of an argument like the creation of poem or a novel, involves a complex range
of human attributes. Conrad knew this well as the following quote from Under
Western Eyes suggests:
Some superior power had inspired him with a flow of masterly argument as certain
converted sinners become overwhelmingly loquacious.
Milton, in common with many great poets requests the aid of a superior power in
creating his 'great argument' - the text of Paradise Lost:
what in me is dark
Illumine, what is low raise and support,
That, to the height of this great argument,
I may assert Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men.
We need to know the domain to be able to argue relevantly, we must also have some
idea of the kinds of inference which are permitted in the domain, the shared
background, the current context of debate and so on. But arguments are rarely simple
functions of all these elements. Good arguments are often novel. New aspects of the
domain are noticed and expressed, new ways of relating elements of the domain are
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created. Whatever view we take of creativity we must admit that arguments are
creative. We might think (as Weisberg does, 1986) that creativity is a form of
problem-solving in which we recognize similarities between the present case and a
previous one and apply the lessons learned form the previous case (suitably modified)
to the present case. This process is more or less the same as that of analogical
problem solving mentioned above. Creativity, in this view, is not something
mysterious. On the other hand we might have a view of creativity in which (as
Poincare thought) we first gather knowledge about a problem and then allow a period
of sub-conscious activity during which a solution appears. The real work is then in
checking that the idea works. Whatever the notion of creativity we hold we must
admit that an argument is more than the production of some conclusion by means of a
series of rewrite rules. If Weisberg is correct, argument must at least involve
analogical problem-solving. This in turn depends on a computational theory of
analogical problem solving. There have been many attempts at this (see references in
section 4.3 above) but it is not clear that any of them is fully successful. If Poincare is
right, and the process is hidden and hence mysterious, it seems that since no formal
rules can be extracted no computational model can be made. I think that the truth is
somewhere in between. There is more to the production of a good argument than
analogical transfer. How, for instance do we hit upon the right analogy, is it purely
serendipitous? At the same time there is nothing mysterious about the creation of
good arguments. We can teach students how to come up with ideas and how to
marshal them subsequently (see Pirie 1985 for a good example). This of course does
not mean that we can capture this process in a formal manner. At best this must
remain an open question. From my own experience of producing arguments, the
process is not guided by any formalizable rules. It is iterative and messy. Good
arguments arise as a result of interactions with others (as the Russian director,
Tarkovsky, suggests in the epigraph to this thesis), reading, building partial models
(as Crick and Watson did). The formation of arguments (the context of discovery)
includes a lot of processing which takes place before the argument can be clearly
enough stated to be assessed in the manner described in the body of this thesis.
There is a sort of negative capability at work here. This notion comes from the poet
Keats as explained by Ward (1966: 160/1):
"Several things dovetailed in my mind," Keats wrote his brothers,"& at once it
struck me, what quality went to form a Man of Achievement especially in
Literature & which Shakespeare possessed so enormously - I mean Negative
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Capability, that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries,
doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason." This ability to "remain
content with half knowledge" - what today is called "tolerance for ambiguity" -
was, as Keats saw it, essential to the poet insofar as he above all men explores
the frontiers of human experience and struggles with its endless diversity and
contradictions in an effort to extend the limits of human awareness.
We are capable of floundering around with a half-baked idea and still come up with
something useful. All great detectives work like this. Can a machine? It is here that
the notion of the background, the affective elements, the culture and the value system
play a part. An arguer must understand and feel a great deal before s/he can produce a
new argument from half-baked ideas.
8.2.9 Interpretation is not simply the application of transformations to data.
For instance Shanks and Tilley (1987) suggest that the process of interpretation is
fourfold. They refer to it as the 'fourfold hermeneutic'. It is interesting and perhaps not
coincidental that Shanks and Tilley, in reacting against what they see as naive
empiricist approaches to archaeology, adopt elements from the same tradition as is
used by Winograd and Flores (1986) in their attack on the rationalism of artificial
intelligence research. They describe the fourfold hermeneutic as follows (ibid: 108):
(i) the hermeneutic of working within the contemporary discipline of archaeology;
(ii) the hermeneutic of living within contemporary society as an active participant,
put broadly, gaining knowledge of that which is to be human, to interact and
participate with others and to be involved in struggles about beliefs and social and
political values;
(iii) the hermeneutic of trying to understand an alien culture involving meaning
frames radically different from our own;
(iv) the hermeneutic involved in transcending past and present.
Perhaps (iii) and (iv) have no relevance to AI as a discipline but (i) and (ii) do. New
hermeneutics (iiia) and (iva) could be coined:
(iiia) the hermeneutic of trying to understand the mechanisms which produce the
behaviour which is interpreted by means of the other hermeneutics.
(iva) the hermeneutic involved in integrating people and machines.
At any rate there is more to interpretation than we have discussed. We have gone
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some way to dealing the common sense and other theories which ground
interpretations and hence arguments. We have even attempted (in the notion of
argument style) to deal with differences between disciplines. We have done nothing
to deal with the economic and political forces which feed an interpretation or with the
'alien meaning frames' within which the objects interpreted had a place.
The upshot of this (largely negative) discussion is that we must be cautious in
ascribing the ability to argue to a machine. Although we have gone some way
towards understanding what it is to argue and to capturing this in a model sufficiently
precise for a computer program to be designed and implemented, we cannot truthfully
be said to have simulated an arguer. There are many outstanding problems in AI
which would need to be solved first. Intelligence is not composed of easily separable
components. The ability to argue cannot be simulated without the prior ability to
simulate many diverse human abilities. As the novelist John Barth says in his novel,
The Floating Opera, 'I think that to understand anyone thing entirely, no matter how
minute, requires the understanding of every other thing in the world'. This is not a
counsel of despair. The program may not really argue but it provides a valuable
service. And, as we shall see in the next section. we can make use of the knowledge
gained to build viable and stimulating programs for the dissemination of knowledge.
8.3 Future directions
I have already discussed the particular extensions and amendments which need to be
made to ASParch if it is to function as a usable tool for archaeologists and others. In
this section I will discuss some ideas for incorporating this research into further work.
One possible direction for future work would be the integration of work done on
KIVA (the archaeological interpreter mentioned in chapter 5) and ASParch. This
hybrid system (illustrated in Figure 8.1) would form part of a toolbox (or
archaeologist's workbench) which would aid in the creation of knowledge bases, their
interpretation and interaction with them. I have already begun to think about the
design for this system which would be known as WORSAAE (after the great Danish
archaeologist). This system has the potential to provide a means of controlling the
interaction between users and knowledge bases in terms of a model of stylized
argument exchange which renders the knowledge base contents accessible. justifiable
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and changeable. As a tool, such a system, in modelling an arguing agent as a means
of providing the interface between the user and archaeological knowledge stored in an
electronic form, would provide reasoned positions about the contents of its knowledge
store and allow the user to change and update this knowledge. Such a system is also
ideally suited to a role in education/dissemination of knowledge because it includes an
argumentation module. It is my belief that what is lacking in the notion of an expert
system as a communicator of knowledge is some means of involving the user. Our
personal experience shows us that argumentation, because it must by its nature be
geared to the specific interests and points of view enunciated by the user, is an
important means of achieving this (cf. Schwartz 1988). We also hold that a great deal
of what is important about any domain is captured in the arguments surrounding the
data rather than the data. As Lowe (1985: 98) suggests in discussing his system for
mediating the arguments of multiple users, the 'goal of this medium is to combine the
content of many contributions on any given topic into a single structure'. That is to
imply that knowledge is not held in facts but in the chains of argumentation which link
the facts to each other and to the various interpretive theories that ground them.
Finally, such a system can perform as a research tool in that the archaeologist can use
the system to test arguments before incorporating them in written texts. The possible
uses for WORSAAE can be summarized as in Table 8.1.
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Area Use
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
expert systems, tutoring systems WORSAAE as an interface which can
provide chains of argumentation
paper publication -
i.e. conventional printed or samizdat
WORSAAE as a pre-processor
of data aimed at producing
rationales for claims
machine readable publication -
i.e. where machines have access to
full data and can autonomously derive
the required information
WORSAAE as a search mechanism for
evidence pro and contra a particular
position.
Table 8.1 - Possible uses for the successor to ASParch
The last of these is the most speculative. Here the notion is that the system has
access to all the data from an excavation and can derive an explanation/interpretation
and correlate it with current beliefs. This data need not be published in any paper form
(cf the notion of electronic periodicals such as BLEND - Shackel, 1982.). Thus the
archaeologist could set WORSAAE off in a search through a given data-base (or set
of databases) in an attempt to find supporting or conflicting evidence. This could then
be incorporated into his or her own work. In this way, the paper publication of the data
is limited to particular interests. While there has been some work on the the scanning
of texts for arguments and on monitoring output from news agency lines (Alvarado et
al., 1986 on argument in newspaper editorials, Dejong, 1979 and Lebowitz, 1980, on
the monitoring of news agency lines), nonetheless this probably represents a very
long-term goal.
A related possibility also suggests itself. The above shows how ASParch could
function as part of a tool box for aiding academic research. This has already been
suggested for other areas (for instance, Marc Eisenstadt, in a lecture at the Open
University which is unpublished, suggests that a system which could argue back
would be helpful in the formation of theories in the domain of neuroscience). The
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second possibility is an extension of the system's role as part of the interface between
the user and the knowledge or database. In pursuing this role it should be possible for
ASParch to act as an intelligent (and argumentative) guide through a hypertext
system.
Halasz (1988) has the following comment about AI and Hypertext (mentioned
already in chapter 3):
The integration of hypermedia and AI technology is an interesting direction to
explore. In many ways, hypermedia and knowledge-based systems are a natural
fit.; A merging of concepts from frame-based systems into the design of
hypermedia systems would be a sensible way to approach the integration of
hypermedia with rule-based, truth-maintenance, and other computational engines.
While such an integration of hypermedia and artificial intelligence is a worthwhile goal,
such an integration is best achieved not at the implementational level suggested in the
above quote but in terms of a model of a higher level cognitive process which combines
the discursiveness of hypertext with the inferential capabilities of expert systems and
which is at the same time an essential aspect of research in the humanities. I suggest
that a computational model of argument fits this description. Inference is necessary
for argument assessment and for selecting an appropriate response. Hypertext is
necessary for the storing and display of an argument. The resources of a hypertext
document could also be used for exemplification and illustration. The resulting system
is one which which has much in common with human/human arguments but which
differs in significant ways. The machine is capable of argument assessment and
response and thus provides a natural means of interaction. At the same time the
system goes beyond human capabilities. It can display several premises for an
argument at the same time in different windows. It can display all the links between
claims and grounds, supporting and attacking arguments and provide the means for
navigating around these links.
The contribution of Trigg and Weiser (1986) and others on the use of hypertexts
as tools for argumentation (discussed above) shows how integration of the
argumentation model and hypermedia is possible. These systems provide a means of
storing and accessing rather than assessing or responding to arguments. They
also provide a means of storing large amounts of diverse domain knowledge.
The system I envisage incorporates many of the features associated with other
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hypertext systems. An argument will proceed by means of links from one chunk of
argument text to another text. These links will include comment, criticism,
redescription and so on. At the same time the system will be capable of interacting
with the user. It will be able to understand user arguments and, as part of the
comprehension process, check argument steps and overall arguments. It will also be
able to produce arguments and keep an argument going.
This system thus integrates AI and hypertext not in terms of a low level
representational formalisms or techniques but in terms of a human-human interaction
which can be captured on a machine and can naturally be seen to make use of AI and
hypertext. From the hypertextual point of view, the system would act as a kind of
intelligent but argumentative guide through complex and diverse domain knowledge.
From the AI point of view, the argumentation module would be enhanced by the
flexible integration of diverse sorts of data possible in a hypertext system as well as
by the capacity to thread the various data together into manifold chains of
argumentation which the user can explore at leisure.
Epilogue
We started with a reference to Rousseau's ideas about political freedom. We end
with the Buddha's notion that error will continue until we become detached from the
blindness of everyday life so that we can see the real; Nirvana. There is a famous
Buddhist parable which provides a rationale for the attempt to understand our need
and capacity to argue. Here it is suggested that we are all possessed of part of the
truth but convinced that we are privy to it all. While mere quarrels are looked upon
with disdain, the Buddha, like Plato, seems to have seen intellectual debate as a
spiritual endeavour: selfless but not without compassion; detached but not coldly
abstract; anatta (the Buddhist doctrine of no-soul) but not nihilistic. Debate is of
vital importance to our spiritual health and to that of our democracies. As the
necessary concomitant of toleration it is needed more and more in this pluralistic world
we live in.
Then said the Exalted One:
'These sectarian, brethren, are blind and unseeing. They do not know the real,
they know not the unreal, know not the truth, know not the untruth: in such a state
of ignorance do they dispute and quarrel as ye describe. Now in former times,
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brethren, there was a rajah in this same Savatthi. Then, brethren, that rajah called
to a certain man, saying: "Come thou, good fellow! 00 and gather together all the
blind men that are in Savatthi!"
"Very good, your majesty," replied that man, and in obedience to the rajah
gathered together all the blind men, took them with him to the rajah and said:
"Your majesty, all the blind men of Savatthi are now assembled."
"Then, my good man, show these blind men an elephant."
"Very good, your majesty,"said the man, and did as he was told, saying,"O ye
blind, such as this is an elephant!"
And to one man he presented the head of the elephant, to another the ear, to
another the tusk, the trunk, the foot, back, tail, and tuft of the tail, saying to each
one that that was the elephant.
Now, brethren, that man having presented the elephant to the blind men, came to
the rajah and said, "Your majesty, the elephant has been presented to the blind
men. Do what is your will."
Thereupon, brethren, that rajah went up to the blind men and said to each, "Have
you studied the elephant?"
"Yes, your majesty."
"Then tell me your conclusions about him."
Thereupon those who had been presented with the head answered, "Your majesty,
an elephant is just like a pot." And those who had only observed the ear replied,
"An elephant is just like a winnowing-basket." Those who had been presented
with the tusk said it was a ploughshare. Those who knew only the trunk said it
was a plough. "The body," said they, is a granary: the foot, a pillar: the back, a
mortar: the tail, a pestle: the tuft of the tail, just a besom." Then they began to
quarrel, shouting, "Yes it is! No it isn't! An elephant is not that! Yes, it's like that!"
and so on, till they came to fisticuffs about the matter.
Then, brethren, that rajah was delighted with the scene.
Just so are the sectarians, who are wanderers, blind, unseeing, knowing not the
truth, but each maintaining it is thus and thus.'2
-000-
2 FromWoodward, 1973. The parable is from the Udana, vi, 4.
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Appendix 1 - Selections from the Prolog code for ASParch
r main control ""I
maincontrol:-
init_runl, init_run2,
retract_sys_kb,
introduction,
message([' Do you want to go on? ')),
get_field(F), retractall( current_field(_), assert( current_field(F»,
get_topic(T), rerractalltcurrem jopicf j). assertfcurrent jopict'I'j),
first_move.
%% NB in wbat follows the current roots will change during interaction
%%USUS form
first_move:-
yesno(['Do you want to go flI"St?']),
ask_for_argument, %% get user's interpretation
current_user_root(R),
udisplay _tree('user interpretation I' ,R),
look_for_argument, %% get system interpretation
retractall(previous_user _rootU) ,assert(previous_ user _root(R»,
current_sys_root(R 1),
retractall(previous_sys_rootU) ,assert(previous_sys_root(R 1»,
udisplay _treefsystem interpretation I ',RI),
ask_for_user_response, %% get user's response
current_user_root(R2),
udisplay _tree('user interpretation2' ,R2),
attack_or_defend_l, %% get system response
current_sys_root(R3),
udisplay _treefsystem interpretation2' ,R3),
I.
%%SUSU
first_move:-
look_for_initial_argument, %% get system interpretation
current_sys_root(R 1),
udisplay _treeCsystem interpretation 1',R 1),
message([' Your tum ']),
retractall(previous_sys_rootU) ,assert(previous_sys_root(R 1»,
ask_for_argument, %% get user's interpretation
current_user_root(R2),
udisplay _tree('user interpretation 1',R2),
attack_or_defend_2, %% get system response
retractal1(previous_user_rootU),assert(previous_user_root(R2»,
current_sys_root(R3),
udisplay _tree('system interpretation2',R3),
ask_for_user_response, %% get user's response - use parameter to take in prop from menu!!
current_user_root(R4),
udisplay _tree('user interpretation2' ,R4),!.
introduction:-
create_dialogue_ window(,ASPA dialogue'),
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nl('ASPA dialogue),nl('ASPA dialogue'),
write('ASPA dialogue';Welcome to the Argument Support Program for Archaeology'),
nl('ASPA dialogue'),nl('ASPA dialogue'),
write{,ASPA dialogue', 'The interaction takes the form of a formal debate in which'),
nl(,ASPA dialogue'j.nlf ASPA dialogue'),
write('ASPA dialogue', 'both system an user have two goes'),
nl('ASPA dialogue'),nl('ASPA dialogue'),
write('ASPA dialogue', 'I. To give an archaeological interpretation'),
nl(,ASPA dialogue'),nl('ASPA dialogue'),
write{,ASPA dialogue', '2. to defend and/or criticise the others argument').
%% deletes windows for new run
init_runl:-
wkill{'system interpretation 1'),
wkill('system interpretation2'),
wkill('user interpretation 1'),
wkill{'user interpretation2'),
wkill{,ASPA dialogue').
init_run2:-
retractall(previous_user_rootU ),
assert(previous_user_root(none»,
retractall(previous_sys_rootU),
assert(previous_sys_root(none) ).
get_previous_sys_root(R): -
previous_sys_root(none),
current_sys_root(R).
get_previous_sys_root(R):-
previous_sys_root(R).
get_previous_user_root(R):-
previous_user_root(none),
current_user_root(R).
get_previous_user_root(R): -
previous_user_root(R).
%% get system argument
look_for_argument:-
fC,I,
current_user_root(R),
my_fetch(R, claim,the All of Obj is Val),
(prove(the All of Obj is Vall); %% i.e. enforces relevance to user claim
prove(the All of Obj is not(Val»),
root_sys_arg(the All of Obj is Vall),!. %%convert production trace to arg nodes
look_for_argument:-
message(['Aspa is unable to find a relevant argument'J),fail.
look_for_initial_argument:-
fchain, % this calls fc and even if it fails it returns true
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current_topic(the Att of Obj),
prove(the Att of Obj is Vall), %% i.e. enforces relevance to topic
root_sys_arg(the Att of Obj is Vall),!. %%conven production trace to arg nodes
look_for_initial_argument:-
message(['Aspa is unable to find a relevant argument']),fail.
% user responds attack
ask_for_user_response:-
menul(S), S=['attack sys arg'[,
menu2(Attack_type),
wfront('system interpretation 1'),
message(['Please focus on a single proposition in the system arg']),
get_previous_sys_root(R),
current_user_root(RO), % old root
ask_for_argument,
current_user_root(R 1),
note(the response_type of RI is Attack_type),
note(the external_attacks of RI is R),
note(the external_supports of RI is RO),
note(the external_attacked_by of R is RI).
note(the external_supported_by of RO is Rl).].
% user responds defend
ask_for_user_response:-
menu3(Defence_type),
wfront(,user interpretation I ,),
message(['Please focus on a single proposition in the user arg'l),
current_user_root(R). % old root
get_previous_sys_root(RO),
ask_for_argument.
current_user_root(RI), % new root
note(the response_type of RI is Defence_type).
note(the external_supports of RI is R).
note(the external_attacks of RI is RO),
note(the external_supported_by of R is RI),
note(the external_attacked_by of RO is RI),!.
% failed to get response
ask_for_user_response:-
message(['Aspa is quitting because there has been no user response'lj.fail.
menu I (Selected):-
scroll_menu([, Please select your response type 'J,
[ 'attack sys arg',
'defend own arg',
'alter arg'], D,Selected).
menu2(Selected):-
scroll_menu([, Please select your attack type 'J,
[ 'attack sys claim',
-._- 'attack sys ground1.D.Selected).
menu3 (Selected):-
scroll_menu([' Please select your defence type 'l.
[ 'defend user claim',
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'defend user ground'),[],Selected).
%%USUS
%% defend i.e. no weak spots in either current or previous user arg
attack_or_defend_l:-
current_user_root(R),
find; weak_spots(R,Spots),
Spots = O.
previous_user_root(pR),
find_weak_spots(PR,PSpots),
PSpots = 0,
support_sys_arg,L
%% attack weak spots since previous user arg had some
attack_or_defend_l:-
previous_user_root(R), % or sys arg!!! i.e. as part of reasoning
fmd_weak_spots(R,Spots),
Spots = O.
current_user_root(pR),
find_weak_spots(pR,PSpots).
attack_ weak_spots(pR,PSpots),!.
%% attack previous user argument
attack_or_defend_l:-
previous_user_root(R),
fmd_weak_spots(R,Spots). !,
attack_weak_spots(R,Spots).
%%SUSU
%% defend i.e. no weak spots in either current or previous user arg
attack_or_defend_2:-
current_user_root(R},
fmd_weak_spots(R,Spots),
Spots = 0,
support_sys_arg,! .
%% attack previous user argument
attack_or_defend_2:-
current_user_root(R),
find_weak_spots(R,Spots), l,
attack_weak_spots(R,Spots).
find_weak_spots(none,(]):-!.
find_weak_spots(R,Spots):-
examine_node(R,Spotsl ),
filter(SpotsI .Spots),'.
examine_grounds(O.[]).
examine_grounds([[]),[]).
examine_grounds({Sl IRest),[SpotlRestSpots]):-
examine_node(S I, Spot),
examine_grounds(Rest,RestSpots). % rest of grounds here
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examine_node(Node, [[Node, Status) I Rest]):-
my_fetch(Node,claim,Proposition),
my_fetch(Node,warrant,Warrant),
my_fetch(Node,supported_by,Supports),
my_fetch(Node,grounds,Grounds),
weakstatus(Proposition, Grounds,Warrant,S tatus),
examine_grounds(Supports,Rest). %% sub-grounds of this sub-ground
filter(S,S 1):-
squash(S ,FlatS),
filter I (FlatS ,S1).
fil ter 1([) ,[]).
filterl([Node,okIRest], Restl):-
filter 1(Rest,Rest 1).
filter I ([Node,S tatuslRest] , [Node,S tatusIRestl]):-
filter 1(Rest,Rest 1).
attack_ weak_spotsL.[]).
attack_weak_spots(R,[Node, StatusIRest)):- %% R= node attacked
attack; weak_spot_main(R,Node,Status),
attack_ weak_spots{R,Rest).
r If analogy and the field is archaeology then deal with in a particular way·'
attack, weak_spot_main(R,Node,analogy _ground):-
current_field(archaeology),
find_analogy_type(Node, AType,Atts, Selected),I,
deal_with_analogy(R,Node,AType,Atts,Selected),I.
attack_ weak_spot_main(R,Node,analogy _ground):-
deal_with_analogy(R,Node,simple_analogy ,Atts, Selected).
attack; weak_spot_main(R,Node,arguable_principle(p»:-
deal_with_principle(R,Node,arguable_principle(P».
attack_ weak_spot_main(R,N ode,selfcontradictory(P»:-
deal_with_selfcontradictory(R,Node,selfcontradictory(p».
attack; weak_spot_main(R,Node,_):-
attack; weak_spot(R,Node,_,_,_).
deal_with_analogy(R,Node, simple_analogy,Atts, Selected):-
attack;weak_spot(R,Node,simple_analogy ,Atts, Selected).
dea1_with_analogy(R,Node, historical_analogy,Atts, Selected):-
attack_historicaI_link(R,Node).
deal_with_analogy(R,Node, relational_analogy,Atts, Selected):-
attack_relationality(R,Node ).
deal_with_principIe(R,Node,arguable_principle(P»:-
attack_ weak_spot(R,Node,arguable_principle(P».
deal_ with_selfcontradictory(R,Node,selfco ntradictory(p»:-
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attack_weak_spot(R,Node,selfcontradictory(p».
find_analogy _type(Node, AType,Attlist.Selected):-
my_fetch{Node, claim, the analogue of X is Y),
get_artifact_atts_s(X,Attlist),
scroll_menu([' Please select the matching attributes of, X, ' and " Yl,
Attlist,O,Selected),I,
get_atype(X, Y .Attlist.Selected.A Type).
get_atype(X, Y ,Atts,Selectedatts,historical_analogy):-
prompt_read(['Is there a historical link between', X, ' and " Yj.Yes), Yes = yes,!.
get_atype(X, Y ,A tts,Selectedatts,relational_analo gy):-
prompt_read(['Is there a relational link between the attributes of, X, ' and " Yl,Yes),
Yes = yes,!.
get_atype(X, Y .Atts.Selec tedatts,simple_analogy):-
Atts = Selectedatts,!.
get_atype(X, Y ,Atts,Selectedatts,simple_analogy ):-
subset(Selectedatts,Atts ),1.
%% 1. look for saliency
attack; weak_spot(Nodeattacked,Node,simple_analogy,Atts, Selected):-
nl,write(' ASPA trying to spot failure in saliency .. .'),
my _fetch{Nodeattacked,claim,C),
my _fetch(Node,claim,the analogue of Al is A2),
current_field(F),
unmatched_salient_attribute(F,Atts,Selected,Salient),
make_sys_arg(saliency,C,[not the analogue of Al is A21,Salient),
nl,writc(' ASPA succeeded in finding failure in saliencyl'),nl;
nl,write(' ASPA has failed to detect error in saliencyl'), fail.
%% 2. look for another analogy which is contrary
attack_weak_spot(Nodeattacked,Node,simple_analogy,Atts, Selected):-
nl,write(, ASPA trying to find alternative analogy ... '),
my _fetch(Nodeattacked,claim,C),
my _fetch{Node,claim,the analogue of Al is A2),
find_another_analogue(A I,A2,Anotheranalogue),
current_field(F),
contrary _analogue(F,Anotheranalogue,A2),
make_sys_arg(alt_analogue,C,[the contrary_analogue of Al is Anotheranalogue)),
nl,write(' ASPA succeeded in finding alternative analogyl'),nl;
nl,write(' ASPA has failed to find alternative analogy!'), fail.
%% 3. deal with weak principle
attack_ weak_spot(Nodeattacked,Node,arguable_principle(p»:-
nl,write(' ASPA attacking principle ...'), write(P),
my _fetch(Nodeattacked,claim,C),
my _fetch(Node-,daim,C2),
make_sys_arg(principle,C,[not C2),P),
nl,write(' ASPA successful in attack on principlel'),nl;
nl,write(' ASPA has failed in attack on principle!'), fail.
- 246-
Appendix I
Argument in the humanities: a knowledge-based approach Appendix I
%% 4. deal with selfcontradictory
attack_weak_spot(Nodeattacked.Node,selfcontradictory(P»:-
nI,write(' ASPA attacking self contradiction ...'), write(P),
my_fetch(Nodeattacked,claim,C),
my_fetch(Node,claim,C2),
make_sys_arg(selfcontradiction,C,[not C2],P),
ni,write(, ASPA successful in attack on self contradiction! '),nl;
nl,write(' ASPA has failed in attack on self contradictionl'), fail.
attack; weak_spot(Node._,_._,_):-
message(['attacking user claim'[).
make_sys_arg(saliency,C,G,Salient):-
initial_make_arg(Arg,Arg2,Arg3,Sysroot,Userroot),
note«Arg instance_of argument with
claim: not(C),
grounds: G,
warrant: 'saliency is good',
supported_by: [Arg2,Ol,
external_supports: Sysroot,
external_attacks: Userrootj),
G = [Gr], Gr= not(the analogue of At is A2),
note«Arg2 instance_of argument with
claim: (Gr),
grounds:[the sal_feature(Salient) of A2 is unmatched],
warrant: unknown,
supported_by: [Arg3,O])),
note«Arg3 instance_of argument with
claim: (the sal_feature(Salient) of A2 is unmatched),
grounds.I],
warrant: unknown,
supported_by: 0»,
note(the extemal_supported_by of Sysroot is Arg),
note(the extemal_attacked_by of Userroot is Arg),!.
make_sys_arg(alt_analogue,C,G):-
initial_make_arg(Arg,Arg2,Arg3,Sysroot,Userroot),
note«Arg instance_of argument with
claim: not(C),
grounds: G,
warrant: 'contrary analogues',
supported_by: [Arg2,m,
external_supports: Sysroot,
external_attacks: Userrootl),
G = [Gr],
note«Arg2 instance_of argument with
claim: (Gr),
grounds:[),
warrant: unknown,
supported_by: 0»,
note(the extemal_supported_by of Sysroot is Arg),
note(the extemal_attacked_by of Userroot is Arg),1.
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make_sys_arg(principle,C,G,Pr):-
initial_make_arg(Arg,Arg2,Arg3,Sysroot,Userroot),
note«Arg instance_of argument with
claim: not(C),
grounds: G,
warrant: 'weak principle',
supported_by: [Arg2,D1,
external_supports: Sysroot,
external_attacks: Userrootj),
G = [Gr]. Gr = (not Gl),
note«Arg2 instance_of argument with
claim: (Gr),
grounds:[the suppon_principle(Pr) of Gl is weak],
warrant: unknown,
supported_by: [Arg3,Om,
note«Arg3 instance_of argument with
claim: (the suppon_principle(Pr) of Gl is weak).
grounds:O,
warrant: unknown,
supported_by: 0»,
note(the external_supported_by of Sysroot is Arg),
note(the external_anacked_by of Userroot is Arg),!.
make_sys_arg(selfcontradiction,C,G,P):-
initial_make_arg(Arg,Arg2,Arg3,Sysroot,Userroot),
note«Arg instance_of argument with
claim: not(C),
grounds: G.
warrant: 'selfcontradiction' ,
supported_by: [Arg2,OJ,
external_supports: Sysroot,
external_attacks: Userrootj),
G = [Or], Or = (not G1),
nOle«Arg2 instance_of argument with
claim: (Or).
grounds:[the claim of Gl is selfcontradictory_with(p»).
warrant: unknown.
supported_by: [Arg3,Om,
note«Arg3 instance_of argument with
claim: (the claim of Gl is selfcontradictory_with(p»,
grounds:O.
warrant: unknown,
supported_by: 0».
note(the external_supported_by of Sysroot is Arg),
note(the external_anacked_by of Userroot is Arg),I.
unmatched_salient_attribute{F,Atts.Selected,SF):-
on(SF,Atts).
nOlon(SF,Selected).
salient_fealures:for(F, SF).
initial_make_arg(Arg ,Arg2.Arg3 .Sysroot, Userroot).-
gensym(sysarg,Arg),
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gensym(sysarg,Arg2),
gensym(sysarg,Arg3),
current_sys_root(Sysroot),
get_previous_user_root(Userroot),
retractall( current_sys_rootU),
assert( current_sys_root(Arg».
saIient_features_for(archaeology,date).
saIient_features_for(archaeology ,angle).
saIient_features_for(F,Sf):-
theory_for(F,n,
saIient_by(T,Sf).
theory _for(archaeology, marxism).
saIient_by(marxism, power).
find_another_analogue(A 1,A2,Anotheranalogue):-
(AI instance_of Class with Bodyl),
assert_sys_kb,
sys_beIief«AnotheranaIogue instance_of Class with Body2»,
not Al = Anotheranalogue,
has_attributes_s(AI, Listl),
bas_attributes_s(AnotheranaIogue, Lisa),
samc_atts_s(Listl, List2).
%% not the same uses for now!!
contrary _analogue(F ,AnotberanaIogue,A2):-
my_fetch(Anotheranalogue,use,U),
my_fetch(A2,use,U2),
not U= U2.
support_sys_arg:-
messagc(rsupporting sys arg ....'D.
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1* weak status rules *'
%% rules for weak links in interpretation %%
%%analogy
weakstatus(p,G,W,analogy_ground):-
P = (the analogue of X is Y).
%% self-contradictory
weakstatus(P ,G, W .selfcontradictoryfxj)»
assert_user_leb,
user_belief(X),
contrary(X,P).
weakstatus(P ,G, W ,selfcontradictory(X»:-
user_belief(X),
can_forward_derive(Xl,X),
contrary(X 1,P).
weakstatus(P,G,W,selfcontradictory(X):-
user_belief(X),
C8D_forward_derive(X2,P),
contrary(X,x2).
weakstatus(P,G,W,selfcontradictory(X»:-
user_belief(X),
C8D_forward_derive(X l.X>,
C8D_forward_derive(X2,P),
contrary(X l,X2).
%% arguable principle = level shift
wealcstatus(p ,G ,DummyW ,arguable_principle(Pr»:-
not G = 0,
G = [Gl],
W = (Gl -> P),
backing_Cor(W ,B),
min_ valued_principle(B,Pr).
%% ok status
weakstatus(P ,G, W .ok).
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/* dialogue control */
ask_for_argument:-
get_cg(C,List_of_grounds),
gensym(userarg,Arg),
retractaII(current_user_root(_»,assert(current_user_rool(Arg»,
note«Arg instance_of argument with
claim: C, grounds:List_of_grounds,warrant:unknown,supportcd_by: [1)),
recurse_on_grounds(Arg,List_o{_grounds),I.
recurse_on_groundsL,[]).
recurse_on_grounds(Arg,[HIT]):-
message(['Taking', H , 'as a subclaim, give grounds'[),
get_grounds(List_of_grounds),
gensym(userarg,NewArg),
note«NewArg instance_of argument with
claim: H, grounds:List_of_grounds, warrant.unknown,
supports: Arg, supported_by: []).
prove(all supported_by of Arg are OldSupports),
note«the supported_by of Arg is [NewArg I OldSupportsJ)),
recurse_on_grounds(New Arg,List_of_grounds),
recurse_on_grounds(Arg,T),I.
get_cg(C,G):-
get_claim(C),
get_grounds(G).
get_field(F): -
prompt_read([ 'Field? '],F).
get_topic(T):-
prompt_read([ 'Topic? 1,T).
get_claim(C):-
prompt_reader 'Claim? '],C).
get_grounds([GIT):-
get_ground(G), not G = stop,get_grounds(T),I.
get_grounds([]).
get_ground(G):-
prompt_read([ 'Ground (type <stop> to end) '],G).
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1* assessment code ,,/
overall_assess_arg(Value) :-
get_user_root(RI), %% i.e. user's first argument
get_user_aux(R2), %% i.e. user's second argument
assess_argument(Rl, Valuel),
nl,write(' user argument 1 > '),write(Valuel),nl,
assess_argument(R2, Value2),
nl,write(, user argument 2 > '),write(Value2),nl,
get_sys_root(R3),
get_sys_aux(R4), %% i.e. sys second argument
assess_argument(R3, Value3),
nl,write(' system argument 1 > '),write(Value3),nl,
assess_argument(R4, Value4),
nl,write(, system argument 2 > '),write(Value4),nl,
combine_overall_values(Valuel, Value2, OValuel),
nl, write('overall value for user argument> '), write(OValuel).
combine_overall_values(Value3, Value4, OValue2),
ni, write('overall value for system argument> '),write(OValue2),nl,nl,
winner(OValuel, OValue2, Value).
assess_argument(Arg, Value):-
assess_wot_arg(Arg, Valuel),
nl,write(' root value of '), write(Arg), writet'is > '), write(Valuel),
(get_directly _attacked_by(Arg, External_attacked_by),
assess_attacked_by(Arg, External_attacked_by, Value2);
Value2 = 0),
nl,write(, attacked by value of '), write(Arg), write('is > '),
write(Value2),
%% recursively assess this root
(get_directly _supported_by(Arg, External_supported_by),
assess_supported_by(Arg, External_supported_by, Value3);
Value3 = 0),
nl,write(, supported by value of '), write(Arg), write('is > '),
write(Value3),
%% recursively assess this root
combine_argvalues(Valuel, Value2, Value3, Value).
assess_root_arg(Arg, Value):-
get_total_nodes(Arg, Nodecount),
ni, write{' the total nodes of ), write(Arg), write('is > '),
write(Nodecount),
get_weak_nodes(Arg, Weaknodecount),
ni, write(' the weak nodes of '), write(Arg), write('is > ),
write(Weaknodecount), I,
check_ratio(Nodecount, Weaknodecount, Value).
%% If both same then argument full of weak nodes
check_ratio(N,W,-¥):-
N=W,
V is O.
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%% If weakcount is greater than half possible nodes then poor
check_ratio{N,W, V):-
Nl is (N!2),
W>Nl,
V is 3.
%% If weakcount is equal to half possible nodes then middling
check_ratio(N,W, V):-
Nl is (N!2),
NI =W,
V is 5.
%% If weakcount is 0 then strong
check_ratio(N,W, V):-
W=O,
V is 10.
%% If weakcount is less than half possible nodes then reasonable
check_ratio{N,W, V):-
NI is (N/2),
NI>W,
V is 7.
%% Formula Fl above
combine_overall_values(VI, V2, OV):-
OV is VI + V2.
%% Formula F2 above
combine_argvalues(VI, V2, V3. V):-
V is (VI + V3) - V2.
winner(OValuei. OVaIue2. Value):-
max(OValuel. OValue2. OValuel).
Value = user.
winner(OValuei. OValue2. system).
max(A.B.A):-
A>B.
max(A,B.B).
get_user_root(R):-
previous_user_root(R).
get_user_aux(R):-
current_user_root(R).
get_sys_root(R): -
previous_sys_root(R).
get_sys_aux(R):-
current_sys_root(R).
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get_directIy_attacked_by(Arg, Ex):-
my_fetch(Arg, external_attacked_by, Ex).
get_directly _supported_by(Arg, Ex):-
my_fetch(Arg, external_supported_by, Ex).
get_total_nodes(Arg, Nodecount)i-
examine_node(Arg,Nl ),
squash(Nl,Nodes),
length(Nodes,Nodecountl),
Nodecount is (Nodecountl/l).
get_weak_nodes(Arg, Weaknodecount):-
examine_node(Arg,Nl),
squasb(Nl,Nodes),
filter(Nodes,Wnodes),
lengtb(Wnodes, Weaknodecountl),
Weaknodecount is (Weaknodecountl!2).
assess_supported_by(Arg, External_supported_by, V):-
assess_root_arg(Extemal_supported_by, V).
assess_attacked_by(Arg, Extemal_attacked_by, V):-
assess_root_arg(External_attacked_by, V).
- 254-
Argument in the humanities: a knowledge-based approach Appendix I
1* display toulmin structure 11</
converl_user_root: -
previous_user_root(R),
convert_lo_toulmin(R).
convert_sys_root: -
previous_sys_root(R),
convert_to_toulmin(R).
convert_to_toulmin(R):-
my_fetch(R, claim, Claiml), pname(Claiml. Claim),
my_fetch(R, grounds, [GroundI I_]),pname(Groundl. Ground).
my_fetch(R, warrant, Warrantl), pname(Warrantl, Warrant).
current_field(Field),
gensym(toulminstructure, Win),
note«the toulminstructure of R is Win».
draw_arg_structure(Win, Ground, Claim. n. Warrant, ".". Field).
%% tool
get_sub_arg(Win, Y, X, Mod):-
find_pic(Win, (Y,X), Name),
find_sub_arg(Win, Sub_arg),
display_sub_arg(Sub_arg).
find_sub_arg(Win. Support):-
find_node_ with_window(Win. Node),
my_fetch(Node, supported_by. [Support I _]).
display_sub_arg(O).
display _sub_arg(Arg):-
my_fetch(R, claim, Claiml), pname(Claiml, Claim).
current_field(Field},
gensym(toulminstructure, Win).
note«the toulminstructure of R is Win»,
draw_arg_structure(Win, noground, Claim, ", nowarrant, ",', Field).
find_node_ with_window(Win, Node):-
my_fetch(Node, toulminstructure, Win).
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,. draw toulmin structures */
create_arg_structure(Window):-
wgcreate(Window ,50,50,350,450,80,200,200, 1,1),
add_tools(Window ,[get_sub_arg(icon(0,0,40,40, 100 1»)]),
gviewer(Window,on).
draw_arg_structure(Window,Datum,Claim,
Modality,Warrant,Backing ,Rebuttal,Arg_ficld):-
create_arg_structure(Window),
draw_box(Window, 'picl', 10,10),
concat('<Datum> ',Datum, Datum l),
draw_text_box(Window, 'btext1',IO,IO,Datum I),
draw_box(Window, 'pic2', 10,350),
concatt'<Claim> "Claim, Claiml),
draw_texl_box(Window, 'btext2', 1O,350,ClaimI),
draw_box(Window, 'pic2a', -55,225),
concat('<Modality> ',Modality ,Modality I),
draw_text_box(Window, btext2a',-55,225 ,Modality I),
draw_box(Window, 'pic3', 100,180),
concat('<Warrant> ',Warrant, Warrantl),
draw_text_box(Window, btext3' ,100,180,Warrantl),
draw_box(Window, 'pic4', 200,180),
concat('<Backing> ',Backing, Backing1),
draw_text_box(Window, 'btext4' ,200,180,Backing I),
draw_box(Window, 'pic5', 150,350),
concat('<Rebuttal> ',Rebuttal, Rebuttall),
draw_text_box(Window, 'btextS' ,150,3S0,Rebuttall),
draw_line(Window, line1, 30, 115, 30, 200),
draw_line(Window, line2, 30,205, 30, 340),
draw_line(Window, line3, 35,202,95,202),
draw_line(Window, line4, 85, 380, 145, 380),
draw_line(Window, lineS, 175,202, 195,202),
draw_line(Window, line6, 25, 280, 18,280),
draw_text(Window,textl,25,lSS,'[So]'),
draw_text(Window,text2,6S,21S,'[Since]'),
draw_text(Window,text3,115,390,'[Unlessn,
draw_text(Window,text4,18S,21S,'[On Account 00'),
add_pic(Window, arg_field, grey(double(fillbox(11S,lO,60,llO,70,30»))),
concat('«ARGUMENT FIELD» ',Arg_field,Arg_fieldl),
add_pic(Window,ari-field_text,
textbox(Times',lO,l,120,lS,SO,lOO,O,Arg_fieldl».
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1* convert frames to argnodes *'
root_sys_arg(the Att of Obj is Val):-
my_fetch_facet(Obj, Att, grounds, Grounds),
my_fetch_facet(Obj, Att, justification, Warrant),
gensym(sysarg,Arg),
retractall(current_sys_root(_»,
assert( current_sys_root(Arg»,
note«Arg instance_of argument with
claim: (the Att of Obj is Val),
grounds:Grounds,
warrant: Warrant,
supported_by: D»,
rest_sys_arg(Arg, Grounds),!.
rest_sys_arg(Arg, 0).
% always unsupported here
rest_sys_arg(Arg, [Obj instance_of Class I Restl)»
gensym(sysarg,NewArg),
note«NewArg instance_of argument with
claim: (Obj instance_of Class),
grounds:[],
warrant: none,
supports: Arg,
supported_by: []),
prove(all supported_by of Arg are OldSupports),
note«the supported_by of Arg is [NewArg IOldSupports])),
rest_sys_arg(Arg,Rest).
% supported grounds therefore recur on subgrounds
rest_sys_arg(Arg, [the Att of Obj is Val I Restl)»
my_fetch_facet(Obj, Att, grounds, Grounds),
my_fetch_facet(Obj, An, justification, Warrant),
gensym(sysarg,New Arg),
note«NewArg instance_of argument with
claim: (the Att of Obj is Val),
grounds:Grounds,
warrant: Warrant.
supports: Arg,
supported_by: 0»,
prove(all supported_by of Arg are OldSupports),
note«the supported_by of Arg is [NewArg I OldSupports])),
rest_sys_arg(NewArg, Grounds),
rest_sys_arg(Arg,Rest),I.
% unsupported ground
rest_sys_arg(Arg, [the Att of Obj is Val I Restl)»
gensym(sysarg,NewArg),
note«NewArg iRstance_of argument with
claim: (the Att of Obj is Val),
grounds: [],
warrant: none,
- 257-
Argument in the humanities: a knowledge-based approach Appendix I
supports: Arg,
supported_by: []),
prove(all supported_by of Arg are OldSupports),
nOle«the supported_by of Arg is [NewArg IOldSupports))),
rest_sys_arg(Arg,Rest).
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1* display argument-I trees "!
udisplay_tree(W,R):-
create_display_ window(W),
udisplay _itree(W ,R,0,O,O,O,140).
%% root
udisplay_itree(W ,R,O,O,O,O,Xval):-
my _fetch(R,claim ,Proposition),
my_fetch(R,warrant,Warrant),
my _fetch(R,supported_by,Supports),
display _prop(W ,Proposition ,0,0) ,
Yl is 80,
display_prop(W,warrant(Warrant) ,0 ,Y I),
line_it(W ,O,O,O,YI),
Y2 is 160,
udisplay_grounds(W,Supports,0,Yl,Q,Y2,Xval),I.
%% with supports
udisplay _itree(W ,R,OldX, OldY ,X,Y ,X val):-
my _fetch(R,claim,Proposition),
my _fetch(R, warrant,Warrant),
my_fetch(R,supported_by,Supports),not Supports = [],
display _prop(W ,Proposition,X,Y),
line_it(W ,OldX,OldY ,X, V),
YI is (Y + 80),
display_prop(W,warrant(Warrant),X,YI),
line_it(W,X,Y,X,Yl),
Y2 is (YI + 80),
udisplay _grounds(W,Supports,X, YI ,X, Y2,Xval),!.
%% no supports
udisplay _itree(W ,R,OldX,OldY ,X,Y ,Xval):-
my _fetch(R,claim,Proposition),
display _prop(W ,Proposition,X, Y),line_it(W ,OldX,OldY ,X,Y),!.
udisplay_grounds(W,[[]],OIdX,OldY,X,Y,Xval). %% this how the list is stored!!
udispIay_grounds(W,[GI I Rest),OldX, OldY,X,Y,Xval):-
NewXval is (Xval - 50),
udisplay _itree(W ,G I,OldX,OldY ,X,Y ,NewXval),
Xl is (X + Xval), YI is (y + 20),
udisplay _grounds(W ,Rest,OldX,OldY ,XI,YI,Xval),1.
display_prop(W,warrant(Warrant),X,Y):-
gensym(prop, Pic), gensym(text,Name),
draw _fancy _box_2(W ,Pic, Y,X),
draw_text_box_2(W,Name,Y,X,Warrant),I.
display_prop(W,the analogue of Obj is Val,X,Y):-
gensym(prop, Pie), gensym(text,Name), pname(the analogue of Obj is Val,Pl),
draw_fancy_box(W ,Pic, Y,X),
draw _text_box(W ,Name, Y ,X,Pl ),1.
display _prop(W ,P ,X, Y):-
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gensym(prop, Pic), gensym(text,Name), pnamecP,Pl),
draw_box(W ,Pic, Y,X),
draw_text_box{W ,Name,Y,X,P I).
draw_box(Window, Pic, Top, Left):-
add_pie(Window, Pic, box(Top, Left,50,l00».
draw_faney_box(Window, Pic, Top, Left):-
add_pie(Window, Pic, double(box(Top, Left,50,lOO,20,20»).
draw_faney_box_2(Window, Pic, Top, Left):-
add_pie(Window, Pic, double(box(Top, Left,50,lOO,50,50»).
line_it(W ,X,Y,X I,Yl):-
X2 is (X + 50), Y2 is (y + 50), X3 is (Xl + 50).
gensym(prop, Line),
draw_line(W, Line, Y2,X2,Yl,X3).
draw_line(Window, Name,Yl,Xl,Y2,X2):-
add_pie(Window,Name,lines([(Yl,Xl),(y2,X2)])).
draw_text(Window, Name,Y,X,Text):-
add_pie(Window,Name,text('Times',14,l,Y,X,Text».
draw_text_box(Window, Name,T ,L,Text):-
Tl is T + 5, Ll is L + 5,
add_pie(Window ,Name,textbox{'Times' ,9,O,Tl,L 1,40.90,0,Text».
draw_text_box_2(Window, Name,T ,L,Text):-
Tl is T + 10, Ll is L + 20,
add_pie(Window,Name,textbox('Times',10,8,Tl,Ll,30,70,O,Text».
ereate_display _window(Window):-
wgereate(Window,50,50,350,450,O,200,200, I ,I).
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1* code to find weak principle */
min_ valued_principle(B ,OutPr):-
findall([pr,S) ,findprinciple(B ,Pr,S),Prlist),
minlist(Prlist, [OutPr,MinSJ).
findprinciple(B,Pr,S):-
principle(backing_set: B,
name: Name,
type: Type,
claim: Pr,
grounds: Grounds,
strength: S).
maxlist([[KI ,Pr]] ,[Kl,Pr]).
maxlist([[Kl,Pr],[K2,Pr2] I Rest], Maxset):-
maxlist([[K2,Pr2] I Rest], MaxRest),
maxl([Kl,Pr], MaxRest, Maxset).
maxl([A,B],[C,D],[A,B]):-
B>=D.
maxl([A,B],[C,D],[C,DD:-
B<D.
minlist([[Kl,Pr ]],[Kl,Pr D.
minlist([[Kl,Pr],[K2,Pr2] I Rest], Minset):-
minlist([[K2,Pr2] IRest], MinRest),
minl([Kl,Pr], MinRest, Minset).
minl([A,B],[C,D],[A,BD:-
B=<D.
mini ([A,B],[C,D],[C,DD:-
B>D.
principle(backing_set: marxism,
name: marxistprinciplel,
type: explanatory,
claim: cause{class_divisions, conflict_ within_groups),
grounds: common_sense_J)rinciple_2,
strength: 7).
principle(backing_set: marxism,
name: marxist_J)rinciple_I,
type: explanatory,
claim: cause(power, show_of_J)restige),
grounds: common_sense_J)rinciple_3,
strength: 5).
principle(backing_set: historico _ecological,
name,-h_principle_l,
type: explanatory,
claim: cause(invasion, conflict withingroups),
grounds: common jsense principlej l ,
- 261-
Argument in the humanities: a knowledge-based approach Appendix I
strength: 8).
backing_for«the social_division of S is class ->
the social_climate of S is conflict_ within_groups),marxism).
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r- a simple form of Gentner's approach to analogy which depends on analogy rules in the KB ..,
get_artifact_atts(Artefact. Att_list):-
(Artefact instance_of _ with Body),
convert_to_list(Body.Att_list).
get_artifact_atts{sys.Artefact. AU_list):-
sys_belief«Artefact instance_of _ with Body».
convert_to_list(Body.Att_list}.
get_artifact_atts_s(Artefact. Att_list):-
(Artefact instance_of _ with Body).
convert_to_list_s(Body .Au_list).
get_artifact_atts_s(sys.Artefact. Att_list}:-
sys_belief«Artefact instance_of _ with Body».
convert_to_list_s(Body .Au_list).
convert_to_list(H:T.[H:T]).
convert_to_list«H.Rest).[HIRestlist]):-
convert_to_list(Rest.Restlist).
convert_to_list_s(H:T. [H]).
convert_to_list_s«H:T.Rest).[HIRestlist]):-
convert_to_list_s(Rest.Restlist).
has_attributes(Artefact.Artefact_list):-
get_artifact_aus(Artefact. Artefact_list).
has_attributes(Artefact.Artefact_list):-
get_artifact_atts(sys.Artefact. Artefact_list).
has_auributes_s(Artefact.Artefact_1ist):-
get_artifact_atts_s(sys.Artefact. Artefact_Iist).
has_attributes_s(Artefact.Artefact_list):-
get_artifact_atts_s(Artefact. Artefact_1ist).
has_second_order_attributes(Artefact. [AttIT]):-
get_artifact_atts(Artefact. Artefact_list).
has_second_order_attributes 1(Artefactjlst, [AttIT)).
has_second_order_attributes 1(Artefact.jist, [AttIT]):-
is_attribute_of_2(Att:[Attl.Atal. Artefact_list).
is_attribute_of(Attl. Artefact_list).
is_attribute_of(Ata. Artefact jist),
remove(Att: [Attl .Atal. Artefact_list.New _A_list). %% others??
has_second_order_attributesl(New_A_list • T).
has_second_order_attributesl (A. m.
is_attribute_of(Att. Artefact_list ):-
member(Att:_. Artefact_list}.
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is_attribute_of_2(Att, Artefact_list ):-
member(Att, Artefact_list).
same_atts([Att:_1 []),[Att:_I[]]).
same_atts([Att:_1 Restl],[Att:_1 Rest2]):-
same_atts(Restl, Rest2}.
same_atts_s(L 1,L2):-
Ll = L2; subset(Ll,L2);subset(L2,Ll).
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1* sys kb */
assert_sys_kb:-
assert(
sys_belief«
feature13 instance_of structure with
height: 2,
width: 2,
angle: 45,
use: hidepreparation,
analogue: unknownjj),
assert(
sys_belief«
featurelO instance_of structure with
height: 2.
width: 2.
angle: 45.
use: cooking.
analogue: unknown))).
retract_sys_kb: -
retractall(sys_belief(_».
1* user kb */
assert_user_kb:-
assert(
user_belief«the use of featurell is pot_making))).
retract_user_kb: -
retractall(user_beliefU)
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1* untested rejigkb */
rejig_kb:-
overall_assess(Val) ,
deal_with_assessment(Val).
deal_with_assessment(,neither wins'):-
nl('ASPA dialogue'),nl(' ASPA dialogue'),
write('ASPA dialogue'. ' NEITHER SIDE WINS - no changes to kbs...'),
wfront('ASPA dialogue').
deal_ with_assessment('system wins'):-
nl(,ASPA dialogue'),nl('ASPA dialogue'),
write(,ASPA dialogue', ' ASPA WINS - changing user kb...'),
wfront('ASPA dialogue').
deal_with_assessment('user wins'):-
nl(,ASPA dialogue'),nl('ASPA dialogue'),
write('ASPA dialogue', ' USERWINS - changing system kb...'),
wfront('ASPA dialogue'),
current_user_root(R),
my_fetch(R, response_type.Rtype),
deal_with_rtype(Rtype).
deal_with_rtype(rattack sys claim']):-
previous_sys_root(R).
my_fetch(R. warrant. W),
devalue(W).
dea1_with_rtype(['attack sys ground']):-
previous_sys_root(RO).
current_user_root(Rl).
actually_attacks(Rl.RO,G),
devalue(G).
deal_with_rtype([,defend user claim']). % no change
dea1_with_rtype(['defend user ground']). % no change
actually _attacks(A,Arg,G):-
ground_of(Arg.G).
my_fetch(A,claim,C),
contradicts(C.G).
devalue(Obj):-
my_fetch(Obj, strength_of_belief,S),
NewS is (S - 10),
note(the strength_of_belief of Obj is NewS).
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Appendix 11·The Early Bronze Age 'Wessex' culture
The Early Bronze Age (EBA) 'Wessex' culture of central southern England owes its
definition to Piggot's 1938 paper. For the purposes of this appendix the EBA is taken
to extend from about 1700BC to 1200BC. The Wessex culture is taken to last from
about 1550BC to 1400BC. There has always been controversy as to whether the
culture identified by Piggot represents a grouping of real people in the area at the time
or whether what he described was an artefact of a particular kind of archaeological
analysis. This is not our concern here. I will briefly talk about the culture and then go
on to describe the argument I am concerned to simulate: i.e. that surrounding the
reasons for the rise of a particular social organization in Wessex at this time.
Piggott defines the classic Wessex culture in terms of the 'presence in grave-
groups of certain objects which are either intrinsically early or of peculiarly Wessex
types'. These objects are given in the paper as follows:
1. Bronze daggers having midribs and/or lateral grooves;
2. Certain pottery forms, notably the incense cups of the well-known 'Grape Cup'
and 'Aldboume Cup' types;
3. Beads of blue faience, now established as of Egyptian origin;
4. Gold ornaments (of Irish origin);
5. Amber beads and pendants;
6. Stone battle-axes of the Snowshill type;
7. Certain pins of germanic types, and perhaps the flanged axes.
More recently a two-fold division of the Wessex culture (derived from ApSimon)
has been accepted. The following (based on Megaw and Simpson, 1979) gives the
main characterising features:
Wessex I
• Armorico-British A and B type daggers. These have triangular shaped blades,
residual tangs and six rivets. At Bush Barrow in the Wilsford barrow cemetery
near Stonehenge a dagger of this type was had a pommel decorated by means of
'thousands of tiny lengths of gold wire... arranged in a chevron pattern'.
• Gold ornaments. These include a gold plate lozenge with geometric design (c.
15cm across), a small lozenge of similar design and a gold 'belt hook' (all from
Bush Barrow). Other similar objects are known from Clandon in Dorset and gold
button covers, gold bound amber discs and a gold armlet are known from other
barrows in the the Wilsford cemetery. Other similar gold objects are known from
Little Cressingham in Norfolk. It has been argued that all of this goldwork is the
work of a single craftsman or workshop.
• Inhumation burials usually in pits but sometimes on the land surface covered by
bowl, bell, disc, saucer or pond barrow types arranged in barrow cemeteries.
• Maceheads are known from Clandon and Bush Barrows.
• Shaft-hole battle-axes are known from Wilsford G58 and Windmill Hill in Wilts.
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• Halberd pendants (but not actual halberds) are known from Hengistbury Head in
Hampshire, Manton near Marlborough and Wilsford 08.
• Amber jewelry is known from Upton Lovell 02 (the 'Golden Barrow').
• The only pottery known is the so-called 'grape' cups. These are small vessels
decorated with round pellets of clay and are known from Manton and Wilsford 058.
Wessex II
• Camerton-Snowhill daggers predominate. These are ogival daggers with
thickened midribs and parallel grooves on either side, frequently decorated with a
dotted pattern. The hilt is normally attached with three rivets. These are known
from Wilsford 023 and Wilsford 056.
• Whetstones perforated for attaching to the belt of the owner are known from
Wilsford 023.
• Metal pins with crutch. ring or globe heads.
• Faience beads are common. The commonest form in Wessex is the segmented
type but ring. disc and star shaped forms exist.
• The grape cups are replaced by the bipartite vessels known as Aldbourne cups.
These vessels have a vertical body. flared neck and are frequently perforated.
They are decorated with geometric chevron and lozenge designs.
• Metal hoards are known from Arreton Down. Westbury-on- Trim and Plymstock.
• Cremation is the dominant burial rite with the remains sometimes placed in a
collared urn.
Piggot himself is the originator of one point of view in our discussion. While he
suggests that the Wessex culture forms an important node in a network of trade
stretching from Ireland to Central Europe and the Mediterranean. he stresses that the
origins of the culture 'represents an actual immigration' from Britanny. These
immigrants brought with them (apart from the daggers) a new burial rite in cremation
and the associated bell and disc barrows (often in barrow 'cemeteries'). Since Piggott
recognises a parallel burial tradition in the 'cinerary urns' he suggests that the
invaders became 'a dominant and intrusive aristocracy who for some centuries at least
lorded it over the native element'.
The notion of an invasion from Britanny and hence of an 'intrusive' aristocracy has
been rejected by Orahame Clarke (1966). He suggests that both the burial rite and
the practice of barrow-building can be traced to earlier local traditions. He also
suggests that it is not unlikely that when individuals accumulate wealth and power
through the extensive trade (or exchange) networks which must have existed they
will show an interest in novel and valuable artefacts.
Grahame Clarke goes on to suggest that it seems to be a 'basic methodological
error ... to categorize a hundred or so rich burials as though these constituted a culture.'
At best the Wessex culture may only represent the burial practices of the better off
members of the central southern England region. Concentration on this 'culture' tends
to obscure the fact that others in the same area and outside were making do with less
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showy burials. At the same time others outside the region were as spendthrift with
their wealth. Nonetheless, the rich burials which cluster in the Wessex area
represent the most developed and intensive displays of individual wealth and
presumably power in the EBA. Thus, while they are not representative of the
situation as a whole in the British Isles they do represent a cultural expression which
both allows comparison with similar developments in Europe and the Eastern
Mediterranean and provides a clear instance of the stratified nature of the society
which was beginning to evolve in the EBA.
Our second point of view can be represented as socially oriented and internal. It
derives ultimately from an marxist analysis of cultural change. I have not made use of
the views of any particular archaeologist but the temper of this view is similar to that
held by Clarke, Cowie and Foxon (1985). They suggest that the new material comes
about as a result of the leaders of society in Wessex having become part of 'an
interregional network of contacts between widespread European groups' and that,
further, the particular expressions of the powerful individuals in Wessex were
selected and modified from the range of possible symbols available. They also
suggest that the power of these individuals came about through their control of the
important cult centres at Stonehenge. Thus, they would argue, change comes about as
the result of internal tensions rather than external divisions.
Whatever the truth of this particular dispute it offers a good example of two
divergent views which are ultimately derived from contrasting models of social change:
invasion and internal tensions. For what it's worth, I tend towards the latter view.
There are good reasons for thinking that the so-called Wessex culture only represents
the activities of a small group of aristocrats. Thus we do not have a whole-scale
invasion. Of course we could have a situation analogous to the Norman Invasion
where the Anglo-Saxon population was dominated by a relatively small group of
militaristic Normans. There are reasons to suppose that the culture derives from
indigenous traditions. Thus we are left with the need to explain how this change
arose in society. Even if there were no contrary evidence, there are also good reasons
for thinking that the particular model adopted by earlier archaeologists (the invasion
model) derives as much from the contemporary uncertainties of pre-war Europe as
from an objective consideration of the evidence.
It is important to note that as with the hermeneutic circle mentioned in chapter 4
the models are used as a means of interpreting the data. At the same time, to the
extent that the data is satisfactorily interpreted (and thus anomalies are explained),
the model itself is reinforced and can serve as a more secure grounding for future
interpretations of sites of the period.
It is also important to note that the 'anomaly' of the social changes in Wessex
depends on a prior interpretation of the changes in the artefacts, burial practices and
so on as a social change. This is of course uncertain like any other interpretation. The
explanation of this phenomenon might well turn out to be an explanation for a non-
existent phenomena.
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Appendix III - Macintosh TM screen snapshots
for example 1(a) in chapter6
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Appendix IV - Results of assessment
algorithm Oil examples 1·3
The following table shows the results obtained by running the assessment
algorithm discussed in chapter 6 on examples 1-3. I leave it to the reader to gauge
the success or otherwise of this algorithm as shown by these results.
exarrple user system winner
1 (a) 7 22 system
1 (b) 7 22 system
2 11 20 system
3 17 20 system
Table A.1 - The results of the assessment algorithm
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